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This study on “The Enabling Environment for Social Accountability in Mongolia” is part of a continuing 
effort by the Social Development Department to promote governance and effectiveness of development 
programs in the Bank’s partner countries through civic engagement and social accountability. It builds on 
important research by the World Bank, other foreign donors, and civil society organizations (CSOs) on 
the activities of CSOs in Mongolia, recognizing their important role in the country’s transition from a 
centrally governed socialist state to a modern democracy with a free market economy. The unique feature 
of this study is its focus on social accountability and the conditions influencing its success and failure. It 
presents a number of important findings and offers recommendations for policy, institutional, legal, and 
regulatory reforms; and for capacity enhancement.  
 
The study, which was carried out from February to June 2005, used an analytical framework that focused 
on the key enabling elements of civic engagement: Association, Resources, Voice, Information, and 
Negotiation (ARVIN). Emphasis was placed on Voice, Information, and Negotiation as particularly 
important to social accountability efforts. The research employed both quantitative and qualitative 
methods. Interviews and focus groups were conducted with a wide range of actors from the Mongolian 
Government, CSOs, media, parliamentarians, religious groups, international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs), and foreign donors in Ulaanbaatar and Uvorkhangai. This was complemented by 
an extensive literature review of government policies and legislation; activities of CSOs, donors, and 
media; and an examination of the larger legal, political, and socioeconomic milieu. A survey of CSOs and 
a national opinion poll contributed critical information on the conditions the conditions that promote 
social accountability by government institutions; the capacity of societal actors for Voice, Information, 
and Negotiation; and popular views about accountability and the performance of government institutions. 
Four case studies provide illustrations of social accountability practices, opportunities, and constraints. 
Given the importance of the media to social accountability, the report also provides an overview of the 
media in Mongolia. 
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Governmental accountability has become an increasing focus of attention by the World Bank and other 
international donors in their development policies, strategies, and programs. Efforts to promote 
accountability have traditionally focused on improving horizontal accountability between governmental 
actors and institutions, that is, the “supply-side” of governance. Recently, however, the “demand side” of 
governance, including but not limited to the electoral process, has received greater attention. This vertical 
form of social accountability is based on civic engagement as a means to promote transparency and 
responsiveness in public policy making and implementation and is increasingly regarded as vital for good 
governance. Moreover, social accountability empowers citizens, especially poor citizens, and promotes 
inclusive and accountable institutions that can enhance the political legitimacy and stability of a 
government and strengthen social cohesion. 
 
Social accountability refers to a range of mechanisms that citizens can use to hold public officials to 
account, and actions on the part of government, civil society, media, and other societal actors that 
promote these efforts.1 While conventional ways of holding governments accountable have included such 
actions as public protests, advocacy campaigns, and investigative journalism, there is growing attention to 
social accountability practices such as participatory budgeting, public expenditure tracking, and citizen 
monitoring of public service delivery, which emphasize a solid evidence base and direct negotiation 
between citizens and government representatives.  
 
The role of civil society actors in promoting social accountability is particularly relevant to Mongolia 
because of the emphasis the Government of Mongolia (GoM) and its development partners place on good 
governance to enhance social and economic development. Social accountability mechanisms that 
strengthen links between the state and citizens form a critical foundation for Mongolia’s ongoing effort to 
develop democratic institutions that enable economic growth and human development. These mechanisms 
are important for limiting corruption, a problem all stakeholders acknowledge as a mounting challenge in 
Mongolia. Given the sociopolitical legacies of the socialist regime that reinforce top-down approaches to 
governance, one of the greatest challenges to achieving Mongolia’s economic and social development is 
enhancing the important role that citizens and their organizations can play in promoting government 
accountability. 
 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is: 1) to analyze conditions that influence the ability of citizens and 
their organizations to promote accountability of public institutions in Mongolia; 2) to identify priority 
areas for policy, legal, regulatory, and institutional reforms to improve these conditions; and 3) to identify 
areas in which the capacity building of civil society organizations and the Government of Mongolia may 
be promoted to enhance social accountability for improved governance, social and economic 
development, and poverty reduction. 
 
Despite numerous studies on related topics of governance, development, and civil society in Mongolia, 
many of which are cited in this document, few have considered and none have focused on issues related 
to social accountability.2 The study applies a civic engagement analytical framework to assess the 
enabling environment: the factors and conditions that would allow CSOs to promote public 
accountability. This framework, represented by the acronym ARVIN, recognizes five enabling elements 
                                                          
1 Although the focus of this paper is public sector accountability, social accountability also applies to society’s actions in exacting 
accountability from private sector institutions and even CSOs. 
2 A notable exception is the recent World Bank study on Mongolian Civil Society Organizations by Chris Finch (2005), which 
provides critical background information to this document. 
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of civic engagement, namely, the ability of citizens to: Associate to further their purposes; mobilize 
appropriate Resources; exercise their Voice; gain access to Information that is relevant, timely, and 
accessible; and Negotiate with government through established mechanisms and rules of engagement. 
While acknowledging the important issues related to Association and Resources, this study focuses on 
Voice, Information, and Negotiation to shed light on the factors that contribute to and detract from civic 
engagement for social accountability. 
 
The study draws on both qualitative and quantitative methods to ensure both breadth and depth. These 
include interviews, focus groups, a CSO Survey (annex 6), an opinion poll (annex 7), and an extensive 
literature review. The study’s methodology also includes four case studies (annexes 1-4) that provide 
insight into key issues related to civic engagement and social accountability, including: legal advocacy 
(National Center Against Violence); local governance (Women for Social Progress–Uvorkhangai); natural 
resource management (Ongi River Movement); and public service delivery (School Councils). Given the 
importance of the media to social accountability, the study also includes an overview of the media (annex 
5). The research for this study was conducted in three stages: the assessment mission in Mongolia in 
February 2005; the field research mission in April/May 2005; and the dissemination mission in 
February/March 2006. During each of those phases, the team met with government officials, civil society 
leaders, media workers, parliamentarians, and representatives from INGOs, and foreign donors (see 
Stakeholders’ Map, annex 8).  
 
Considering Mongolia’s recent democratic transition, there is an impressive array of social accountability 
approaches currently in use by civil society, foreign donors, and, to a lesser extent, government. For 
example, various methods were used by the CSOs in the detailed case studies for this report, such as 
legislative advocacy, public expenditure monitoring, petitioning of public officials for access to 
information, public demonstrations, and direct negotiation with government agencies. Other examples of 
social accountability mechanisms include community score cards that are part of the World Bank-
supported Local Initiatives Fund, and the Public Service Reform Project, which uses citizen report cards 
to monitor the health sector. 
 
While there are many sociocultural, political, and economic constraints on social accountability in 
Mongolia, the major findings of the study focus on actionable recommendations for the client as well as 
for other stakeholders. The recommendations are tied to the enabling factors of Voice, Information, and 
Negotiation and to the overall capacity of CSOs as summarized in the Conclusion. The study 
recommends the revision of critical legal codes affecting CSOs with regards to anticorruption, taxation, 
and the Non-Profit Law. It also proposes actions to increase CSO financial resources, which are limited 
and precarious, and capacity building measures to promote organizations outside of Ulaanbaatar, 
strengthen umbrella organizations, and enhance CSO involvement in and public knowledge of social 
accountability initiatives.  
 
To promote civil society’s Voice in the pursuit of social accountability, the study recommends the reform 
of Mongolian laws regulating defamation, media registration, and broadcast licensing. Since all 
stakeholders recognize that implementation is a greater obstacle than the legal code itself, the study also 
recommends various institutional reforms and capacity-building measures to ensure the implementation 
of these reforms as well as existing codes that guarantee freedom of expression. These include a civic 
education program to inform citizens of their rights through public service announcements and culturally 
appropriate community theater projects.  
 
A number of recommendations related to Voice as well as Information focus on the need to improve the 
quality of the media to ensure freedom of expression and citizens’ right to reliable information and 
enhance public interest broadcasting. Among the proposals for institutional reforms is capacity building 
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of public radio and television, which is currently threatened by funding cuts and politicization of its 
governing board. 
 
As access to Information is crucial to social accountability, the study recommends not only the adoption 
of an Access to Information Law, which is currently on the parliament’s agenda, but also the amendment 
of the Law on State Secrets as it reinforces a culture of secrecy. Reform of Mongolia’s culture of secrecy 
will require significant leadership by senior officials, extensive training of civil servants and civic 
education programs, as well as vigilant monitoring by CSOs. Moreover, given the costs of independent 
research, the study recommends that CSOs, with start-up support from the international community, 
expand their provision of alternative sources of information and collaborate with the GoM in both 
gathering and analyzing relevant data to promote social accountability. 
 
Finally, the study recommends greater knowledge, use, and expansion of current mechanisms and forums 
for Negotiation with public officials. Community Scorecards, for example, could be incorporated into the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Project to increase the scope for citizen monitoring, assessment, and eventually 
negotiations to improve the program. While international donors should support CSO efforts to form 
liaisons with public officials and other stakeholders, the study recommends that public officials should 
create formal mechanisms to encourage civil society and citizen input into the legislative and policy-
making process and provide increased opportunities for regular dialogue and networking (for example, a 
CSO council to the Prime Minister). 
 
The study concludes that while impressive strides have been made since the transition from socialism, 
particularly in comparison with other governments in the region, Mongolia continues to face significant 
institutional, legal, and sociopolitical obstacles to effective social accountability. Since middle- and 
lower-level public officials are often more resistant to civic engagement, GoM and political leaders must 
lead reform not only of the legal structure and governmental institutions but also of Mongolia’s political 




Part I. Introduction 
 
1.1 DEFINITION AND IMPORTANCE OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Accountability of public officials is the cornerstone of good government and a prerequisite for an 
effective democracy. The World Bank and other international donors are paying increasing attention to 
accountability and transparency of public institutions in their development policies, strategies, and 
programs. Efforts to enhance government accountability have concentrated on improving so-called 
“horizontal” mechanisms of accountability between governmental actors and institutions. These include: 
1) political mechanisms such as constitutional constraints, separation of powers, the legislature, and 
legislative investigative commissions; 2) fiscal instruments such as formal systems of auditing and 
financial accounting; 3) administrative mechanisms such as hierarchical reporting, norms of public sector 
probity, public service codes of conduct, and rules and procedures regarding transparency and public 
oversight, and 4) legal mechanisms such as corruption control agencies, ombudsmen, and the judiciary 
(Goetz and Gaventa 2001). 
 
Recently, efforts to improve governance have focused on the “vertical” mechanisms of accountability to 
encourage the participation of citizens, especially impoverished citizens, in promoting accountability and 
responsiveness among public officials and service providers. Such forms of accountability, commonly 
referred to as social accountability, promote transparency and responsiveness in public policy making and 
implementation and are increasingly regarded as an important means to improve governance and develop 
effectiveness.3 While this approach to accountability empowers citizens,4 it can also promote inclusive 
and accountable institutions and enhance the political legitimacy and stability of a government, thereby 
strengthening social cohesion and capacity for socioeconomic development.5  
 
Social accountability, as used in this study, refers to 1) the broad range of actions and mechanisms, 
including but not limited to voting, that citizens can use to hold public officials to account, as well as 2) 
actions on the part of government, civil society, media, and other societal actors that promote or facilitate 
these efforts. Traditionally, citizen or civil society-led efforts to hold public officials accountable have 
included actions such as public demonstrations, protests, advocacy campaigns, investigative journalism, 
and public interest lawsuits. In more recent years, the expanded use of participatory data collection and 
analysis tools, combined with enhanced opportunities for civic engagement with the state, have led to a 
new generation of social accountability practices that emphasize a solid evidence base for direct dialogue 
and negotiation with public officials.6 These include participatory public policy making, participatory 
budgeting, public expenditure tracking, and citizen monitoring and evaluation of public service delivery. 
They also include efforts to enhance citizen knowledge and use of conventional mechanisms of 
accountability through public education about legal rights and services; and efforts to improve the 
effectiveness of “internal” accountability mechanisms through activities such as citizen involvement in 
public commissions and hearings, citizen advisory boards and oversight committees (Malena 2005). 
                                                          
3 John Ackerman defines social accountability as “society’s role in improving government accountability” (Ackerman 2004a). On 
the conceptualization of social accountability and its applicability to economic and political development, see also Dennis Arroyo 
(2004) and Carmen Malena, et al. (2004). 
4 The World Development Report 2001(World Bank 2001d) and the World Bank’s empowerment framework, Empowerment and 
Poverty Reduction, A Sourcebook (World Bank 2002a) also recognize accountability as an integral component of empowerment. 
5 Inclusion, cohesion, and accountability are the three principles prioritized in the World Bank’s Social Development Strategy 
(2005b).   
6 A well-cited example of this is the “citizen report card” survey pioneered by the Public Affairs Center in Bangalore (India) that 
assesses the quality and effectiveness of public services in the city. 
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1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is: 1) to analyze the conditions that influence the ability of citizens and their 
organizations to promote accountability; 2) to identify priority areas for policy, legal, regulatory, and 
institutional reforms to improve these conditions; and 3) to identify areas in which capacity building of 
civil society organizations and the Government of Mongolia may be promoted to enhance social 
accountability for improved governance, social and economic development, and poverty reduction.  
 
The role of civil society actors in promoting social accountability is particularly relevant to Mongolia 
because of the emphasis the GoM and its development partners place on good governance to enhance 
social and economic development. Social accountability mechanisms —which strengthen links between 
the state and citizens—form a critical foundation for Mongolia’s ongoing effort to develop effective and 
accountable democratic institutions. These accountability mechanisms check corruption—increasingly 
acknowledged by all stakeholders7 as a challenge in Mongolia. Furthermore, both public governance and 
civic engagement are constrained by sociopolitical legacies of the socialist regime that accustomed 
Mongolians to a top-down approach to governance and ensured their passive acquiescence to the state. 
Consequently, one of the greatest challenges to the consolidation of Mongolia’s transition to an open 
political and economic system is that public officials and citizens must gain a greater understanding of the 
role of citizens in promoting social accountability, as well as the knowledge to effectively incorporate 
citizen contributions into governance and development. 
 
Finally, a 2003 Client Survey conducted by the World Bank in Mongolia indicated “that there are two 
areas where the Bank is seen less positively, and may want to explore in further detail: building capacity 
at (the) community level and including local communities and civil society in strategy development” 
(World Bank 2003b:34). This analysis of the enabling environment for civil society participation in social 
accountability responds to both of these concerns. 
 
1.3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR CIVIL SOCIETY’S 
PARTICIPATION IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Broadly defined, social accountability is the pursuit of accountability of public institutions, the private 
sector, or even CSOs to societal actors. Social accountability mechanisms may be initiated or promoted 
by the state, international agencies, or individual citizens. To be effective, however, social accountability 
requires the sustained participation of a strong, vibrant, and autonomous civil society that is active in 
social, economic, and political governance issues.8 The participation of both civil society actors and 
ordinary citizens is commonly referred to as civic engagement. 
 
This study focuses on civil society organizations (CSOs) rather than individual citizens because CSOs 
generally have greater access to resources and represent many citizens who may be seen as a significant 
voting bloc; thus, they are better placed to promote social accountability. A frequent critique of studies on 
civil society is that they focus on formally organized and officially recognized NGOs. This study goes 
                                                          
7 See Sant Maral Foundation 2005; UNDP 2000; Zorig Foundation 2004. 
8 Although there are many actors in the private sector who may hold a government accountable, such as influential 
business leaders, this study focused on the role of civil society actors in promoting social accountability. Only when 
business leaders have banded together to form a CSO, such as through business associations, would their activities 
come within the parameters of this study. 
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further and recognizes other types of civil society actors, in particular informal and religious groups. 
However, while the study is informed by interviews with several Buddhist leaders, as well as by 
secondary literature on the role of religion in Mongolian society, the team found little evidence of 
informal civil society actors involved in civic engagement and social accountability, other than the 
anticorruption movement Healthy Society and several nascent environmental movements.9 Despite these 
findings and a general lack of secondary sources on civil society organizations other than NGOs, it is 
acknowledged that additional research may reveal the less visible participation of informal CSOs and 
other societal actors in civic engagement and social accountability.10 
 
Given Mongolia’s recent democratic transition, the study found a diversity of social accountability 
mechanisms in use by civil society, foreign donors, and, to a lesser extent, the government. For example, 
various methods used by the CSOs are the subject of detailed case studies for this report. These include 
legislative advocacy by the National Council Against Violence (annex 1); public expenditure monitoring 
by the Women for Social Progress-Uvorkhangai (annex 2); petitions to public officials on issues of public 
interest by the Ongi River Movement (annex 3); and public demonstrations, direct negotiation with 
government, and information campaigns by all three CSOs. Other examples of social accountability 
mechanisms include interactive radio talk shows that host public officials; community scorecards, which 
are a part of the Bank-supported Local Initiatives Fund; and the Public Service Reform Project, which is 
using citizen report cards to monitor the health sector.  
 
Most of these efforts have been undertaken by conventional NGOs, often with support from foreign 
donors, including international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) like the Asia Foundation, the 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the Open Society, as well as bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. 
There is also encouraging evidence of interest in social accountability at different levels and branches of 
government. For example, the Ministry of Finance’s Poverty Reduction Group, in collaboration with the 
World Bank, organized a workshop in February 2005, to introduce social accountability concepts and 
tools. The audience was diverse, with mid-level officials from the finance, health, education, and social 
welfare ministries, the state audit agency, the public reform project, and several CSO leaders.  
 
To analyze the successes and failures of social accountability mechanisms, this study applies a civic 
engagement analytical framework to assess the enabling environment: the components that would permit 
CSOs to promote public accountability. Within this framework, there are five enabling elements, the 
ability of citizens to: Associate to further their purposes; mobilize appropriate Resources; exercise their 
Voice; gain access to Information that is relevant, timely, and accessible; and Negotiate with public 
officials through established mechanisms and rules of engagement. These elements, represented by the 
acronym ARVIN, informed the research for this study, exploring factors that contribute to and detract 
from effective civic engagement for social accountability (civic engagement/social accountability). 
 
After the initial assessment mission, the team decided to concentrate on only three aspects of ARVIN. 
Association appeared to be straightforward and did not warrant an exhaustive analysis; whereas issues 
related to Resources were too complex to be fully researched and analyzed in the restricted time. 
Association-related issues are, nonetheless, discussed in part II, the overview of Mongolian civil society, 
                                                          
9 The movement’s name, Eruul Niigmiin Hudulguun is varyingly translated as either Just or Healthy Society. 
10 The preliminary CIVICUS report identified 10 different elements in Mongolian civil society, including: NGOs, 
trade unions, religious organizations, the chamber of commerce, apartment owners’ unions, savings and credit 
cooperatives, nonprofit media, private sector philanthropy, and informal self-help health and leisure or community 
groups. All of these were analyzed in this report, although not classified in the same manner or given the same 
attention. The CIVICUS report also included political parties in its definition of civil society, whereas parties are 
defined here as a part of political society that are nonetheless implicated in social accountability both as an object of 
and potential proponent of civic engagement. 
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and Resources-related issues are discussed in various parts of this study, although not as thoroughly as the 
issues related to Voice, Information, and Negotiation, analyzed in part III. 
 
Since the elements of ARVIN are influenced by factors that are both external and internal to civil society, 
the impact of these factors is briefly outlined in part II. The analytical framework identifies four principal 
external factors: the legal and regulatory framework, political factors (including governance), economic 
issues, and sociocultural characteristics. Internal factors that influence civic engagement/social 
accountability are grouped into three analytical categories: capital (financial, human, and physical), 
internal governance, and accountability relationships between CSOs and their constituencies. 
 
1.4 DESCRIPTION OF METHODOLOGY 
 
The study draws on both qualitative and quantitative methods to ensure both breadth and depth. The study 
was conducted in three stages: the assessment mission in Mongolia in February 2005, the field research 
mission in April/May 2005, and the dissemination mission in February-March 2006. During each of those 
phases, the team met with government officials, civil society leaders, media workers, parliamentarians, 
and representatives from INGOs and foreign donors (see Stakeholders’ Map, annex 8). The study team set 
up interviews and focus groups to gain insights into the stakeholders’ views on and participation in civic 
engagement and social accountability. These also provided the team with extensive documentation on 
government policies and legislation, the mission and activities of CSOs, and the role of media and 
international actors in supporting civic engagement/social accountability, as well as the legal, political, 
institutional, and socioeconomic climate in which they operate.11 The team also reviewed vast secondary 
sources before and after each mission (see Bibliography). The analysis from these various publications 
added to the body of information available to the team. 
 
While the focus groups permitted meetings with more stakeholders in a relatively short time, they also 
permitted the team to observe the dynamics among them and their level of consensus on key issues 
related to civic engagement and social accountability. Moreover, the six focus groups with CSO leaders 
permitted follow-up on issues that came out of the CSO Survey and offered an opportunity to pose 
broader, more open-ended questions (see Survey of CSOs, annex 6). Participants in the CSO focus groups 
were selected from among the survey respondents, who fell into two categories: a sample of randomly 
selected NGOs registered with the Ministry of Justice (35) and a list of “active” CSOs (61), identified in 
consultation with several different NGOs, INGOs, and members of the donor community.12 The CSO 
focus groups were held simultaneously. Plenary sessions were conducted before and after the focus 
groups to present survey findings of the CSO survey and discuss both the key issues and 
recommendations that participants identified as critical to the enhancement of civic engagement/social 
accountability. 
 
In addition to basic demographic information and general questions regarding their involvement in civic 
engagement and social accountability, the CSO survey specifically probed key issues of involvement in 
social accountability, as well as the enabling environment for voice, information and negotiation as well 
                                                          
11 Outside of direct personal requests for documentation, it was surprisingly difficult to gain access to reports on various issues 
related to the study. An exception to the rule was the impressive Web site maintained by the Open Society Forum, which has a 
wealth of information. 
12 The difficulties encountered while conducting the random sample of registered NGOs, including difficulties in ascertaining the 
list from the ministry and locating selected NGOs, are indicative of a number of issues discussed in this report. 
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as resources.13 The quantitative component of the research methods was a national opinion poll on the 
performance of the government and general knowledge about and opinions on the role of CSOs in 
enhancing the performance and conduct of public officials, that is, social accountability (see annex 7).14  
 
As mentioned above, the study’s methodology also included four case studies that were selected to 
provide greater depth and insight into key issues related to civic engagement/social accountability and the 
World Bank’s mission. These experiences offer concrete illustrations of the benefits of and obstacles to 
civic engagement/social accountability (see annexes 1-4). Another component in the study’s methodology 
is an overview of the vital role of the media in expanding social accountability practices (see annex 5). 
 
The final component of the study was a dissemination mission that involved both bilateral interviews with 
various stakeholders and another CSO forum. Before the meetings, stakeholders were provided a 
summary of the studies findings and recommendations so they could provide informed responses and 
detailed feedback. The analysis presented here reflects their comments and suggestions. 
                                                          
13 Although several NGOs in Uvorkhangai responded to our questionnaire, the overwhelming majority of respondents to the CSO 
survey (93 percent) were based in Ulaanbaatar. This is a reflection of a UB-bias among active CSOs discussed in part II, and a 
bias toward those registered with the MoJHA. 
14 The CSO survey was conducted by TAF, whereas the opinion poll was contracted to a Mongolian NGO, Sant Maral, which has 
extensive expertise in conducting nationwide polls. 
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PART II. Key Aspects of the Mongolian Country Context15 
 
 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF MONGOLIA’S POLITICAL,  
ECONOMIC, LEGAL, AND SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT  
 
Since 1990, Mongolia has undergone a rapid economic and political transition from being an authoritarian 
socialist regime with a centrally planned economy to a democracy with a market-based economy. 
However, corruption in key sectors has undermined its economic performance and political reforms. In 
addition, economic and environmental factors, combined with relaxation in state control of internal 
migration, have contributed to a dramatic increase in urban migration, particularly to the capital city, 
which now constitutes approximately half of the Mongolian population. Although Mongolia’s legal 
regime is relatively conducive to civic engagement and social accountability, there remain problematic 
areas within its legal and regulatory codes as well as inefficiencies in implementation, some resulting 
from Mongolia’s socialist legacy. 
 
2.1.1 Political Institutions 
Mongolia fares well across several governance indicators. At a global as well as regional level, World 
Bank indicators suggest that Mongolia has above-average levels of political stability; slightly above-
average levels of voice, accountability and rule of law; though only average levels of government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and corruption control (Kaufman 2003). Moreover, the annual Freedom 
House survey ranking political freedom and civil liberties in countries throughout the world, classifies 
Mongolia as “free.” Mongolians currently enjoy most civil and political freedoms: dissenting views are 
regularly expressed and tolerated, and government intervention is largely absent from everyday personal 
life (Freedom House 2005). The indicator on which Mongolia is comparatively weak is the Corruption 
Perception Index of Transparency International, which currently ranks Mongolia eighty-fifth out of 147 
countries, on par with Romania and the Dominican Republic (Transparency International 2005). 
 
Since its initial transition, the country has moved toward the establishment of democratic laws and 
institutions. The 1992 Constitution created a semi-parliamentary system with a unicameral parliament and 
a prime minister-led dual executive branch. The president exercises little power other than an advisory 
veto over legislation. Nonetheless, this provision has resulted in revisions to pending legislation in recent 
years such as the public broadcast law adopted in 2005 (see part 3.2 and annex 5 on the media). In 
addition to the dual executive, the Mongolian Constitution promotes a balance of power among the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. The Constitution also recognizes the 
“supreme objective of building a humane, civil, and democratic society in the country,” and explicitly 
guarantees basic civil rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, and association, as well as the 
right to own property.16 
 
Following the transition to a multiparty democracy in 1992, Mongolia has held relatively free and fair 
elections regularly, with several peaceful transfers of political power between parties. However, 
according to a preliminary draft of the CIVICUS report on civil society in Mongolia (2006), “the 2004 
                                                          
15 The overview of the country context and Mongolian civil society draws heavily on two academic sources (Kaplonski 2004 and 
Rossabi 2005) and the preliminary CIVICUS report (2006), as well as several reports by the international donor community. See 
inter alia reports by Asian Development Bank (2004a), UNDP (2000), and the World Bank (2003b, 2005a). 
16 Mongolian political and economic institutions have weathered recent changes in land tenure laws that initially created a great 
deal of popular dissatisfaction and political instability. 
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parliamentary elections demonstrated an alarming trend of increasing corruption of election management 
and campaign practices at all levels,” including voter list manipulation and the misuse of public servants 
and state property by the ruling party. According to the report, some of these practices were repeated 
during the 2005 presidential election. 
 
While researchers have emphasized Mongolia’s exceptional success in consolidating its democratic 
transition (Fish 1998 and 2001; Fritz 2002), an opinion poll conducted for the study by Mongolian NGO, 
Sant Maral, in May 2005 shows that there is growing concern about the political situation. Nearly half the 
respondents indicated that the current political situation in Mongolia is bad or very bad, with another 39 
percent describing it as mixed (see figure 2.1.1).17  
 
















Source: Opinion Poll (Annex 7, Question B). 
 
These popular attitudes are largely a reflection of what the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) describes as 
the current “volatile” political scene in Mongolia (EIU March 2006). Following the 2004 parliamentary 
elections, opposition parties and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP)—the socialist party 
that ruled Mongolia for most of the twentieth century— formed a coalition. The coalition collapsed later 
that year, leading some members of parliament (MPs) from the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP), 
Mongolia’s largest opposition party, to “cross over” to the MPRP parliamentary group. This new 
coalition governed until January 2006 when the MPRP withdrew its support and, in February 2006, 
formed a new government with several smaller parties. Since then the MDP and the Civil Will Party have 
been attempting to create a “shadow government.”18 
 
Leadership struggles within both the MDP and the MPRP have intensified the volatility of the political 
environment and reinforced popular perception of Mongolia’s political parties as institutionally weak. An 
opinion poll conducted in May 2005 (see figure 2.1.2) and various other independent polls conducted by 
                                                          
17 Subsequent independent polling by Sant Maral in November 2005, January 2006, and April-May 2006, indicates a 
high level of dissatisfaction with the current political system. The data from the frequently conducted Sant Maral 
opinion polls are largely available online via the Open Society Forum portal at www.soros.org.mn.  
18 There have also been persistent calls for the dissolution of parliament by leaders of civil society, some of whom 
have been demonstrating outside the Government House, where a group of protestors went on a hunger strike in 
April 2006, demanding that issues of corruption be immediately addressed by the dismissal of various prominent 
public officials. 
8 
Sant Maral show an extreme lack of confidence in political parties. In January 2006, for example, 
respondents once again gave political parties the lowest confidence rating (13.7 percent) among 
Mongolia’s various sociopolitical institutions, while 18 percent of the respondents indicated that they 
preferred no party rather than any of the existing choices. Moreover, 31.5 percent believed that Mongolia 
does not need parties but should instead have a strong presidency. 












































Source: Opinion Poll (Annex 7, Question I). 
 
As public confidence in Mongolia’s political parties has waned, popular support for a presidential system 
has intensified.19 In the January 2006 Sant Maral poll, 36.9 percent of respondents reported that a 
presidential system is “more suitable for Mongolia.” A Mongolian political scientist cited newspaper 
speculation on the need for a presidential system just prior to this study’s dissemination in February 2006, 
observing that some politicians are playing to a populist desire for strong leadership in a time of political 
crisis.20 Various observers expressed concern that a presidential system would undermine Mongolian 
democracy as it has in other former socialist countries, most notably the Russian Republic. 
 
Other stakeholders, including several prominent CSO leaders, have also voiced concern that the potential 
rise of a dominant party in Mongolia could erode its democratic institutions. Research conducted by the 
Political Education Alliance (PEA) indicates that the MPRP has increased its spending on campaigns as a 
percentage of total spending by political parties from 25 percent in 2000 to 75 percent in 2004. Although 
this raises the issue of “where the money is coming from,” a question rhetorically posed by a PEA leader, 
it is also noteworthy that in spite of increased campaign spending, the MPRP received a mere plurality of 
votes in the 2004 elections. Moreover, an opposition MP noted during a dissemination interview that 
opposition parties have introduced some important legislative reforms, including campaign finance 
reform and a 30 percent quota for women candidates. 
 
                                                          
19 This study’s analysis includes political parties, but does not define them as part of civil society as does the recent 
CIVICUS study. Parties are nevertheless an important part of political society. As such, parties are a potential target 
for demands for social accountability as well as one of its potential promoters. 
20 An MP also speculated about who was “paying” for this press coverage and financing the push for the dissolution 
of parliament so that this alternative political system may be proposed. 
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As figure 2.1.2 clearly illustrates, Mongolian society also lacks confidence in the country’s judiciary. 
During the dissemination CSO forum, several CSO leaders concurred that the judicial system was “the 
most corrupt institution in Mongolia.” Criticisms included allegations of high levels of corruption and low 
levels of professionalism among judges, a lack of transparency within the legal system, and cronyism 
between the judiciary and politicians. 
 
2.1.2 Intergovernmental Relations 
Mongolia’s intergovernmental structure is a mixture of decentralization and deconcentration (World Bank 
2005c). At the subnational level, the structure consists of three levels of government outside of 
Ulaanbaatar: aimags (provinces), soums (districts), and bags (rural communities).21 At each of these 
levels, there is a khural (assembly) and a governor who serves as an executive administrator. The aimag 
governor is nominated by the local khural and appointed by the prime minister, while soum and bag 
governors are nominated by their khurals but appointed by the governor at the next highest level of 
government. Citizens directly elect their aimag and soum khurals. Although the local election of khurals 
indicates a certain level of political decentralization, critics claim that this structure of authority 
undermines the autonomy of the governors in relation to the central government, their horizontal 
accountability to the local khurals, and their vertical accountability to the local citizenry (see part III, 
Finding 3.4.1, annexes 3 and 4, and Findings ORM 6 and EDU 6, respectively). 
 
At each level of the three-tiered structure, khurals serve as governing bodies that pass laws. However, 
neither the 1992 Constitution nor the Administrative and Territorial Units and their Management Law 
(ATUTML) clearly defines the functional jurisdiction of the khural, which appears to be more a voice for 
local views than a body for pivotal decision making. Members of the local khurals were described by a 
CSO leader at the dissemination forum as acting like “apparatchiks looking for instructions from their 
superiors.” 
 
Among the three subnational levels of government, soums and bags are the basic administrative and 
territorial units for consolidating communal services. Indeed, Mongolians have expressed that bag 
governors are the most visible and accessible government officials (McClean 2001). According to the 
ATUTML, however, bags have no independent budget. The salary and expenditures of bag governors are 
included in the soum budget (Center for Mongol Management 2004).22 This scenario clearly restricts the 
scope for citizen engagement in local governance at the lowest level. 
 
Although public administration and sector policy making in Mongolia are formally deconcentrated, local 
governments at the aimag and soum levels have little effective input in sector policy formulation 
(McClean 2001). The 2002 Public Sector Management and Finance Law (PSMFL) significantly 
centralized fiscal management, including most of the revenues that were previously shared with local 
governments, leaving these with limited power to institute new taxes. The PSMFL also shifted most of 
the expenditure assignments from local governments to central government, and curtailed local 
governments’ responsibility for service delivery (World Bank 2005a). At present, local governments do 
not have adequate resources to fulfill even their limited service-delivery responsibilities as mandated by 
Article 52 of the PSMFL (see part III, Finding 3.4.1). 
 
                                                          
21 The capital itself is divided into similar levels of administration, referred to as duuregs and hooros. 
22 The CIVICUS report gave Mongolia a score of zero for decentralization because the “sub-national share of 
government expenditure is less than 20 percent” (CIVICUS 2006:29). 
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2.1.3 Economic Context 
Immediately after its political transition, Mongolia suffered from rapid economic contraction and the 
breakdown of its trade and economic relations with the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON). However, Mongolia moved rapidly to establish a framework of market-based 
laws, policies, and institutions. In 2004, it had the world’s highest growth rate of 10 percent. Despite 
relative macroeconomic stability, however, the sources of its record economic growth have remained 
narrow, and the economy remains vulnerable to external shocks. 
 
Similarly, Mongolia has mixed results in social sector development. Since its transition, Mongolia has 
preserved the relatively high levels of human development that characterized the socialist period and 
recovered from sharp drops in key indicators such as infant mortality and school enrollment (see annex 
4). However, progress toward several key Millennium Development Goals has been weak. For example, 
more than one-third of the population remains below the poverty line, and rural-urban disparities in 
economic activity and social services have widened, contributing to further rural-urban migration 
(HIES/LSMS 2004).23 
 
In particular, Mongolia’s economy remains highly dependent on the mining sector. According to a 
background paper on “Mineral Wealth and Equitable Development” prepared for the 2004 World 
Development Report by UCLA Professor Michael Ross, Mongolia’s mineral dependence is twenty-third 
highest in the world; this is due to its sizable deposits of copper, gold, and various other minerals and its 
relatively narrow economic base. On the positive side, rapidly rising mineral prices in recent years have 
fueled economic growth, improved Mongolia’s trade balance, contributed to Mongolia’s first budget 
surplus in 2005, and attracted significant foreign interest and investment by large multinational mining 
companies.24 This mining boom has catalyzed an intense debate over whether Mongolia is receiving a fair 
share of the benefits from its mineral resources. Some politicians have urged greater governmental 
participation in new mining ventures, while the mining industry remains opposed to amending the 
country’s 1997 Mining Law.25 In addition, parliament recently passed a windfall tax on copper and gold 
revenues when prices exceed set levels. The current boom has also prompted discussions on how 
Mongolia can utilize mineral windfalls accrued during boom years to compensate for future price 
downturns; the GoM is discussing various options, including the establishment of a stabilization fund. 
The GoM’s decision late last year to join the global Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, an 
initiative promoting good governance, transparency, and balanced development in resource-rich countries 
such as Mongolia, has been well received by civil society and international partners. 
 
2.1.4 Legal Context 
All stakeholders, including CSOs, concur that Mongolia’s legal framework is relatively conducive to 
civic engagement and social accountability. Nevertheless, there remain some problematic areas. For 
example, although the Mongolian Constitution and the 1998 Law on Freedom of Media guarantee 
freedom of expression, certain legal codes such as criminal defamation laws and media registration and 
licensing systems may constrain the exercise of this right (see part III, Findings 3.2.2 and 3.2.3). 
 
                                                          
23 The Bank-supported Participatory Living Standards Assessment documented the emergence of multiple sources of 
vulnerability. 
24 Copper and gold prices increased by 28 and 8.6 percent, respectively, in 2005. 
25 An opinion poll taken by Sant Maral in November 2005 showed that when the parliament debated the existing 
mining laws, 41 percent of the respondents indicated that foreigners or multinational corporations benefited a lot 
from these laws; and 30 percent indicated that the GoM and politicians did as well. However, only 5 percent thought 
that ordinary citizens benefit a great deal from the current legal regime, with 36 percent indicating that they do not 
benefit at all. 
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The Constitution also guarantees the “right to seek and receive information from public bodies; but in 
practice, this right is limited by the State Secrecy Law and the absence of an Access to Information Law 
(see part III, Findings 3.3.1 and 3.3.2; and annex 5, Findings MEDIA 5 and 6). According to the 2006 
CIVICUS study, this “political culture of nontransparency” is largely responsible for the ineffectiveness 
of the Mongolian bureaucracy, which is ranked in the World Bank Governance data set as slightly below 
average with a score of -0.46. 
 
Over the last year a parliamentary working group has considered revisions to Mongolia’s 1997 Law on 
Non-Governmental Organizations, which prompted the proliferation of NGOs. Although there are more 
than 5,300 NGOs at present, observers estimate that there are only between fifty to a few hundred active 
NGOs. Under the current law, there are two types of NGOs: mutual benefit NGOs, which serve the 
interests of their members; and public benefit NGOs, which promote public interests in specific areas. 
Regardless of their mission and activities, most NGOs are registered as public benefit NGOs as this 
designation offers more favorable tax status. Consequently, individuals misuse this tax “loophole” to 
register their enterprise as an NGO.  
 
According to the CIVICUS study, “many government officials as well as conservative NGO 
representatives express concern over the ‘excessive’ number of NGOs and stress the need to ‘bring order 
to the NGO field’ by restricting their numbers, imposing hierarchical umbrella structures, and heightening 
state supervision” (CIVICUS 2006:40). These issues, combined with the desire to “remove NGOs from 
politics,” were an impetus for the proposed Non-Profit Law. Although its enactment would prohibit the 
registration of politically affiliated associations, such as the women’s group of a political party, which is 
currently registered as an NGO, a broad interpretation of this provision could prevent the registration of 
NGOs explicitly involved in civic engagement/social accountability (Finding 2.1). Healthy Society, for 
example, alleges that the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs (MoJHA) has refused its registration on 
the basis of its political activism against corruption, requiring instead that it register as a political party.  
 
Corruption is one of Mongolia’s most serious challenges as it seeks to maintain high levels of economic 
growth and ensure equitable development for all citizens (see annex 7, Question C).26 In October 2005, 
Mongolia ratified the UN Convention on Anti-Corruption. A new Anti-Corruption Law is on the 
parliamentary agenda for the Spring 2006 session, but key provisions of the law, including provisions on 
asset and income disclosure of public officials, are still under debate (see box 2.1.1 and Finding 2.2). 
 
Box 2.1.1 Proposed Changes to the Anti-Corruption Law 
The 1996 Law of Mongolia on Anti-Corruption lacked implementation measures, relying primarily on a system of 
confidential asset declarations. Importantly, the new draft Anti-Corruption Law, which was put to parliament in 
December 2005, includes some recognition that the fight against corruption will depend on mobilizing the support 
of civil society. The draft establishes an independent central Anti-Corruption Agency with broad powers to enforce 
the Law. It proposes a range of educational, informational, and promotional roles for NGOs and citizens. A key 
issue is the extent to which the new law will require officials to provide public asset declarations; such information 
is key in civil society investigations in order to expose corruption. The document Ten Steps to Intensity: The 
Implementation of the National Program to Combat Corruption, published by the government late in 2005, only 
calls for income declarations. It also proposes that the media be educated about these declarations. However, as 
of 15 December, 2005, the draft Anti-Corruption Law provided that asset declarations were protected by private 
secrecy rules and that only the total sum of assets and income for senior officials would be made public (Articles 
10 and 12). Such general declarations are of limited use in tracking corruption. 
 
                                                          
26 On corruption in Mongolia, see Quah (2003), as well as reports by UNDP (2002), and the Zorig Foundation (2004). The Zorig 
Foundation is an NGO that focuses on anticorruption, headed by MP S. Oyun whose brother was assassinated on the eve of his 
appointment as prime minister. 
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The new disciplinary committee for judges has found extensive corruption. During the first two years of 
the committee’s operation (2003–2004), 31 judges—an astounding 7 percent of all judges—were subject 
to disciplinary measures. Given that many judgments were not enforced, there are significant issues 
regarding the enforcement of legal decisions against public authorities such as these justices.  
 
2.1.5 Sociocultural Context 
In sociopolitical terms, Mongolian civil society continues to be marked by legacies of the old socialist 
regime. Under this system voluntary citizen association was highly restricted and state-society relations 
were strictly a top-down affair. The high level of political deference and passivity among stakeholders 
and the general population undermined civic engagement and social accountability.  
 
The socialist period was also characterized by large state-controlled mass organizations affiliated with the 
ruling MPRP. These “legacy associations”—such as trade unions, the Red Cross, and associations for 
women, youths, and the elderly—continue to exist and typically enjoy privileged access to state 
resources, reinforcing upward accountability toward public officials rather than downward accountability 
to Mongolian civil society. 
 
Religious-based components of civil society among Mongolia’s overwhelming Buddhist majority have 
also been constrained by the socialist legacy. Buddhist leaders and institutions were severely repressed for 
decades by the socialist state. Although Buddhism is now experiencing a strong resurgence, along with 
other minority religions, Buddhism has not served as a focal point of social activism or civic engagement 
in Mongolia.27 Rather, a prominent lama in Ulaanbaator (UB) acknowledged that “politicians use the 
monks to gain support from the population” by associating themselves with the monasteries. He noted 
that they do not support a political party but rather individuals who they believe to be honest and 
trustworthy and who provide them with access to political resources, quickly adding that after the 
elections they never hear from the politicians again.  
 
In contrast to the historical legacy of socialism, Mongolia’s nomadic culture has reinforced the need for 
and value of mutual assistance. However, the vast expanse of the Mongolian countryside has constrained 
the development of communal associations, presenting a geographic obstacle that explains the limited 
number of community-based organizations in Mongolia compared to the multitude of “national” NGOs 
based in Ulaanbaatar (see annex 3, Finding ORM 8). 
 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN MONGOLIA 
 
In a relatively short time, Mongolia’s civil society has made notable strides in supporting economic, 
political, and social development, although there remain some significant challenges and obstacles to their 
participation in civic engagement and social accountability.  
 
2.2.1 Civil Society-State Relations 
Although state-society relations have been influenced by each of the external factors discussed above, the 
characteristic political deference and passivity associated with the socialist legacy in Mongolia did not prevent the 
                                                          
27 Christian missionary groups have found post-socialist Mongolia to be a fertile ground for conversion, which they promote 
through INGOs and the English-language-instruction programs. 
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rise of mass pro-democracy movements that played a critical role in the transition to democracy in 1989–90 nor 
the creation of more than 5,300 registered NGOs that have formed largely since the transition.28 
 
Post-transition relations between CSOs and public officials have been marked by the state’s acceptance of an 
independent civil society. The transition is not unqualified, however; the CIVICUS report notes that CSOs 
continue to be “subject to occasional unwarranted government interference” (CIVICUS 2006:39). Methods of 
state control include the NGO registration process; control of information dissemination through state-owned 
mass media; and restrictions on public protests and demonstration; as well as intimidation, interrogation, and 
surveillance at the local level. The CIVICUS report also criticizes the state’s discriminatory dialogue with a small 
set of CSOs and selective legitimization of CSOs by hand-picking “friendly” organizations for collaboration, a 
practice that leads to self-censorship by some civil society leaders (CIVICUS 2006:39–41). 
 
As a result, civil society is susceptible to politicization by public officials and political party leaders. This is 
clearly a double-edged sword for CSOs pursuing social accountability. On the one hand, the more politically 
well-connected CSOs enjoy better access to public officials, information, and other resources (see part III, 
Finding 3.4.4; and annexes 1 and 2, Findings NCAV 4 and WSP 1, respectively). On the other hand, close 
affiliation with government officials or political parties undermines CSO autonomy and, therefore, its 
effectiveness at civic engagement/social accountability (see box 2.2.1 and annex 3, Finding ORM 2). 
 
Box 2.2.1 MACNE and UMENGO: A Tale of Two Environment Networks 
In the late 1990s, the Mongolian branch of the World Wildlife Fund facilitated the establishment of the Union of 
Environmental NGOs (UMENGO). The Union served as an umbrella organization with 30 members, including the 
Mongolian Association for Conservation, Nature and the Environment (MACNE), the biggest environmental NGO 
in Mongolia. MACNE is a “legacy” NGO that was established in the socialist era as a governmental NGO 
(referred to as a GONGO) that still has strong ties to government. UMENGO initially benefited from this close 
relationship with the Ministry of Nature and Environment (MoNE). After the 2000 elections, however, UMENGO’s 
relationship with both MACNE and the Ministry deteriorated. MACNE withdrew from UMENGO over “differences 
of opinion,” while the new Environment Ministry shifted emphasis from protection of the environment to the 
exploitation of natural resources to balance its budget. For instance, hunting licenses became easier to obtain, 
causing an increase in trophy hunting of endangered species. 
Over the last few years, the environmental NGO community under the leadership of UMENGO has been active in 
pressuring the government about protected areas. According to a leading environment NGO, “the Ministry of 
Environment’s reaction is that we are enemies, and those NGOs who are not criticizing them, like MACNE, are 
friends.” The tension has mounted to the point where “enemy” NGOs claim they are not invited to high-level 
workshops and meetings. This partisan approach has made it difficult for environmental NGOs to work with the 
government and influence public policy while MACNE, as a legacy NGO, continues to receive government 
funding. Meanwhile, the government accuses UMENGO and some of its members of not being willing to work 
with it. This partisan approach has made it difficult for environmental NGOs to work with the government and 
influence public policy. Given the challenges of working with this Ministry, the environmental NGOs would be 
more effective were they to work together as a united front. 
 
Although the majority of respondents to the CSO Survey indicated that there is some possibility for a 
cooperative relationship with the GoM (annex 6, Question P), CSO leaders in interviews and focus groups 
frequently described their relationship with the GoM and public officials in general as adversarial. For 
example, participants at the dissemination forum raised concerns that this study’s findings could be 
interpreted as critical of CSOs, such as their politicization, and would allow public officials and 
politicians to denounce civil society and undermine their efforts at social accountability. Although there 
was consensus that some CSOs do succumb to political pressure, CSO leaders emphasized that the 
fundamental problem was that politicians and political parties create CSOs to capture donor funding. 
                                                          
28 In contrast with business associations and trade unions, women are well represented in most professional associations and 
NGOs. In fact, they dominate certain areas such as health, education, poverty alleviation, and human as well as women’s rights, 
leading some observers to refer to Mongolian civil society as “matriarchal” (CIVICUS 2006:19). 
14 
Therefore, it is incumbent upon “donors to be careful about what sort of CSO is receiving (donor) 
funding” (Finding 2.3). 
 
2.2.2 CSO Capital 
Mongolian CSOs are particularly sensitive to funding issues as they suffer from a chronic lack of 
financial resources. As a result, the few CSOs who have access to foreign funding are highly dependent 
upon it (see figure 2.2.1).29 
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         Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question U).  
 
The three case studies on Mongolian CSOs with impressive records of civic engagement and social 
accountability illustrate CSOs’ critical need for financial resources. CSO successes in social 
accountability were attributable to significant and diverse international funding sources. Similarly, 
failures arose from their vulnerability to a limited and precarious resource base. In several instances, 
CSOs were forced to halt successful social accountability initiatives due to a cessation of funding (see 
annexes 1-3, Findings NCAV 1, WSP 2, and ORM 1).  
 
Furthermore, during interviews and focus groups as well as in the survey, CSO leaders repeatedly 
complained that donor funding was short term and did not cover administrative costs (see annex 6, 
Questions Y and Z).30 CSOs also criticized the lack of significant GoM tenders or philanthropic 
contributions from the private sector. While the scarcity of GoM tenders was attributed to GoM’s 
favoritism toward certain CSOs, some stakeholders tied the lack of private donations to the shortcomings 
in the current tax code (see Finding 2.2).31 
 
Although there are few opportunities for local funding at present, a few CSOs have striven for greater 
financial self-sufficiency. The lack of fiscal autonomy makes CSOs vulnerable to the vagaries and 
                                                          
29 Whereas the CIVICUS study scored CSO human and technical resources at a moderate- to low-level of capacity 
(2 and 1 respectively on a 3-point scale), the financial capacity of CSOs was rated a zero (CIVICUS 2006:24-25). 
30 Donors were also criticized at the dissemination forum for perceiving “CSOs as [a] cheap labor force to 
implement their projects.” 
31 The CIVICUS study also noted that there were no tax benefits available to individuals or corporations for charitable giving and 
that “the level of state resources channeled through CSOs is insignificant” (CIVICUS 2006:36, 41). 
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preferences of funders. This has led some organizations to pursue funding for activities that divert them 
from their self-identified mission and objectives.  
 
Whereas most CSOs leaders pointed out that scarce financial resources were one of the largest problems 
in pursuing social accountability, the survey also showed that NGOs are confronted with insufficient 
physical and human capital. For example, more than half of the CSOs indicated that their organization 
does not have a vehicle and that they rent rather than own their own office, whereas more than 10 percent 
operate without office space (annex 6, Questions Q and R). These statistics would be more dramatic if the 
survey had included more CSOs outside of Ulaanbaatar. Similarly, the human capital (particularly in 
terms of formal education and knowledge of technical issues such as legal and regulatory codes), which 
clearly was key to the social accountability successes of the CSO case studies, is undoubtedly higher 
among NGOs in Ulaanbaatar. 
 
2.2.3 CSO Accountability and Internal Governance 
The scarcity of funds also affects which CSOs are actually allowed to form and operate; and that, in turn, 
determines whose interests are represented by the CSO’s civic engagement activities. For example, 90 
percent of the registered NGOs are located in Ulaanbaatar, whose residents, therefore, benefit from better 
representation by and services from CSOs (Finding 2.4). However, even within the capital city, there are 
disparities, so that the largely poor inhabitants in the Ger District along the city’s periphery are often 
marginalized. 
 
Although many of the UB-based NGOs have branches in provincial centers (see annex 6, Question C), 
these branch organizations are typically established by the UB office and lack financial or programmatic 
autonomy from the UB leadership. A notable exception is the Women for Social Progress’ Uvorkhangi 
branch (see annex 2, Finding WSP 7). The overall lack of community-based organizations results in an 
under-representation of rural Mongolians. Some CSO leaders attribute the UB-focus to the centralization 
of resources in the capital and suggest that once effective decentralization occurs, CSOs will decentralize 
as well. 
 
Although stakeholders were concerned that local branches of NGOs suffered from a lack of autonomy, 
they also criticized the lack of effective umbrella organizations (Finding 2.4). According to the CIVICUS 
report, Mongolians are averse to umbrella organizations due to CSO “efforts to confront and counteract 
the socialist tendency toward massive hierarchical structures” and continued “hypercentralization” in the 
post-socialist era (CIVICUS 2006:20). Notable exceptions include the Mongolian Women’s NGO 
Coalition, which has successfully lobbied for more female candidates in the 2000 parliamentary elections, 
and the collaboration of the National Center Against Violence (NCAV) with other CSOs to advocate for 
the Law Against Domestic Violence (see Finding NCAV 2). 
 
At the other end of the spectrum there are CSOs that depend upon the leadership and vision of a single 
individual; in such cases they are known as nongovernmental individuals (NGI) (see annex 2, Finding 
WSP 6). The NGI phenomenon makes it exceedingly difficult to ensure the durability of the organization 
or replicate its successes in other localities (Finding 2.4). 
 
Although limited in number, the existence of NGIs raises the issue of CSO accountability. Although a full 
discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note that the perception of 
CSO accountability is critical to their capacity to promote social accountability. Public officials are 
unlikely to respond to an organization that is not seen as representative of a constituency, or one that is 
not accountable to the beneficiaries of its services. One measure to ensure the accountability of CSOs 
would be to make accounts public; unfortunately a preliminary CIVICUS report indicates that only a 
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minority of CSOs have done so (January 2006). CSOs are also typically confronted by multiple 
“constituencies” to whom they are accountable, including international actors and governmental agencies 
from which they receive funding. CSOs in many countries have addressed these concerns by developing 
voluntary codes of conduct and establishing mechanisms of self-regulation, which are currently being 
discussed in Mongolia as part of the agenda of regional consultations organized for the CIVICUS report. 
 
The Bank’s study, “Civil Society in Mongolia’s Development and Governance,” notes that NGO internal 
governance systems to enable board members and constituents to monitor the use of resources are weak 
or, in many cases, completely lacking. Although there is generally stronger upward accountability to 
funders than to constituents and beneficiaries, “most NGO boards play a limited role in setting strategic 
priorities and objectives, monitoring organizational finances and implementation, contributing to 
fundraising, or reviewing the performance of the organization” (Finch 2005). 
 
2.2.4 Lack of Visibility and Popular Support of Accountability Initiatives 
Perhaps the two greatest obstacles to effective civic engagement and social accountability in Mongolia are a 
dearth of CSOs explicitly working in this area and a lack of knowledge among the public of those who are 
(Finding 2.5). Most of the registered NGOs do not define their missions as civic engagement activities that lead to 
social accountability.32 Moreover, the 2006 CIVICUS report also gives civil society a relatively low score of 1 
out of 3 for its capacity to influence public policy, although some CSOs have played a high profile role in 
development-related activities, political advocacy, and legal reform. The CIVICUS report maintains, however, 
that there is a lack of broad-based support and visibility of such initiatives. 
 
Indeed, one of the greatest challenges for Mongolian CSOs is a general lack of knowledge among the 
public about their role and function. Ninety-two percent of respondents to the opinion poll conducted in 
May 2005 indicated that they knew little to nothing about civil society organizations (annex 7, Question 
Q1), which may explain the low level of confidence in CSOs (see figure 2.1.2 above). Whereas the 
expectations of what a relatively young civil society can and should do may be high—a result of foreign-
imposed expectations according to one observer—the achievements and potential of Mongolian civil 
society should not be minimized.33 
 
2.3 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
The external and internal factors influencing Mongolian CSOs outlined in this section have a significant 
impact on the capacity of CSOs to participate in civic engagement and social accountability initiatives. 
Although the implications of these factors will be discussed more fully in the subsequent analysis of the 
Mongolian Enabling Environment in part III, there are several findings in this section related to the 
structure, resources, and involvement of CSOs in social accountability initiatives that have prompted the 
following recommendations. 
 
Finding 2.1. The proposed Non-Profit Bill may undermine the capacity of CSOs for involvement in civic 
engagement and social accountability if current provisions prohibiting their political activism are broadly 
interpreted. 
 
                                                          
32 According to a survey done by UNDP in 2000, most registered NGOs that are involved in sports and cultural 
activities are less likely to become involved in CE/social accountability than NGOs involved in human rights or 
environmental issues, for example. 
33 Still optimistic about the future of Mongolian civil society, this CSO leader offered the counterexample of civil 
society in the Russian Republic, rhetorically asking “Why should we be any different?” 
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Recommendations: 
1) The Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs and MPs should revise the definition of explicitly 
political organizations (for example, wings of political parties or lobbying firms) that would be 
excluded under the Non-Profit Bill. 
2) CSOs should present a revised version of the Non-Profit Bill and pursue legal remedies if the 
revised provision is not adopted or is improperly implemented. 
 
Finding 2.2. The Proposed Anti-Corruption Law only provides for disclosure of the total sum of assets 
and income for senior officials, undermining CSO capacity to track corruption. 
Recommendations: 
1) The MoJHA and MPs should revise the wording of the bill to stipulate that individual officials 
disclose asset and income declarations to strengthen the mechanisms for tracking corruption. 
2) As proposed in the GoM document, To Intensity: The Implementation of the National Program to 
Combat Corruption, implementation of the law should include a provision for media training. 
Media-related CSOs could offer technical support, along with INGOs and donor agencies, which 
could also provide initial financial support. 
 
Finding 2.3. Mongolian CSOs have limited and precarious access to financial resources owing to several 
factors. These include the lack of GoM tenders, limited philanthropic donations, and the creation of CSOs 
specifically to attract donor funding. 
Recommendations: 
1) Public officials and CSOs should seek technical support from the international community to 
reform the tax code affecting CSOs, particularly the absence of tax breaks for philanthropic 
donations. 
2) The GoM should expand the number and amount of tenders available to CSOs and other private 
enterprises, based on a competitive system, to increase the capacity and efficiency of service 
delivery 
3) CSOs should eschew “mission creep,” to lure donor funding. This detracts from their core 
mission and may undermine their reputation and that of civil society in general. Instead, their 
energies should be directed toward lobbying for greater access to GoM tenders, competitive 
donor funding, and the development of autonomous resources (membership fees or donations), as 
pursued by the Ongi River Movement (see annex 3). 
4) Donors should consider longer term commitments and the need to finance institutional and 
administrative costs, while bearing in mind the origins, purpose, and sustainability of the CSOs 
they fund. 
 
Finding 2.4. The capacity and effectiveness of CSO involvement in social accountability is adversely 
affected by CSO concentration in UB, the lack of CSO umbrella organizations, and the existence of de 
facto nongovernmental individuals. 
Recommendation:  
Donors should provide technical and financial support to expand current CSO efforts at 
institutionalization while targeting programs that assist in the creation and development of community-
based organizations (CBOs) and CSO branches outside of UB. They should also promote CSO umbrella 
organizations that may be more efficient and effective at social accountability. 
 
Finding 2.5. Two of the greatest obstacles to effective civic engagement/social accountability are a dearth 
of CSOs explicitly working in this area and a lack of public understanding of the importance of their 
accountability initiatives 
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Recommendations: Stakeholders should strive to inform and educate Mongolians about their rights to 
and opportunities for civic engagement with public officials, the importance of civic engagement, and the 
role of CSOs in promoting social accountability. The range of possibilities is broad. Some options 
include: 
1) Public officials, monitored by CSOs and the media, should implement laws that promote direct 
citizen engagement. Focus should be on key sectors such as education, given its important role in 
economic and social development. The GoM, for example, should ensure that citizens are fully 
aware of their right to participate in school councils. GoM should ensure that citizens are 
informed about elections, meetings, and agendas as well as the importance of active civic 
participation (see annex 4, Finding 2). Moreover, training and awareness-raising activities should 
be promoted, such as seminars for parents who are newly appointed to a school council. 
2) Stakeholders should collaborate to develop civic education programs to inform citizens of their 
rights to civic engagement and the key role of CSOs in social accountability initiatives. Activities 
may include: public service announcements and community theater projects for adults as well as 
innovative educational initiatives for youth (see related recommendation under Finding 3.2.1). 
3) Given the importance of CSO-media relations, CSOs should redouble their efforts to develop 
strong relations with various media outlets and individual journalists. Sound media relations 
would ensure publicity of civic engagement/social accountability activities, as suggested by the 
example of the Ongi River Movement (see Finding ORM 5). CSOs should also enhance both 
outreach and accountability to instruct their constituents about their important roles and activities 
in social accountability. 
4) The donor community should provide greater support to better publicize the CSO mandate and 
agenda. Donors should help CSOs and GoM build capacity and expertise in civic engagement and 
social accountability. For example, they may target activities that provide public officials and 






PART III – Assessment of the  





Having established the sociopolitical and economic context in which social accountability mechanisms 
operate in Mongolia, the remainder of the ESW focuses on an assessment of the enabling environment for 
CSOs to exact accountability from their public officials. The three aspects of the environment the study 
evaluates—Voice, Information, and Negotiation—serve as an analytical framework to evaluate both the 
opportunities for and constraints on civic engagement and social accountability. 
 
3.2 THE ROLE OF VOICE IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Social accountability initiatives empower citizens, particularly the poor and other disadvantaged groups, 
by reinforcing their rights to voice opinions and demand accountability from public officials and by 
providing them with the opportunities to do so. There are two sets of critical factors for Voice to function 
effectively as an enabling element for civic engagement/social accountability. The first is the need for 
Freedom of Expression without fear of political, economic, or social retribution. The second concerns the 
availability of Mechanisms for Voice that ensure that demands are heard by appropriate public officials 
(those with authority to respond), and are received in a manner that will result in accountability, either an 
explanation or a change in policies or performance of public officials.  
 
3.2.1 Freedom of Expression 
Article 16.16 of the Mongolian Constitution guarantees the rights to freedom of thought, opinion, 
expression, and the freedom of the press. The 1998 Law on Freedom of the Media expands on these 
constitutional guarantees, prohibiting censorship and enactment of laws that restrict media freedom 
(Articles 2 and 3). However, in court cases involving freedom of expression (cases involving obscenity, 
contempt of court, or defamation) defendants rarely employ these legal codes as part of their defense.  
 
Nevertheless, stakeholders, as well as outside observers, generally agree that there is a relatively high 
level of freedom of expression in Mongolia (Freedom House 2005; CIDCM 2003; Press Institute 
2004b).34 There are several media outlets with editorial opinions that span the political spectrum. 
Moreover, the opinion poll conducted for this study indicates that respondents voiced their opinions and 
concerns in significant numbers. For example, 12 percent of the respondents reported that they had 
written to public officials, 37 percent had petitioned them, and 39 percent had participated in a 
demonstration or rally (see annex 7, Question M).35 
 
                                                          
34 According to two opinion polls conducted by the Mongolian NGO, Press Institute, public perception of freedom of the press 
has dramatically improved since 1998 when only 10 percent of the respondents believed that media freedom was fully 
guaranteed, to more than 42 percent in 2004, with another 46.5 percent believing that it is at least partially guaranteed. In 2004, 
less than 1 percent claimed that the media has no freedom compared to 15 percent in 1998 (Press Institute 2004b:24-25). 
35 Responses to this question also indicate a smaller percentage of participation in activities that involve interaction with officials, 
requiring Voice, but are also more clearly examples of Negotiation, such as meeting with an official (25 percent), participating in 
a call-in radio show with an official (15 percent), and legislative lobbying (5 percent). These activities will be discussed more 
fully in a subsequent section that focuses on Negotiation. 
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The CSO Survey indicates even higher rates of “speaking to power.” For example, when asked whether 
their organizations publicly commented on public policy or the conduct of public officials, 64 percent 
indicated they had at least once, while 23 percent of these respondents stated they had done so at least 
once a month (see figure 3.2.1).  
 









































Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question H). 
 
There remain, nonetheless, certain constraints on the ability of Mongolian civil society to translate 
freedom of expression into voices that will compel public officials to be socially accountable. The 
qualitative research for this study revealed several sources of such constraints. 
 
First, many Mongolian citizens are not aware of their civil rights (Finding 3.2.1). For example, the 
Governor of Uvorkhangai issued a resolution to remove vendors from the city of Arvaiheer. The vendors 
did not wish to relocate to a new market but were uncertain of their legal rights.36 After a violent 
confrontation with the police, the vendors approached Women for Social Progress-Uvorkhangai (WSP-
UV), which was able to counsel them on their legal right to demonstrate as well as assist them in voicing 
their concerns to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). During an interview in April 2005, 
the coordinator for the WSP-UV remarked that the order to vacate the market had provided an 
opportunity for the vendors to learn about their rights, something her organization had been unable to 
achieve despite years of disseminating information about human and civil rights (see annex 2, Finding 
WSP 5). 
 
In other cases, sociocultural barriers appeared to prevent members of Mongolia’s civil society from 
speaking out. Research on community involvement in Mongolian schools suggested that one of the 
obstacles to effective participation in the oversight of school administrations and their budgets was a 
sociopolitical legacy from the socialist era. During this period, governmental institutions such as schools 
were very hierarchical, with top-down structures of authority that characterized them as state rather than 
public institutions. According to the NGO, Mongolian Education Alliance, parents continue to believe 
that principals, and those above them, are the sole authority in school management. As a result, they do 
not avail themselves of opportunities such as school councils to voice concerns about school management 
                                                          
36 The vendors claimed that the new facilities did not provide sufficient storage for their perishables and that they were losing 
clientele because the new location was too far from the town’s center. 
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and operations, or demand elections for council members as mandated by the law (see annex 4, Finding 
EDU). 
 
The National Center Against Violence also had to confront social norms and taboos to give voice to the 
victims of domestic violence. In 1994 when several leading women’s NGOs decided to join forces to 
address this issue, the term “domestic violence” did not exist in Mongolian society, let alone in its legal 
code. NCAV struggled to educate the public. Its efforts resulted in government funding for NCAV 
shelters for victims in 2001 and legislation against domestic violence in 2004. By giving voice to the 
victims of domestic violence, this NCAV played a crucial role in delivering a public service and 
generating legal reform (see annex 1, Finding NCAV 3). 
 
The ability of Mongolians to exercise Voice and achieve accountability is restricted by the Mongolian 
legal code on defamation which exerts a chilling effect upon media (Finding 3.2.2). Mongolia has both 
civil and criminal defamation laws. The civil code stipulates payment of damages for defamation in 
several circumstances. This is problematic for a number of reasons, such as insufficient defenses against 
these charges and the high level of damages that may be awarded.37 The criminal code, however, lends 
itself to more egregious problems (see annex 5, Finding MEDIA 7). It includes a provision for 
imprisonment for up to five years and special provisions for defamation against public officials (see box 
3.2.1). The two main offences are deliberate propagation of false allegations and willful humiliation. The 
defendant has no basis for defense against these charges and in the latter case, the law does not require 
that the allegations be false,  
 
Box 3.2.1 Imprisonment for Defamation 
At least two journalists have been imprisoned in Mongolia for defamation in recent years. One of the cases 
concerned an allegation of serious wrongdoing by an MP who was accused of using his influence to secure a 
lighter sentence in a criminal case involving his illegitimate daughter. This second case was based on an article 
in the newspaper, Mongoliin Neg Udur (One Day in Mongolia) in 2004. After the allegations were found to be 
false and defamatory, the journalist was sentenced to three months’ imprisonment and forced to pay a fine. The 
penal sentence was lifted on appeal, but only after she had spent 23 days in prison. 
 
Although the case involved serious and unwarranted mistakes by the journalist, proponents of media freedom 
both in Mongolia and internationally argue that it is inappropriate to address such mistakes through criminal law, 
and excessive to imprison journalists for defamation. The defense lawyer noted that the journalist wrote the 
article not to harm the MP but to expose public wrongdoing by a public official. Such cases are inevitably 
detrimental to the media’s freedom of expression. Journalists raised the issue of criminal defamation in 
numerous interviews and with CSOs, who identified legal threats such as defamation as the second most 
serious threat to media reporting, after political pressure (see annex 6, Question EE). 
 
Consequently, the guarantee of freedom of expression in Mongolia remains constrained. Survey responses 
indicate the inability of CSOs to voice their views on areas related to their organization’s work, with only 
27 percent indicating that they have sufficient opportunities to present their views (annex 6, Question 
MM). Nevertheless, CSOs and the media have developed an impressive array of mechanisms for Voice 
since the transition from authoritarian rule. 
 
                                                          
37 Article 7 of the Civil Code provides for damages, for actual harm to name or dignity when the defendant cannot prove the truth 
of the allegations. Article 377 provides for damages for defamation for harm to name, dignity, or reputation when the defendant 
fails to prove he or she acted without fault. Article 392 provides for damages for defamation for nonmaterial harm to name, 
dignity, or reputation when the defendant cannot prove his or her allegations were true. 
22 
3.2.2 Mechanisms for Voice 
As illustrated above, CSOs have been closely involved in providing mechanisms for Voice both for 
themselves and for ordinary citizens. Respondents to the CSO Survey indicated that their organizations 
have used an array of means to voice their opinions and to disseminate information (see figure 3.2.2). 
 


















































































Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question JJ). 
 
Several CSO respondents disseminate information via e-mail or maintain a Web site. Their numbers 
indicate the growing importance of IT in Mongolia (InfoCo., Ltd. 2003:15). In the CSO Survey, more 
than 95 percent of respondents said that they have computers, most have more than one, with the 
overwhelming majority (80 percent) also having access to the Internet. It should be noted, however, that 
these results are skewed as the overwhelming majority of respondents were registered NGOs with greater 
access to IT-related resources (annex 6, Question R). In addition to the Gateway Web site that provides 
subportals for stakeholders to discuss pressing issues such as sustainable development and poverty 
reduction, several other CSOs maintain impressive Web sites that both voice their views and provide a 
forum for others to do so. The Open Society Forum in particular has an impressive Web site filled with 
contributions by various other organizations and individuals on a range of social, political, and economic 
issues.  
 
Although the Internet is a critical tool for Voice as well as for Information and Negotiation, other more 
traditional mechanisms for Voice remain relevant to reaching the broader Mongolian public, which has 
limited access to computers and the Internet. Most CSOs rely on a combination of both methods to voice 
their opinions and disseminate information. 
 
The social movement Healthy Society, for example, has used the Internet not only to mobilize support 
both within and outside of the country, but also to voice its critiques and demands of the government and 
specific officials. It has also staged mass demonstrations to call attention to political corruption among 
senior officials. Its efforts have met with various political and legal obstacles, including difficulties 
obtaining the required authorization from city officials to hold a demonstration. According to the 
leadership of the movement, when they decided to hold their first demonstration in February 2005 in front 
of the Government House in Sukhbaatar Square, the administration “trumped up” an agricultural trade 
fair as a pretext to disallow the rally. In the end both events took place in relative calm. 
 
Both the NCAV and the Ongi River Movement (ORM) also employ remarkably diverse approaches to 
inform both officials and the general public. These range from more traditional forms, such as press 
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conferences and workshops, to more innovative methods such as the ecology protest march organized by 
the ORM in 2004 (see box 3.2.2).  
 
Box 3.2.2 The Ecology Protest March for the Ongi River 
Gold mining activities in the region have severely damaged the environment by the drying up of the Ongi River 
and the Ulaan Lake. For three years, the Ongi River Movement has demanded government action to reverse this 
trend. The movement has used different strategies to raise awareness and garner support for its cause among 
both public officials and citizens. One recent activity was an ecology protest march in May and June 2004, tracing 
the entire 478 kilometers of the Ongi River. More than 2,000 people participated in the march, which provided a 
rallying point for people to air their concerns about the plight of the Ongi River, while serving as an educational 
forum for citizens as well as for public officials. During the walk, Ongi leaders addressed 12 public rallies, 
including a protest rally at a gold mine. Buddhist priests also conducted religious ceremonies, offering prayers for 
the preservation and protection of the Ongi ecosystem. Extensive media coverage, both broadcast and print, 
ensured wide publicity for the event and greater dissemination of the movement’s message.  
 
In addition to mechanisms for Voice, social accountability requires a vibrant and autonomous media.38 
Since the end of socialist rule in Mongolia, media outlets have grown rapidly. The sector is now 
characterized by numerous competing media outlets in the different subsectors of radio, television, 
broadsheets, tabloids, and magazines. Ulaanbaatar has the largest concentration of the media outlets in the 
country although all provincial centers have some locally based media, typically newspapers, radio, and 
television, even some cable services (see annex 5).  
 
The more repressive forms of control over the media that characterized the Socialist period no longer 
exist, but a range of what might be termed ‘soft’ limitations remain in place to control media content. In 
addition to restrictive defamation laws, many informal measures are employed to censor the media, such 
as threatening telephone calls from public officials and threats to investigate the tax or registration status 
of a media outlet in retaliation for unfavorable reporting. 
 
The Mongolian media is also constrained by various systems of media regulation. For example, all media 
outlets in Mongolia are required to register with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs. Applications 
are reviewed by the Minister to make sure that the applicant does not pursue illegal objectives (see annex 
5, Finding MEDIA 4).  
 
In many democracies, registration systems for the media no longer exist since they serve no purpose that 
cannot otherwise be achieved with less risk to freedom of expression. At a minimum, registration systems 
should not obstruct those who wish to enter the market, and should never be used to delay or refuse 
registration or to resolve political disputes, as happened recently in Mongolia (see box 3.2.3). 
Consequently, the registration system threatens the independence of the Mongolian media (Finding 
3.2.3). To avoid the risk of political abuse or financial exploitation, the submission of the requisite 
information should be sufficient to guarantee automatic registration or alternatively, responsibility should 





                                                          
38 Social accountability requires all stakeholders in social and economic development, whether NGOs, media, government, 
religious institutions, or professional associations, to embrace a culture of accountability, both to enhance their credibility and to 
improve governance and the effectiveness of development initiatives.  
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Box 3.2.3 Registration: The Mongol Times Case 
The Mongol Times was founded as a weekly newspaper in the 1990s by Kulanda Chonoido, who registered the 
newspaper in her own name. A complicated series of events led to the closure of the newspaper in June 2004, 
and its takeover by Uyanga Gantumur in October 2004. Uyanga effectively ran The Mongol Times as a 
Democratic Party opposition paper, building subscriptions to 1,500 and overall circulation to 3,000 by the first 
quarter of 2005. The newspaper was noted for its harsh critiques of the MPRP presidential candidate during the 
2005 electoral campaign. 
 
According to Uyanga, subscribers started complaining about harassment at work, where they had their 
newspapers delivered, so she established a home delivery system. Based on a letter from the MoJHA in early 
March, the newspaper’s printer, Free Press Foundation, refused to print it. The Press showed Uyanga a letter 
from the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs indicating that the paper was registered in Kulanda’s name and thus 
Uyanga was not authorized to publish it. Printing difficulties continued, but the newspaper continued to circulate. 
 
At the same time, due to changes in the Law on State Registration of Legal Entities, all newspapers had to 
reregister with the MoJHA by the end of March 2005. The Ministry refused to reregister The Mongol Times to 
Uyanga. It also refused to register a new newspaper under the name The New Mongol Times as it was too similar 
to the original name. Uyanga reported that she agreed to register under another name but faced repeated delays. 
The registration certificate for the new Political Newspaper was finally received on 19 May, 2005; funding is 
currently being sought to launch it. 
 
This case illustrates complications in the newspaper registration process. First, the registration system arbitrarily 
decided the question of ownership of the newspaper in favor of the original owner. Second, delays in registration 
led to the effective silencing of an important political newspaper for most of the crucial period of the presidential 
election campaign. 
 
In terms of media licensing, the 2001 Law on Communications stipulates that for private broadcasting, a 
media license must be obtained from the Communications Regulatory Commission (CRC). As with 
Mongolian media registration, the CRC lacks the guarantees of independence that characterize 
international law and best practices in this area in that its oversight body is composed largely of 
government employees appointed by the Prime Minister (Finding 3.2.4). Moreover, applicants for a 
broadcasting license need a letter of support from the governor. The purpose of this is unclear, and it is 
not a practice that is followed in other countries, even relatively decentralized ones, given the obvious 
potential for politically or economically motivated interference. For example, many interviewees noted 
instances of refusals or delays if the applicant had a reputation of being staunchly independent or critical 
of the governor (see annex 5). 
 
Furthermore, the present broadcast licensing system does not use opportunities present in existing 
regulation to promote public interest. For example, the system does not assess the type or quality of 
programming as part of the license tender process. Local licenses are offered regardless of the market so 
there is an oversupply of broadcasters who rely on the support of wealthy individuals, who in turn 
demand political support. On the other hand, the lucrative national market is dominated by one player, the 
public broadcaster. Nor does the licensing system specifically recognize community broadcasting, an 
effective vehicle for local voice, particularly in a poor, low-population-density country like Mongolia.  
 
Some independent radio stations in rural areas are playing a vital role in promoting social accountability 
by giving Voice to citizens, access to Information, and occasionally a means to Negotiate with public 
officials through call-in radio programs.39 While this sector is vulnerable and operating on limited 
funding, it has the potential to expand social accountability in the countryside. As is discussed more fully 
in the 2005 World Bank report, “Community Media Activity in Mongolia: Stocktaking and Design of a 
                                                          
39 These local stations have produced programs that support several World Bank initiatives, including segments on herder 
diversification, starting a small business, street law, and local health concerns. 
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Capacity Building Program,” independent rural radio provides citizens with both “Voice and Access to 
Information in their communities…[and] serves as an open forum to hold public officials accountable” 
(Siemering and Rice 2005: 3). 
 
Box 3.2.4 Mongolian Community Radio and Social Accountability 
Community radio is an effective tool to monitor and negotiate with public bodies and officials. It permits citizens 
and their CSO forums to Voice their views and concerns, gain access to both government-controlled and 
alternative forms of Information, and provides opportunities to Negotiate with public officials who appear on call-in 
programs. 
 
According to the 2005 study, “Community Media Activity in Mongolia: Stocktaking and Design of a Capacity 
Building Program,” conducted by Bill Siemering and Charles Rice, prominent members of the public radio 
community in the United States, “the four community radio stations currently on the air in Mongolia form the only 
independent radio sources in the country and are among only a few independent broadcast media stations in the 
nation.” These stations air programs to empower, educate, and inform Mongolian citizens, while facilitating a dual 
flow of information between local communities and public officials. 
 
The study cited several examples of community radio programming that have promoted social accountability in 
Mongolia. The Selenge and Darkhan stations, for instance, were the only radio stations in the country to 
broadcast the 2004 parliamentary debates. In addition, Radio Orkhon 106 in Darkhan has produced a series of 
soap operas on “street law,” which have been distributed to other stations around the country. Several local 
World Bank projects have also supported the production of several series addressing issues related to HIV/AIDS, 
herding, and business in Mongolia. These series were produced by three community radio stations and aired by 
all four. 
 
Although the existing community radio stations in Mongolia are self-sustaining, their ability to operate effectively 
is hindered by overextended management, limited financial resources, and a lack of basic infrastructure. 
Moreover, Mongolian law currently provides no special recognition to or consideration for community radio as 
providers of public interest broadcasting. These factors not only hinder the operation of the existing radio stations 
but hinder the creation of others as well. To ensure that community radio plays a critical role in social 
accountability and the effectiveness of local development strategies, in general, the 2005 report recommends 
that the local independent radio stations be transformed into a network of Community Information Resource 
Centers under a central agency that sets professional standards and raises funds for the sector (Siemering and 
Rice 2005). 
 
The quality of media coverage is also a serious concern. The three most common complaints are political 
bias, a focus on “yellow” or sensational reporting, and inaccurate or misleading reporting (Finding 3.2.5). 
These problems are fueled by weak standards of professionalism, the absence of a central body to set 
standards, a lack of sufficient funding for investigative journalism, and widespread self-censorship (see 
annex 5, Findings MEDIA 8-10). Indeed, respondents to the CSO Survey found that media coverage was 
influenced especially by political and economic pressures (see figure 3.2.3). 
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Significant 61% 36% 50% 26%
Somewhat 75% 67% 75% 52%
Political Legal    Economic SocioCultural 
 
Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question EE). 
 
Although recent media monitoring exercises show improvements, the media’s close links to political 
parties (through their owners) result in politically biased reporting (Globe International 2005a and 2005b). 
Ministries and other public bodies are informally required to subscribe to the pro-government tabloid, 
News of the Century, a significant economic advantage for that newspaper given the very low circulation 
numbers in the country. 
 
Officials often deal with critical press by resorting to the Defamation Law, which, as noted above, can 
have a chilling effect on freedom of expression. An alternative is to establish a press or media council 
with the power to entertain and resolve complaints from the public (see box 3.2.5). 
 
Box 3.2.5 The UK Press Complaints Commission 
The Press Complaints Commission (PCC) is the leading body in the United Kingdom for dealing with complaints 
about the print media. Its members are appointed by an Appointments Committee, which is dominated by 
nonjournalists; and a majority of the PCC’s members are also from outside the media. Press members are 
nominated by various media bodies, while lay members are selected on a competitive basis.  
 
The PCC has adopted a Code of Practice for the print media, which deals with issues ranging from a right of reply 
and accuracy to payment for articles. Several of the PCC articles may be overridden if this serves the overall 
public interest; for example, if it prevents the public from being misled or exposes a serious crime.  
 
Complaints are free and do not require a lawyer. The procedure for processing complaints is simple: in 2004, the 
average complaint was processed in 17 days. The vast majority of complaints are resolved through mediation. 
When the PCC adjudicates a complaint and finds in favor of the complainant, the newspaper concerned must 
print a copy of the adjudication, under a headline that refers to the PCC. At many newspapers, compliance with 
the Code of Practice is also part of the contractual obligations of editors, offering another means of enforcement. 
The more than 3,500 complaints lodged with the PCC in 2004 are evidence of its success in redressing 
unprofessional behavior in the print media sector. 
 
Mongolian stakeholders expressed general support for the idea of a press council. Overall, the preference 
was for a nonstatutory, self-regulatory initiative led by the media sector, although the possibility of a 
mixed statutory but media-led council was also canvassed by some stakeholders. The need for better 
training for media workers, including editors and owners, was also often noted as a way of promoting a 
more professional media sector. 
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Efforts to transform the state broadcaster into a public service broadcaster are directed at increasing the 
political autonomy of the media (Finding 3.2.6). Although the 1998 Law on Freedom of the Media 
formally prohibited state control of the media, this change in public policy was never implemented; 
Mongolian Radio and Television (MRTV) thus remained a state-controlled media outlet. The Law on 
Public Radio and Television, which came into effect on July 1, 2005, however, transformed MRTV into 
Public Radio and Television (PRTV). It is now operating under an independent board, the National 
Council, with a mandate to provide a variety of high-quality programming to the public.  
 
The new Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) Law, however, restricts PRTV’s access to advertising, which 
was formally limited to 2 percent of airtime on July 1, 2005, and then eliminated altogether on January 1, 
2006 (see annex 5, Finding MEDIA 3).40 As a result, serious concerns have been raised about the ability 
of PRTV to survive let alone to continue its current levels of programming. On the other hand, 
interviewees pointed out that the old MTVR operated inefficiently, and that PRTV could realize 
significant savings by establishing more effective systems and by retrenching staff. 
 
There have also been problems with the appointment and early operations of the National Council (see 
Finding MEDIA 2 in annex 5). The Mongolian Press Institute oversaw a wide-ranging and highly 
participatory process that led to the nomination by civil society of 37 candidates for the 15 positions on 
the National Council. When the president, government, and parliament made the final selection, however, 
only 8 of those appointed to the Council were from the list of nominees. The others were selected without 
any open discussion or democratic process. It was suggested that the Chair of the Council, an MPRP MP 
until 2004, lacked the requisite independence that his position demanded.41 Following their controversial 
appointment, there was also a serious rift in the Council over the designation of the new General Director 
of PRTV. This led some members to lodge a court case challenging the appointment, although the case 
was ultimately withdrawn and the appointments ratified. 
 
Despite the politicization of the media, CSOs receive a high level of media coverage of their activities as 
indicated in interviews with CSO leaders and their responses to the CSO Survey. Sixty-five percent 
reported that they had been interviewed or their organization profiled in the media, and 61 percent said 
that an activity or event had been covered. Only 44 percent, however, indicated that they received media 
coverage upon their request, whereas many CSO leaders complained that they had to pay for media 
coverage, including advertisements for their events. Consequently, some stakeholders from both the 
media and CSO community described their relations as adversarial. Moreover, CSO leaders as well as 
various other stakeholders repeatedly stated that adequate coverage of an event was only possible if one 
were to read all Mongolian newspapers as each report with its own particular political slant. 
 
Nevertheless, a number of CSOs indicated that they have worked closely with the media over a number of 
years to build stronger relationships and thus ensure better coverage (see recommendations in Finding 
2.5). Globe International, for example, has cultivated a positive working relationship with the media, in 
part through its work to defend freedom of expression (see box 3.2.6). 
                                                          
40 The complete elimination of all advertising was added to the PSB Law after a presidential veto of the law 
originally adopted by the State Great Khural. 
41 The Public Service Broadcasting Law prohibits the appointment of elected officials and members of management 
of political parties to the National Council, but not former MRTV officials or former members of management. 
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Box 3.2.6 Promoting Freedom of Expression: Globe International 
Globe International is a Mongolian NGO founded in 1999 with a mission to promote freedom of expression, 
information, and the media. It has been active in promoting an Access to Information Law, as well as the 2005 
Law on Public Radio and Television. Globe has undertaken a range of activities aimed both at the media and 
policy makers. In 2002, Globe published Report on Media Law Reform in Mongolia, an in-depth analysis of legal 
and other constraints on media freedom, in collaboration with ARTICLE 19, an INGO that promotes freedom of 
expression (ARTICLE 19 and Globe International 2002). Globe is currently working with two local NGOs, the 
Press Institute and the Zorig Foundation, on a project to support the role of the media in promoting transparency. 
The project includes training for investigative journalism and bringing together editors from a range of media 
outlets to form an editors’ task force, to enhance the role of the media in anticorruption activities. Globe also 
conducted a media monitoring exercise during the 2005 presidential elections, aimed at exposing political biases 
in six TV channels, the national radio, and four daily newspapers. 
 
Other instances of CSO-media cooperation include the Ongi River Movement, which has cultivated a 
strong relationship with various media outlets to gain extensive coverage of its events and a greater voice 
in promoting awareness about environmental degradation (annex 3, Finding ONGI 5). In addition, the 
Gender Center for Sustainable Development has worked with certain journalists over time and built 
supportive relationships, while the National Human Rights Commission has awarded media workers for 
their role in giving Voice to human rights abuses and related issues.  
 
3.2.3 Voice: Findings and Recommendations 
As a critical enabling element of civic engagement/social accountability, the capacity of citizens and 
CSOs to Voice their concerns and opinions has dramatically increased since the transition to democracy 
in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, certain weaknesses remain in both the guarantee of freedom of 
expression and the various mechanisms for voice. As a remedy, the study suggests the following 
recommendations. 
 
Finding 3.2.1. Mongolians lack awareness of their civil rights, including freedom of expression. 
 
Recommendations: Citizens’ understanding about their own democratic rights and obligations should be 
fostered. There are a wide range of options, including the following: 
1) Public officials, CSOs, foreign donors, and the media should collaborate in civic education 
programs to inform citizens about their rights. Information may be disseminated through public 
service announcements; literature that uses accessible language and illustrations based on local 
experiences; and projects that directly involve citizens in exploring their rights and 
responsibilities, such as community theaters. 
2) An innovative educational curriculum should target youth for special instruction on citizenship, 
including their democratic rights and responsibilities. In addition to current drama and art 
programs and essay contests, the GoM and education-focused NGOs should explore the 
experiences of other countries within the region to generate new programs. 
 




1) In collaboration with other stakeholders, public officials should comprehensively review and 
reform the criminal and civil defamation regimes in accordance with international standards. At a 
minimum, the provision of imprisonment for defamation should be removed. International donor 
agencies, INGOs, and CSOs with an expertise in defamation laws should advocate for these 
changes, for example, by providing comparative materials on defamation laws in other countries. 
 29
2) Given the culture and norms that have developed under the current defamation regime, 
stakeholders need to undertake explicit actions to implement reforms to the legal code. In 
addition to technical and financial support that need to be provided by the donor community, 
stakeholders should revise the legal text, and have media-related CSOs sponsor training on its 
implications for both journalists and the judiciary. 
 
Finding 3.2.3. The registration system for the media poses a threat of politicization that can delay or 
obstruct the entry of various media outlets. 
 
Recommendation: In consultation with the media and media-related CSOs, public officials should revise 
the media registration system to ensure it does not arbitrarily impede entry into the market. To curb 
political interference in the registration process, responsibility for media registration may be transferred to 
a nongovernmental agency. International donor agencies, INGOs, and interested CSOs should actively 
advocate for these changes, for example, by providing comparative studies on other country experiences.  
 
Finding 3.2.4. The current licensing system for broadcasters is susceptible to political distortions, fails to 
promote public interest broadcasting, and constrains the capacity of broadcasters by saturating the market. 
 
Recommendations: 
1) The GoM should strengthen the autonomy and capacity of the Communications Regulatory 
Commission to promote public interest broadcasting by enabling it to take into account diversity 
of content and ownership, as well as market-carrying capacity when licensing broadcasters. The 
GoM should also establish a differential fee schedule that offers lower fees for nonprofit 
community broadcasters. 
2) In consultation with independent and public broadcasters as well as media-related CSOs, the 
GoM should revise the laws governing broadcast licensing to eliminate the requirement of a letter 
of support from the governor and add a provision for the licensing of nonprofit and community 
broadcasters. 
 
Finding 3.2.5. Inadequate funding and related problems of self-censorship have resulted in the poor 
quality of media output. This is a serious threat to both freedom of expression and the public’s right to 
diverse sources of reliable information. 
 
Recommendations: 
1) Media-related CSOs, public officials, and media representatives should hold a broad social 
consultation to analyze the negative influences on media reporting, such as the politicization of 
the media, funding constraints, weak ethical and professional norms, and the narrow 
concentration of media ownership. They should also explore actions to improve quality and 
reliability. A media council should be established to address the problem of poor media reporting 
and make concrete, country-specific recommendations.  
2) Additional training for media workers, including editors and owners, should be provided. The 
training should promote not only professional reporting but also financial viability of media 
outlets through efficiency and fundraising. 
3) Seniors officials should address the widespread phenomenon of self-censorship by taking the 
following measures: prosecute threats and acts of violence against journalists to the fullest extent 
of the law and publicly expose the perpetrators; stop pressuring state employees to subscribe to 
particular media outlets; and instruct the intelligence services to restrict monitoring of media 
output to a limited set of legally defined issues related to state security.  
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Finding 3.2.6. The politicization of the National Council for the PRTV and dramatic reductions in its 
funding have resulted in inadequate public interest programming. 
 
Recommendations: 
1) In collaboration with the PRTV and media-related CSOs, the GoM should promote the capacity 
building of the PRTV to ensure better management and resource mobilization. International 
donors should provide initial support, including investigation of cost-saving measures within 
broadcasting operations and exchanges with other public broadcasters that have been forced to 
cut back on operations (for example, the Georgian Public Broadcaster). 
2) PRTV should monitor the elimination of advertising resources, keeping the GoM and the public 
informed about the adverse consequences. If this critically undermines the ability of PRTV to 
provide public interest programming, public officials should not only amend this restriction but 
also establish a five-year budget to promote PRTV autonomy. 
3) With initial technical and financial support from the international community, media-related 
CSOs should monitor the implementation of the Public Broadcasting Law. If complications arise, 
they should initiate inquiries with government agencies and the judiciary. 
4) The international community should provide technical assistance to the National Council for 
capacity building, to enable this body to operate effectively and in accordance with best practices 
around the world. 
 
3.3 PROMOTING SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH  
INFORMED OPINIONS AND DECISIONS 
 
Information is a critical enabling element for civic engagement and social accountability. Civil society 
actors require sufficient information from multiple sources to formulate and voice their opinions, monitor 
governmental expenditures and service delivery, and effectively negotiate with public officials. 
Unfortunately, all categories of stakeholders repeatedly indicated during interviews, in focus groups, and 
in their survey responses that they are unable to access information, particularly information held by 
Mongolian public institutions. Additionally, a recent study by the Press Institute on freedom of 
information (2005b) indicates that the lack of access to information is one of most serious obstacles for 
both the media and civil society to fulfill their roles in Mongolia’s democracy. 
 
As in the case of Voice, there are two critical factors for Information to function effectively as an 
enabling element for civic engagement/social accountability. The first is the need to recognize and 
implement the right to access information, specifically information held by public officials. The second is 
the capacity of and opportunities for civil society actors, including the media, to generate and disseminate 
alternative sources of information that permit CSOs and ordinary citizens to evaluate the performance of 
public officials. 
 
3.3.1 Access to Information 
While the vast majority (93 percent) of respondents to the CSO survey indicated that they have requested 
documents or other information at least once, they have had variable success in obtaining them (annexes 
3, 4, and 5: Findings ONGI 3, Finding EDU 5, and MEDIA 5, respectively). The majority of respondents 
(56 percent) indicated that officials only provided information sometimes, while 23 percent said that they 




















Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question AA). 
Figure 3.3.2 Frequency with which Officials Provided 

















Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question BB1) 
 
Among the ministries, information is most difficult to access at the Ministry of Finance and Economics 
(MoFE). A staff member at one NGO stated that the MoFE considers all information on the GoM budget 
to be “top secret.” Various informants confirmed this perception, including a staff member of an MP who 
added that budget information in general is not published. Inability to access budget information has 
serious implications for CSOs and individuals for civic engagement/social accountability. 
 
The 1995 Mongolian Law of State Secrets and its culture of secrecy were repeatedly cited as significant 
constraints on access to information (Finding 3.3.1) Article 16.17 of the Mongolian Constitution gives 
citizens “the right to seek and receive information except that which the state and its bodies are legally 
bound to protect as secret” (emphasis added). The justification for secrecy is based on the need “to protect 
human rights, dignity and reputation of persons and to ensure national defense, security and public order.” 
Under this Article, information that is not subject to disclosure is to be classified and protected by law. As 
the Constitution fails to define secrecy or to set limits on what may be considered secret, the government 
is able to classify documents without regard for international standards. 
 
Under international law, restrictions on the right of access to information are legitimate only when they 
are proved to be necessary to protect a small number of legitimate aims listed in international treaties. The 
standard of necessity requires public officials to demonstrate that all restrictions are clearly and narrowly 
drawn and that disclosure is likely to damage a protected interest. 
 
The Mongolian Law on State Secrets and its supplementary List of State Secrets (revised on January 2, 
2004) provides the legal framework for secrecy.42 Article 3 of the law describes secrets as information 
that must not be disclosed in the interest of national security. Article 5, however, broadly characterizes the 
scope of state secrets, including in its definition, ambiguous concepts such as economic security (see 
annex 5, Finding MEDIA 6). Moreover, in a recent study conducted by the Press Institute (2005b), some 
officials claimed that by law, they could only disclose information through one central source, for 
example, the public relations department of a ministry. This regulation is problematic as it gives this 
                                                          
42 The law establishes a procedure for official bodies to propose items for the List of State Secrets, which is ultimately submitted 
to the State Great Khural. The current list includes 58 categories of secrets, along with lengthy periods of classification. There is 
no provision for overriding secrecy in the public interest. 
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department unchecked authority to provide or deny access to information and may, thus, arbitrarily 
obstruct access to information.43  
 
The wide range and ambiguous content of the legal code effectively allow individual bureaucracies to 
define their own rules, leading to an extensive classification of documents. During both interviews and 
focus groups, CSO leaders and journalists repeatedly complained that too many government documents 
are classified. In a welcome development, however, the government made a commitment in 2005 to 
revoke the Law on Secrets in its Ten Steps to Intensity the Implementation of the National Program to 
Combat Corruption. Unfortunately, during the study’s dissemination in February 2006 opposition leaders 
called into question the government’s commitment to reforming the secrecy laws. A prominent opposition 
MP indicated that “there is no talk yet of modifying [the laws on secrecy] either within the government or 
among the MPs.” Another MP from a different opposition party indicated that “there might be some 
struggles for (retaining) the secrecy laws.” When a representative of the Ministry of Justice and Home 
Affairs was asked to comment; he responded that this was not within their preview but the responsibility 
of the State Intelligence Agency.  
 
Poor accessibility of information characterizes the Mongolian legislative process as well (Finding 3.3.2). 
During an interview in February 2005, an MP cited a proposal for mandatory publicizing of all bills to be 
considered in parliament at least 30 days before they are put to a vote. During this period, citizens have 
the right to evaluate the bill and voice concerns. However, the provision was revised to read that bills can 
be publicized; consequently very few are. The MP attributed the revision to the socialist legacy of state 
secrecy but asserted that “the soil is now ready” to change this practice and other legalities that hinder 
CSO civic engagement and social accountability.  
 
Access to parliamentary deliberations is also limited, so that citizens rarely attend parliamentary sessions 
and standing committee meetings. Citizens are permitted no more than 15 minutes to observe sessions of 
the State Great Khural; and minutes from the sessions are not easily accessible to the public. It is 
therefore difficult, if not impossible, for citizens to evaluate the performance of their representatives or 
monitor the legislative process, including budget allocations. 
 
To address this issue, The Asia Foundation (TAF) funded a project in the mid-1990s to publish multiple 
copies of parliamentary debates for the public record and to deliver them to various public access 
libraries. One of these depositories was the UB headquarters of Women for Social Progress, which also 
gained live television access to parliamentary debates (see box 3.3.1). After TAF funding ran out, the 
GoM continued to publish and distribute parliamentary deliberations, as had been previously agreed upon 
with TAF, but soon stopped, citing budgetary reasons. Currently, the only copy of the minutes from 
recent parliamentary debates is in the archives of the State Great Khural. The general public has a legal 





                                                          
43.A survey by Globe International (2003) reports that out of the 47 government agencies surveyed, only 32 had produced a list of 
secrets; and 33, a procedure for classifying documents as secret, indicating that many agencies have not fulfilled the legal 
requirements to establish their own secrecy regime. Of the agencies that are complying, 23 considered the lists and procedures, 
themselves, to be secret. 
44 The UNDP also allegedly attempted to undertake a project to promote public parliamentary hearings, but there was some 
political resistance, so it was never implemented. 
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Box 3.3.1 Women for Social Progress: Pursuit of Information for Voter Education 
In 1994 the leader of the Women for Social Progress (WSP) proposed a project to The Asia Foundation to 
conduct a voters’ education survey. To evaluate voter selection of officials, WSP conducted research on political 
campaign promises and the performance of politicians while in office. However, WSP could neither locate such 
information nor obtain MP voting records, as it could not gain access to the State Great Khural’s archives. The 
leader of WSP presented her complaint to the Constitutional Court and received permission, a year later, to see 
the parliamentary protocols. These, however, were of little help as the MPs had used a secret voting system. 
 
Since the TAF project could not be implemented as initially envisioned, the WSP approached “Vote Smart,” an 
American nonprofit organization, for assistance with another project to enhance voter awareness of their legal 
rights. WSP published brochures and organized workshops for voters in the countryside; and in 1995, just prior 
to the 1996 parliamentary elections, WSP asked the State Great Khural to change its policy and deliver its 
transcripts to the public. There was no reply. The leader of the NGO then wrote to political parties asking them to 
include open voting and the right of access to parliament protocols in their campaign platform. Only the MDP 
agreed. After its coalition won a majority in parliament, access to parliamentary debate became easier, although 
it remained restricted to 15-minute intervals. With funding from TAF, parliament also provided the WSP and other 
public access libraries around the country with copies of parliamentary deliberations. WSP also gained live 
television access to the parliamentary debates, which was piped into their library.  
 
Although this window into the legislative process ended shortly after the TAF funding ran out, WSP considers the 
opening of the parliamentary voting system one of its greatest successes. With Sansar Cable TV‘s resumption of 
live broadcasts of parliamentary debate in April 2004, under a UNDP parliament-strengthening project, WSP is 
considering lobbying once again for greater access to parliamentary records. 
 
Stakeholders also consider the judicial system to be a particularly secretive branch of the government; its 
broad claims of legal confidentiality reinforce a legal regime on secrecy (Finding 3.3.1). Journalists who 
wish to attend a court session must receive prior permission from the presiding judge. Even members of 
the National Human Rights Commission, which as an official body has authorized access to confidential 
information, have experienced problems accessing information from the judicial system. 
 
Other stakeholders have claimed that the worst offenders in Mongolia’s “culture of secrecy” are the 
police, who have even refused to provide human rights NGOs with the regulations that guide police 
conduct.45 Ironically, in this culture of secrecy, CSO leaders and journalists alike have reported that it is 
easier to get information from high ranking officials as lower-level officials are afraid of the 
consequences of providing information.  
 
The absence of a general law on access to information exacerbates this culture of secrecy (Finding 3.3.3). 
Certain laws hold disclosure provisions, such as the 1993 Law on Government, Article 31 which provides 
for the publication of GoM Decrees and PM Ordinances, but only with consent of the chair of the 
Administration Department (administrative staff). The Political Parties Law, Article 18.4 also requires 
disclosure of information about donations to political parties, and the draft Anti-Corruption Law will 
require senior officials to disclose their income (see box 2.1.1).  
 
                                                          
45 The leader of this NGO, which provides access to pro bono legal advice and monitors the judicial system, also mentioned that 
when trying to get a map of a soum, she was told that this was “secret information.” 
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Box 3.3.2 Globe International: Promoting an Access to Information Law 
Since 2002, Globe International has actively promoted the adoption of an Access to Information or Freedom of Information 
(FOI) Law, giving citizens the right to access information held by public bodies. They have adopted a multi-tiered strategy 
that focuses on drafting legislation and publishing research, lobbying MPs and other decision makers, and conducting 
public education campaigns. 
 
Globe initially prepared a Draft Law of Mongolia on FOI. The draft was written by a team of eight leading Mongolian 
lawyers, in consultation with their international partner, ARTICLE 19. This allowed them to set the baseline standards 
against which a parliamentary legislative proposal would be judged. They also prepared a “Law Concept” (legal concept 
note) on FOI to explain the law’s structure. Globe’s Executive Director, Munkhburen Dash, is a member of the working 
group recently set up by the MoJHA to prepare access to information legislation. 
 
To achieve its objective, Globe has primarily targeted legislators. It prepared a Handbook for Legislators on FOI, which 
was sent to all MPs. A series of roundtables and seminars for MPs have had remarkable success, with one roundtable on 
December 17, 2002, attracting 19 MPs. Globe also accompanied a group of MPs on a Study Trip to Bulgaria to expose 
them to mechanisms of FOI in other parts of the world. 
 
Globe has undertaken a number of public awareness campaigns, using the media to transmit their message. In addition 
to a number of national and local programs on both radio and television, Globe prepared a 50-minute TV quiz show to 
engage the public more actively in the issue. 
 
These disclosure provisions can play an important role in empowering civil society. Public disclosure of 
assets by senior officials can be an invaluable tool for CSOs and investigative journalists seeking to 
expose corruption. Similarly, rules on public disclosure of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) 
allow civil society to monitor both the EIA itself and its implementation of recommendations.  
 
These legal provisions, however, are not an effective substitute for a comprehensive Access to 
Information Law. The constraints on access to information have led various civil society actors, most 
notably Globe International (see box 3.3.2), to advocate for the adoption of an Access to Information 
Law, which would require public bodies to provide access to information. At present, a working group of 
CSO representatives set up by the MoJHA is developing a draft with comments from the other ministries. 
The draft may be ready for parliamentary review by April 2006. 
 
The Access to Information Law must provide information seekers the opportunity to appeal refusals. 
Ideally, the law should establish an independent administrative mechanism for appeal, but in smaller 
countries like Mongolia, this may not be practical. Instead, this task may be allocated to an existing body 
such as the National Human Rights Commission. 
 
A provision to appeal denied or delayed access would greatly assist CSOs frustrated by both refusals and 
“foot dragging” by public officials. It would also serve as an important mechanism for promoting 
accountability to the law, ensuring that decisions on access are not left exclusively to civil servants. The 
recent experience of the Ongi River Movement exemplifies such bureaucratic delays (see box 3.3.3)  
 
Box 3.3.3 Ongi River Movement: Denial of Access to Information Law by “Passing the Buck” 
In 2004, leaders of the Ongi River Movement approached the mining company Erel to request information on the volume 
of it earth removed during its operations in order to know the level of water diverted and to monitor the company’s 
rehabilitation activities of its sites in Uyanga. The company declined to release the information. The team proceeded to the 
local environment inspector, who said that he did not have the information. They then contacted the soum governor, who 
by law should have had this information. He informed them that he did not and directed them to the inspector at the aimag 
level. The inspector told them that he had the report, but that it was in the possession of someone else. The inspector then 
referred them to the Ministry of the Nature and Environment in Ulaanbaatar, to whom the ORM leaders submitted an 
official request letter. To date, they have not received a response (see annex 3). 
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These bureaucratic delays highlight the need of CSOs to draw from independent sources of information 
and for investigative journalists to uncover issues of public interest. 
 
3.3.2 Generating and Disseminating Alternative Sources of Information 
During interviews and in focus groups, various CSO leaders and journalists commented that one of the 
biggest problems is not only the selective provision of information by public bodies, but also the quality 
of the information obtained. These stakeholders felt that public officials typically offer information that 
shows the GoM in a favorable light while covering up more negative or potentially damaging information 
about government policy, budgets, or the performance of public officials. Hence, stakeholders frequently 
referred to the need for “truthful” or “objective” information. 
 
Ironically, stakeholders also contended that Mongolian society believes that “true” and “objective” 
information can only be obtained from the state. One informant quoted a journalist outside of Ulaanbaatar 
who asserted that “we want objective truth and the only truth comes from government, and the higher the 
position the greater the truth.” 
 
This mentality, a by-product of the socialist era, is highly problematic for several reasons. First, it is an 
uncritical evaluation of the source (public officials), and hence, the information they provide. Second, it 
undermines the ability of the citizenry (including receptive public officials) to evaluate information that 
contradicts the official line or to challenge official positions. The ability to critically evaluate and 
challenge official information is a key aspect of civic engagement/social accountability.  
 
Social accountability requires not only evaluating the limits and biases of governmental sources but also 
requires access to alternative sources of information. As discussed in the previous section on Voice, the 
media is an important source of information, although the degree to which media outlets and individual 
journalists critically evaluate the information provided by public officials and seek alternative sources of 
information can vary dramatically. CSOs also generate alternative sources of information through 
monitoring public service delivery and governmental expenditure and general analysis of the budgetary 
process (Finding 3.3.4). 
 
Although the CSO Survey indicates that CSOs are more involved in monitoring of public service delivery 
(32 percent) than governmental expenditures (9 percent), they are actively involved in budgetary analysis 
(22 percent) for their own constituencies and for Mongolian citizens in general. Fifty-eight percent of 
respondents reported that the monitoring of services influences public policy, legislation, or the conduct 
of officials almost always or at least often, 50 percent in the case of budget analysis, and only 42 percent 
for the monitoring of expenditures (see figure 3.3.3).  
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Figure 3.3.3 Activities Likely to Result in Policy, Legislation, or Conduct Changes (percent)  
 
Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question I). 
 
When respondents were asked if CSOs have sufficient opportunities to influence policy, legislation, or the 
conduct of officials in these areas, the statistics were more dramatic: 31 percent reported some 
opportunities to monitor services and only 15 percent to monitor expenditures (annex 2, Finding WSP 3)46 
. This will be discussed further in the final section on Negotiation. The case study on the Uvorkhangai 
branch of Women for Social Progress (WSP-UV) offers a prime example of how alternative sources of 
information can play a critical role in social accountability (see box 3.3.4). 
 
Box 3.3.4 Provision of Information by the Women for Social Progress-Uvorkhangai: Triangle News 
In 2002, the WSP-UV began publishing the Triangle News “to deliver local information to the local citizens” 
for enhanced participation in local government (WSP-UV 2003).47  
 
 The suspension of this publication in 2004 was particularly unfortunate as Triangle News had published 
information about governmental policies and actions, particularly budgetary issues, and thus played an 
important role in promoting civic engagement/social accountability. In each of its issues, an entire page 
presented information on local budget issues in simple, accessible language.  
 
Articles in the newspaper also provided important information about governmental policies and public goods 
and services that were available to citizens. For example, in April 2002, the newspaper reported that the 
GoM was distributing free hay for livestock that were suffering from recurrent drought in the region. When 
their readers realized that they had been illegally charged for the hay by soum officials, they contacted the 
local agriculture office. Even though no action was taken against the responsible parties, by June, soum 
officials had stopped their illegal sales  
                                                          
46 Respondents were not asked about opportunities for budget analysis, although the survey questions focused on 
CSO monitoring of GoM. In interviews and focus groups there were some references to the need to monitor CSO 
projects and for government and foreign funding, as the government’s internationally funded projects are 
insufficiently monitored. 
47 With funding from the Globalization Fund for the Future and subsequently the Mongolian Foundation for an Open Society 
(now the Mongolian Open Society Forum), WSP-UV published 18 issues with a circulation of 9,000 (one-third of the households 
in the aimag) before funding ran out, forcing them to stop publishing the newspaper in March 2004. After an interview with 
study team members in April 2005, the Bank’s Ulaanbaatar office provided WSP-UV additional funding to publish 12 monthly 
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Other ways for CSOs to generate alternative sources of information are research and publication of 
nongovernmental documents about their activities. As previously mentioned, the Open Society Forum 
Web site presents documents on an array of issues related to its work, and lists a fellowship program that 
supports independent research on topics ranging from land privatization to participatory budget analysis. 
 
Other examples of such documents from case studies include the environmental research conducted by 
ORM in collaboration with Professor Chandmani, an agronomist and lecturer at the Mongolian 
Agriculture University, who acted as advisor and researcher for ORM (see annex 3, Finding ONGI 4). 
The NCAV has also conducted extensive research and documentation of its efforts to convince both the 
public and GoM officials of the gravity and extent of domestic violence (see annex 1, Finding NCAV 3). 
 
3.3.3 Findings and Recommendations Related to Information 
Access by citizens, CSOs, and the media to state information has dramatically increased since the 
transition to democracy in the early 1990s. Similarly, the capacity of civil society to independently 
generate and disseminate information has also radically improved. Nevertheless, there exist several legal 
and cultural constraints on access to information and opportunities to generate and disseminate alternative 
information. These serve as the basis for the following recommendations.  
 
Finding 3.3.1. The GoM culture of secrecy, reinforced by broad and ambiguous laws on the 
confidentiality of information, obstructs citizen access to information of public interest that is necessary 
to civic engagement. 
 
Recommendations:  
1) In consultation with the relevant CSOs, and in accordance with constitutional and international 
standards, the GoM should review the legal regime of secrecy to provide a balance between state 
interests and the need for openness (see Finding 3.3.3). 
2) With initial support from the donor community, the GoM should address problems related to its 
culture of secrecy. It could initiate training programs for civil servants and politicians on the 
negative effects of secrecy and the importance and benefits of openness to good governance and 
socioeconomic development. Moreover, senior officials and political leaders should send clear 
signals that excessive secrecy will no longer be tolerated—for instance, by disciplining officials 
and civil servants who withhold information to which public access is guaranteed under law.  
 




1) The GoM should explore ways to make proceedings and key decisions more accessible to 
citizens. For example, it should produce regular publications (an official journal) containing 
presidential decrees, parliamentary proceedings, and significant judicial rulings and local decrees. 
These publications should be available at public libraries and other depositories in every aimag, 
and should be sold at cost. While the international community may cover initial costs, the GoM 
must be prepared to assume the financial costs of distributing this information as a responsibility 
of a democratic state to its citizenry. 
2) Parliamentarians should mandate that pending legislation be disseminated through public 
hearings or the media within a reasonable period (for example, 30 days) prior to their 
deliberation. 
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3) CSOs should be a primary means for disseminating information about pending bills and recent 
legislation to an informed public and should be encouraged to assist in disseminating this 
information to the broader public. 
4) The media, in particular public broadcasters, should produce public interest programs about 
pending issues, proceedings, and key decisions by public bodies. 
 
Finding 3.3.3. Public officials deny or delay access to information, whereas the absence of a 
comprehensive Access to Information Law undermines the ability of civil society to exercise its 
constitutional right to access information held by public bodies. 
 
Recommendations:  
1) Public officials should enact the comprehensive Access to Information Law, currently on the 
parliamentary agenda. To assist in that process, CSOs should continue their efforts to ensure that 
the Law meets constitutional and international standards. This includes a general presumption of 
openness, clear procedures for citizens to access information, and a narrow regime of exceptions 
to the right of access. 
2) The Law should also provide for a right to appeal any refusals or undue delays to an 
administrative body. This body could be either an existing body, such as the National Human 
Rights Commission, or one specifically created for this purpose, such as an Information 
Commissioner. Once operational, a capacity-building program should be established so that this 
body is able to fulfill its responsibilities under the Law. Any further appeals should be assigned to 
the courts. 
3) After the law is adopted, stakeholders should ensure that it is implemented effectively. CSOs 
should make active use of the law through comprehensive training and increased incentives for 
public officials to act efficiently in providing the public access to information, publicity to ensure 
the public is aware of its right to information, and training for judges to ensure effective 
implementation of the legislation. 
 
Finding 3.3.4. CSOs are providing critical alternative information through the conduct of independent 
research or the creation of forums, including newspapers, that confirms, counters, or expands upon the 
information provided by the GOM. 
 
Recommendations:  
1) With initial technical and financial support from the international community, CSOs should 
expand their provision of alternative sources of information to fill in gaps and to confirm the 
accuracy of official information. Collaboration among CSOs working in similar or overlapping 
areas may promote efficiency and cost-effectiveness.  
2) Given the costs of research, CSOs should collaborate with the GoM and other international actors 
who are analyzing related issues. Donors should provide start-up funding for data collection and 
analysis in policy areas critical to governance and development. 
 
3.4 SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH NEGOTIATION 
 
Citizens’ participation in governance beyond the electoral process enhances the effectiveness of 
government and its socioeconomic policies.48 When civil society actors Negotiate with public officials, 
                                                          
48 A great deal has been written about the role of citizens in governance. See, for example, the OCED publication, 
Citizens as Partners (2001). 
 39
development initiatives become more responsive to socioeconomic problems such as poverty reduction, 
while strengthening democratic institutions and political legitimacy.49 
 
International precedents and norms establish the right of citizens to participate in their own governance. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights refers specifically to the right of each citizen to “take part in 
the government of his country,” without delineating the form of participation beyond the electoral 
process. The United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development broadly recognizes the “inalienable 
human right” of each citizen “to participate in, contribute to and enjoy economic, social, cultural and 
political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized” (UN 
General Assembly Res. 41/128, December 4, 1986). Once again, the precise mechanisms are to be 
worked out according to the customs and conditions of each individual country. 
 
Mongolia’s legal code contains provisions for CSO and citizen participation in governance and 
development. However, CSOs generally consider these formal mechanisms for negotiation to be 
inadequate, relying on other informal opportunities to negotiate with public officials. Moreover, CSOs 
frequently collaborate with public officials and international donors or act on their own to initiate forums 
that encourage negotiation and promote social accountability.  
 
3.4.1 Provisions and Opportunities for Negotiation 
More than 65 percent of the respondents to the CSO Survey participated in a public hearing or meeting 
with public officials on a regular basis (at least one a month), while 34 percent participated in more 
selective state commissions and advisory committees. More than a third of CSO leaders also stated that 
they regularly engage in advocacy for changes in public policy or legislation (see annex 6, Question H). 
 
Moreover, the vast majority of respondents believe that these activities influence the performance of 
public officials at least some of the time, with a significant percentage (35-60 percent) believing that they 




Figure 3.4.1 Likelihood that Negotiation Activities Will Result in Changes in  







Advocacy 21% 39% 25% 4% 1% 9%
Hearings 17% 23% 37% 13% 1% 8%
Committees 8% 27% 36% 9% 3% 18%




Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question I). 
                                                          
49 Mechanisms for negotiation also entail opportunities for civil society actors to Voice their opinions and concerns, 
and potentially to gain Information from public officials while providing it as well. The overlap is evident in 
references to Negotiation in the two previous sections. 
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Nevertheless, while more than 40 percent of the respondents indicated that opportunities to influence 
public policy and legislation by negotiating with public officials were at least somewhat sufficient, nearly 
a third stated that they are insufficient. Another 14 percent went so far as to declare that there were no 
opportunities for negotiation, undoubtedly reflecting their own inability to negotiate with public officials 
(see figure 3.4.2). 
 














Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question N). 
 
One might assume intuitively that negotiation between citizens and public officials at the local level 
would be greater, due to the greater accessibility of local officials and their more direct accountability to 
local constituents. Indeed, this is the underlying assumption of decentralization initiatives among 
international development agencies and donors. In fact, respondents to the CSO Survey found local 
officials to be only slightly more receptive to their social accountability-related activities than were 
national officials, with 48 percent of respondents indicating that local officials are at least somewhat 
receptive to social accountability initiatives by CSOs, as opposed to 45 percent for national officials 
(annex 6, Question K). There is, however, a great deal of potential for local-level social accountability 
initiatives, including the use of Community Scorecards (CSCs) in the World Bank-sponsored Sustainable 
Livelihoods Project (SLP) (Finding 3.4.1). Donors, governments, CSOs, and service delivery agencies all 
over the world are increasingly using community scorecards and citizen report cards for stakeholders to 
evaluate the quality of services and negotiate desired changes. In Mongolia, however, the CSCs will 
become an effective mechanism for negotiation only if there is greater GoM ownership and closer CSO 
involvement (see box 3.4.1). 
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Box 3.4.1 The Community Scorecard: Giving Stakeholders a Platform to Review Project Activity 
Following the failure of the National Poverty Alleviation Program to significantly reduce poverty, the GoM made 
poverty reduction one of the highest priorities. A key instrument to this end is the Mongolian Sustainable Livelihoods 
Project (MSLP) under the Household Livelihoods Capacity Support Council (HLCSC 2004). Stakeholder monitoring 
of the quality and effectiveness of social services under this program would help GoM to attain its goal “to reduce 
vulnerability and achieve a secure and sustainable livelihood by targeting poor and vulnerable near-poor households 
and individuals nationwide.”  
 
In particular, the CSC mechanism of the Local Initiatives Fund (LIF) that facilitates community-based performance 
monitoring has the potential to become a model of social accountability in service delivery, which may be replicated 
on a larger scale. According to the Project Implementation manual, the process is to be facilitated by the bag 
governor, khural members, and trained community members, assisted by the soum HLCSC secretary. After the 
completion of a one-month subproject, the soum HLCSC secretary presides over an open community meeting to 
assess the subproject and its impact. At the same time, information is elicited from individual community members, 
and a CSC and Impact Record completed. In a process largely driven by the HLCSC secretariat as opposed to 
CSOs or user communities, the information from the CSC and Impact Record is combined with that from the 
community assessment and compiled into a report, which is sent to the aimag HLCSC secretary. The aimag 
HLCSC retains a record of the information on which the evaluation report is based and then submits a compiled 
report to HLCSC. 
 
The current system of implementation, however, constrains social accountability in several ways. A report by 
the World Bank’s supervision mission in March-April 2005, notes that the HLCS secretaries regard community 
score cards and the Impact Record as cumbersome paperwork that they must complete to comply with World 
Bank requirements. Their attitude indicates a common problem of ownership and sustainability of donor-
initiated social accountability mechanisms. The attitude could reduce the usefulness of such tools and must 
be addressed to promote institutionalization. Fortunately, the Bank’s task team intends to monitor whether 
community views are aired and heeded, and review how the score cards and other monitoring and evaluation 
tools are used. This will be done through direct observation by the project’s M&E Officer (MSLP 2005:49). 
 
Moreover, when asked about their participation in forums organized by public officials, respondents said 
they were least likely to participate in a local council on a regular basis (see figure 3.4.3).50  
 









5% 21% 37% 6% 30% 2%
Legislative Hearing 4% 22% 42% 12% 18% 1%
Local Council
Meeting
4% 16% 32% 7% 38% 2%




Source: CSO Survey (Annex 6, Question KK). 
                                                          
50 Even this low percentage seems a bit high. One CSO leader noted that local councils do not meet monthly, let 
alone weekly, as some CSOs indicated in their responses, and in any case, far fewer than the 20 percent indicated, 
participate in local councils on a regular basis. 
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Respondents were equally divided on whether participation in a local council meeting would be effective, 
somewhat effective, or slightly effective (annex 6, Question LL). The results of the survey are explained partly by 
the UB-bias of NGOs in Mongolia and the likelihood that national rather than local officials were targeted. 
Additionally, the centralization of public policy and the budget process have weakened incentives for citizens and 
CSOs to negotiate with relatively anemic local governmental institutions that are upwardly accountable (Finding 
3.4.2).  
 
A striking example is weak involvement in school councils or local communities in general (see annex 4, Finding 
EDU 6). When the Ongi River Movement tried to gain information that would make mining companies and 
public officials accountable, the lack of downward accountability thwarted its efforts for enforcement of laws on 
environmental protection (see annex 3, Finding ONGI 6).  
 
Many stakeholders blame the Public Sector Management and Finance Law for the lack of downward 
accountability. The PSMFL has shown positive results in several areas, such as timely budget transfers, control of 
wage arrears, and overall fiscal discipline. However, the law has also removed most revenue-raising authority 
from local governments, and limited their role in service delivery. Nor have any compensating arrangements been 
made for citizen engagement in local budget processes and expenditure tracking (see box 3.4.2). 
 
Box 3.4.2 Decentralization: Structural and Practical Impediments to Social Accountability 
An important constraint on social accountability in Mongolia is the inconsistency between the centralized intergovernmental 
fiscal transfer system and the relatively decentralized political structures. The centralized fiscal management system has 
achieved macroeconomic stability, controlled wage arrears, and enabled timely budgetary transfers to local governments 
(Mongolia’s Regional Development Note 2005).  
 
The intergovernmental fiscal mechanism has its legal basis in the General Budget Law, which regulates revenue relations, 
and the 2002 Public Sector Management and Finance Law, which regulates expenditure responsibilities. The intention of 
the PSMFL is to increase the accountability and effectiveness of public sector institutions at all levels while respecting the 
need for fiscal restraint and sustainability. Unfortunately, by centralizing fiscal powers, the law effectively weakened local 
governments, severely limiting their tax-raising powers and responsibilities for service delivery. Indeed, the current 
governance system “fragments responsibilities of local governments and control over resources, resulting in weakening of 
accountability and service delivery for public resources” (Mongolia’s Regional Development Note 2005:2). 
 
The PSMFL does not make provision for the participation of soum khurals or ordinary citizens in budget processes. At 
present their roles are ad hoc and varied in practice (World Bank 2004d). During interviews and focus groups, many 
stakeholders concurred that the PSMFL had not enhanced downward accountability of public sector institutions, but rather 
limited the autonomy of local officials and thereby strengthened their upward accountability. These findings are supported 
by the work of Robin Mearns, Decentralization, Rural Livelihoods and Pasture-Land Management in Post-Socialist 
Mongolia. Mearns notes that while the PSMFL requires all public agencies to review and submit reports annually to the 
Ministry of Finance and Economics, there are no provisions holding these agencies accountable to local citizens. 
Consequently, under the current system, the governors “have little downward accountability to their local constituencies.”  
 
The PSMFL also centralized most taxes previously shared with local governments, and local governments have few 
powers to institute new taxes. Such restrictions in revenue-collection powers may diminish incentives for governors to be 
downwardly accountable, as well as for citizens, who do not pay taxes to local governments, to demand accountability from 
local officials. 
 
Local governors have limited decision-making powers in each sector. Although aimag budgets reflect spending on 
education and health, the funds actually flow directly from the central government to respective schools and hospitals. 
Hence local governments do not have any control over these funds. As one soum governor noted, these “limitations on 
budget spending on the part of the governor also constrain citizen influence on the budget-allocation process,” as line-item 
provisions leave little room for local decision making. Indeed, as Mearns argues, in this environment there is little incentive 
for local populations to use their elected representatives as channels for articulating concerns and making claims (Mearns 
2002:138). 
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Negotiation also ensures that legislative processes are democratic and responsive to citizen needs. As 
figure 3.4.3 indicates, citizen participation in a public forum was highest for legislative hearings. 
Moreover, half of the respondents found these hearings to be at least somewhat effective, indicating the 
highest level of confidence in this form of negotiation to influence public policy (annex 6, Question LL). 
 
Still, there are no formal mechanisms for CSO participation in the drafting of legislation (Finding 3.4.3). 
Various NGOs have been invited to participate in targeted working groups that provide citizen input into 
certain draft pieces of legislation. NGOs have also given critical testimony before parliament and, in some 
cases, independently prepared draft legislation, which has been picked up by officials.  
 
Three recent examples on NGO involvement include the proposed Access to Information Law; the Public 
Service Broadcasting Law, which was passed in January 2005; and the Domestic Violence Law, which 
was passed in 1994, due largely to advocacy efforts by the National Center Against Violence (see annex 
1, Finding NCAV 5). The Ongi River Movement also submitted detailed recommendations to inform 
proposed amendments to the 1996 Water Bill at both a National Workshop on the Management of River 
Basins organized by the government and a meeting of the cabinet in August 2002 (see annex 4). Although 
most of their inputs did not feature in the amended law, the ORM leadership claimed that the new law had 
in fact reflected a number of the positions they had promoted in their recommendations, including those 
related to the functions of the water management committees. 
 
A representative of the Association of Mongolian Elders (AME) also claimed that his organization had 
made recommendations over the years on legislation related to welfare, medical insurance, family, 
retirement, and pension law, adding that AME cooperates closely with the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. 
The AME is a “legacy institution” as it was created and received state funding under the socialist regime. 
As such it continues to be one of the few CSOs to receive state funding in Mongolia. Undoubtedly, the 
informal and formal ties that AME enjoys with public officials have been key not only to its continued 
funding but also to its presumed influence in the legislative process. 
 
Although there are relatively few CSOs that receive resources from the GoM, newer CSOs rely on 
informal networks with public officials for their advocacy work. In fact, most active CSOs reported 
having extensive networks and allies among public officials, often on a partisan basis (Finding 3.4.4). 
Both the WSP-UV and the NCAV, for example, reported that formal and informal networks with officials 
have been critical to their capacity to voice the distinct and varied opinions and concerns of Mongolian 
civil society (see annexes 1 and 2, Findings NCAV 4 and WSP 1, respectively). 
 
Nevertheless, CSO ties to government officials and politicians may be a double-edged sword that 
undermines CSO political autonomy and capacity to promote social accountability.51 Politicians may 
create organizations to gain access to financial resources from foreign donors, or manipulate the agenda 
of existing CSOs as their board members or benefactors. In fact, a leading political party has been 
accused of instructing its members to gain control over the growing number of CSOs to gain access to 
their financial and social capital.  
 
In contrast, however, the blurred line between state and societal actors involved in the Ongi River 
Movement is not the result of local politicians with nefarious intent but an indication of their commitment 
to the environmental mission and activities of ORM. When Ongi leaders decided to send a letter to the 
prime minister and members of parliament, however, the presence of local officials in the organization 
                                                          
51 In the extreme form of state corporatism, public officials control civil society, and thus, disallow pressure for social 
accountability. Although there is less concern about the inverse relationship under societal corporatism in which societal groups 
dominate policy areas (for example, health, labor, or the environment) through participation in state institutions or forums, state 
autonomy (that is, the capacity to avoid capture by domestic or foreign interests) is equally critical to social accountability. 
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nonetheless threatened its ability to voice its concerns. In the letters, ORM called on the GoM to protect 
the Ongi River system, which has been drying up over the last decade in large part because of mining 
practices in the region. One local official, who had been under pressure from senior officials not to sign 
the letter, resigned from ORM, while several local governors refused to sign and were ultimately replaced 
as members of the ORM board. The experience of ORM indicates one of the reasons why the promotion 
of social accountability requires autonomy from vested political interests to ensure the voice of civil 
society is not compromised or muted (see Finding ORM 2 in annex 3).  
 
Based on interviews, focus groups, and the CSO poll, it was nevertheless clear that the overwhelming 
majority of Mongolians view CSO relations with public officials, especially the GoM, as 
characteristically adversarial. During a dissemination interview, a prominent CSO leader went so far as to 
describe CSOs and the GoM as seeing “each other as enemies.”  
 
Although Mongolia does not have an ombudsman to mediate disputes between these stakeholders, the 
National Human Rights Commission has played an intermediary role in encouraging vertical as well as 
horizontal accountability. For example, the Women for Social Progress asked the NHRC to mediate a 
dispute in Uvorkhangai between local vendors and the aimag governor who had decreed that the vendors 
must relocate to a new market area. When the police attempted to enforce the resolution by harassing the 
vendors and confiscating their goods, the vendors turned to the local branch of the WSP. The WSP 
requested the NHRC to investigate possible human rights violations. The NHRC ruled that the vendors’ 
rights had indeed been violated, but the governor refused to rescind the resolution (which would have 
been a case of horizontal accountability). The ruling nevertheless became a “resource” for the vendors 
and their NGO allies to elicit a response from the governor (see annex 2). 
 
In addition to “supply-side” forums for negotiation initiated by the GOM, some CSOs have created 
forums for stakeholders to meet and discuss various topics (Finding 3.4.4). The Open Society Forum 
takes the lead in organizing forums to promote negotiation and provide opportunities to voice societal 
concerns and disseminate information. The OSF organizes numerous seminars and workshops that are 
attended by government officials, politicians, CSO leaders, and members of the media. In January 2004, 
OSF organized a meeting for stakeholders involved in budget work to discuss participatory budgeting. As 
a follow-up, the Minister of Finance, who had attended the conference, contacted local public officials in 
Uvorkhangai, encouraging them to cooperate with the important work of the WSP-UV. 
 
The WSP-UV has also organized tripartite or “triangle” discussions for community business leaders (see 
Finding WSP 4). In 2003, The Asia Foundation funded WSP-UV to conduct a series of individual 
meetings with representatives of CSOs, the business community, and local government officials along 
with a tripartite meeting to discuss a survey WSP-UV had conducted on the creation of small businesses 
and other business-related issues. WSP-UV held a follow-up consultation in December 2004, which 
resulted in a series of successes: the dismantling of a passport photo monopoly for the aimag’s citizen 
registration bureau and the dismissal of the Central Intelligence Agency official involved; expedited 
licensing by the land department; and improved conditions in the local market, including toilets and 
garbage disposal.52 
 
                                                          
52 After the first BDC, the aimag khural created a Business and Economic Council that includes three representatives of the 
business community, three governmental officials, and three CSO leaders. Although this may be seen as a positive development 
as the BDC attempts to institutionalize dialogue among the three sets of stakeholders, the WSP-UV noted that there had not been 
a great deal of commitment to the council, which has only met a few times. From their perspective, one of the main problems is 
that the representatives are mostly “progovernment” (that is, pro-MPRP), including the two NGOs other than WSP-UV on the 
council (Chamber of Commerce and the Gobi Initiative). Therefore, they are not interested in confronting controversial issues. 
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Although the Environmental Impact Assessment Law exists, environmental NGOs stress that there is lack 
of both capacity and consistency in enforcing that law. Citizens therefore have few opportunities to give 
their views on natural resources projects prior to government approval. The Ongi River Movement case 
study (Annex 3) provides an illustration of mining operations that were begun without prior EIAs. 
 
3.4.2 Findings and Recommendations Relating to Negotiation 
As with the enabling elements of Voice and Information, formal mechanisms for Negotiation with public 
officials have dramatically increased since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, 
citizens and CSOs alike seek informal opportunities to negotiate with officials. However, informal setting 
such as this one results in highly ad hoc basis for negotiation that favors CSOs with extensive social 
capital (networks) and greater proximity to officials (UB-based). Although some of the obstacles to 
negotiation may be mitigated through GoM, CSO, and donor actions, as outlined in the following 
recommendations, the most critical challenge to Negotiation (as well as Voice and Information) is the 
lack of understanding about the CSO role in promoting civic engagement/social accountability among 
officials and the general public. 
 
Finding 3.4.1. While the Community Scorecard, as part of the World Bank-supported Sustainable 
Livelihoods Project, allows beneficiaries to assess the quality and effectiveness of SLP subprojects, it 
could be enhanced to provide more opportunities for Voice, Information, and Negotiation.  
 
Recommendation: Incorporate best practices from the portfolio of Bank-supported operations using 
CSCs into the Sustainable Livelihoods Project so that citizens can monitor the quality of services and 
negotiate the necessary changes to improve the program. This effort may be supported, for example, 
through “South-South” learning and in-country capacity-building activities. The SLP should create 
partnerships with CSOs and develop their capacity to use community score cards effectively. 
 
Finding 3.4.2. Mongolia’s intergovernmental arrangements, particularly the PSMFL, limit local 
government accountability to local constituents and constrain citizen participation in local governance.  
 
Recommendations: 
1) In consultation with CSOs, public officials should address the lack of downward accountability. 
They should consider legal and regulatory reform and the creation of forums or other 
mechanisms, as well as the need for leadership from senior public officials to change the current 
political culture of upward accountability. 
2) The Ministry of Finance and Economics, in particular, should collaborate with CSOs to enhance 
citizen engagement in the budget process. There should be greater budget disclosure to local 
citizens, more forums for civic involvement in setting local development and budget priorities, 
tracking expenditures, and in evaluating performance. There must also be mechanisms for 
transparency and direct accountability; governors, khurals, and citizens should also be responsible 
for the local components of line ministry budgets (for example, schools and hospitals). 
3) Since local governors wield substantial power but lack downward accountability, the GoM, 
CSOs, and donors should evaluate the adverse economic and governance consequences of this 
structure of authority, and develop programs to increase awareness of the important role that 
citizens and CSOs play in improving local governance, and how local governments can facilitate 
such a role. Such a program, which could benefit from international best practices, may inform 
future proposals for improvement of political and fiscal decentralization in Mongolia. 
 
Finding 3.4.3. There are no formal mechanisms through which CSOs can become involved in the 
legislative process or policy formulation. 
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Recommendations:  
1) CSOs and public officials should consider formal mechanisms to encourage civil society and 
citizen input into the legislative process and policy formulation. This should be done in 
consultation with international donors, who may provide initial financial and technical support, 
including comparative studies of best practice. Civil society input could include expert testimony, 
preparation of draft legislation, participation in working groups, and in public hearings on 
pending legislation and public policies, which they could also help to disseminate. 
2) Public officials should also work collaboratively with CSOs to encourage dialogue and 
networking through regular meetings (for example, town meetings and CSO councils to the prime 
minister, president, or local governments) to discuss common ground and specific areas for 
potential collaboration. Such forums may be organized by public officials, by CSOs, or jointly by 
both stakeholders. 
 
Finding 3.4.4. CSO-organized forums have promoted networking and Negotiation with public officials 
and politicians, and provided opportunities to Voice societal concerns, and disseminate Information 
generated by CSOs, the GoM, and other stakeholders. 
 
Recommendation: With initial support from the donor community, CSOs should establish individually 
and jointly organized forums among themselves and with other stakeholders. The CSO forums should 
meet regularly and include the participation of public officials. In the interim, they should communicate 
regularly through various mechanisms such as a common list serve or Web site. 
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Part IV—Conclusion  
 
 
This study on the enabling environment for social accountability in Mongolia has illustrated diverse 
approaches to promoting accountability of government institutions through civic engagement. These 
include legislative advocacy, participatory public expenditure monitoring, information campaigns, and 
community score cards. These mechanisms have had mixed results because of certain factors external to 
civil society (the political, economic, legal, and socio-cultural context) and internal factors (CSO capital, 
governance, and accountability) that affect the ability of civil society actors to exercise their Voice, gain 
access to Information, and Negotiate with public officials to promote social accountability (part II). In 
particular, the study concurs with the findings of the 2005 World Bank study, “Civil Society in 
Mongolia’s Development and Governance: An Overview of Trends, Constraints, and Opportunities” 
(Finch 2005), which established that CSO financial constraints lead to a high level of dependency on 
foreign resources and limits their ability to fulfill their missions, including civic engagement. 
 
There are several key issues identified by this study. First, the findings and recommendations 
(summarized in the chart in section 4.2) indicate the need for legal and regulatory reforms, including the 
adoption of an Access to Information Law as well as the reform of the defamation regime and the Law on 
State Secrets. In addition there is a need for institutional reform and capacity building among the 
stakeholders to reinforce a political culture of accountability among not only public officials but also all 
stakeholders that share the common goal of good governance and economic development in Mongolia. 
This point is closely tied to the final key issue raised in this study: For Mongolia to reap the potential 
benefits of civic engagement and social accountability, it must be given time, resources, and a 
commitment by all stakeholders. 
  
It is recommended that formal dissemination of this report, which took place in March 2005, should be 
complemented by broader dissemination to more stakeholders across the country. In addition to informing 
the GoM’s reform agenda, the report should continue to be a part of the in-country dialogue on 
governance and accountability in Mongolia, as much as it is an important resource to the Bank’s own 
Governance Assistance Project, and the strategies and programs of other donor agencies and CSOs. 
Moreover, the highly participatory, multi-stakeholder approach employed in the study can help to 
strengthen constituencies for reforms in Mongolia, and promote new frameworks of collaboration.  
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4.2. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform 
CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 
PART II. External and Internal Factors 
2.1.1. Proposed 
nonprofit law could 
restrict CSO 




* The MoJHA and 
MPs should revise 
the wording of the 
bill before its 
passage with a 
more specific 
definition of the 
explicitly political 
organizations (for 
example, wings of 





* CSOs should offer 
a revised version of 
the nonprofit bill 
that addresses this 
issue and then 
pursue legal 
remedies if the 
revised provision is 







of only the total sum 
of assets and income 
for senior officials, 
thereby undermining 
capacity to track 
corruption. 
* The MoJHA and 
MPs should revise 
the wording of the 
bill before its 
passage to provide 
for the publication 











technical support in 




 * As proposed in the GoM 
document, Ten Steps to 
Intensity: The 
Implementation of the 
National Program to Combat 
Corruption (2005), 
implementation of the law 
should include media 
training on the publication 
of these declarations for 
which donors provide both 
technical and financial 
support. 
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4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform 
CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 
2.3 Although access 
to resources is 
critical for the 




remain limited and 
precarious due to the 
following: 
 
- GoM offers few 
tenders 
- Public officials 
create CSOs to 
capture donor 
funding 
- Donor funding is 
short term and 





- CSOs’ lack of 
fiscal autonomy 
leads to distortion of 
mission 
* With technical 




and CSOs should 
consult to reform 
the tax code 
affecting CSOs, 
particularly the 




* Despite their 
limited resources, 
CSOs should avoid 
“mission creep,” 
which detracts from 
their initial mission 
and can potentially 
undermine their 
reputation and that 
of civil society in 
general. Instead, 
their energies would 
be better spent on 
lobbying for greater 
access to GoM 
tenders and more 
competitive donor 




* The GoM 
should expand 




CSOs and other 
private 
enterprises, 




the capacity and 
efficiency of its 
service delivery. 
* Donors should consider 
financial commitments that 
are long term; include 
institutional and 
administrative costs; and 
consider the origins, 
purpose, and sustainability 
of the CSOs that they fund. 
2.4 The Structural 
limits to CSO 
capacity for social 
accountability as a 
result of: 
- Concentration of 
CSOs in UB 
- Lack of CSO 
umbrellas 
- De facto non-
governmental 
individuals 
 Creation and 
development of 
CBOs and CSO 
branches outside of 
UB and promote 
those CSO umbrella 
organizations that 
could be more 
effective at social 
accountability. 
 Donors should provide 
technical and financial 
support to expand current 
CSO efforts at 
institutionalization, while 
targeting programs that 
assist in the development of 
CBOs, CSOs outside UB 
and umbrella organizations 
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4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 
 * CSOs should 




















focusing on key 
sectors such as 
education. 
* The donor community 
should provide greater 
incentives, including 
capacity-building support to 
increase CSO and GoM 
expertise in civic 
engagement and social 
accountability. 
2.5 Lack of 




- Few CSOs are 
involved in civic 
engagement and 
social accountability 
- Few Mongolians 
are aware of their 
role or its 
importance 
 * Stakeholders should collaborate to develop civic education programs 
to inform citizens of their right to civic engagement and the key role of 
CSOs in social accountability initiatives. Activities may include public 
service announcements and community theater projects directed at the 
adult population, as well as innovative education curricula for 
Mongolian youth. 
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4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform 
CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 
Part 3.1 Voice 
3.2.1. Lack of 




 * Stakeholders should collaborate to develop civic education programs 
to inform citizens of their rights. These may include public service 
announcements, distribution of culturally specific literature that 
illustrates these rights, and community theater projects that involve 
citizens in exploring their rights and responsibilities, as well as 
innovative education curricula for Mongolian youth. 
3.2.2. Defamation 
laws unduly restrict 
freedom of 
expression and exert 
a chilling effect on 
the media.  
The most egregious 
issues: 
- Civil code 
stipulates stringent 
punishment for 
damages but offers 
insufficient defenses 
against these charges 
- Criminal code 
stipulates 
imprisonment for up 
to five years 






review and reform 
the criminal and 
civil defamation 






* Given the norms that have developed under the current defamation 
regime, stakeholders need to undertake explicit actions to ensure the 
implementation of legal reforms. With the donor community and 
media-related CSOs providing financial and technical support, GoM 
should revise the legal text and provide training on its implications for 
both journalists and the judiciary.  
3.2.3. Media 
registration system 
is susceptible to 
political distortions. 
 
* In consultation 










registration to a 
nongovernmental 
agency. 
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4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED)  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 
3.2.4. Broadcast 
licensing system is 
susceptible to 
political distortions, 
fails to promote 
public broadcasting, 





* In consultation 
with broadcasters 
and media-related 
CSOs, the GoM 





elimination of a 
required letter of 
support from 
governors, and 





 * The GoM 
should strengthen 
the autonomy and 
capacity of the 





























of the intelligence 
services to restrict 
media monitoring 
to a limited set of 
legally defined 
issues related to 
state security. 
* International community 
should provide initial 
funding for additional 
training for media workers, 
including editors and 
owners, to focus on 
enhanced professionalism 
and the financial viability of 
the media. 
3.2.5. Poor quality 
of media threatens 
freedom of 




* Media-related CSOs, public officials, and media representatives 
should have a broad consultation to analyze the factors that influence 
the poor quality of media reporting in Mongolia, with special 
consideration given to the establishment of a media council. 
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4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform 
CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 
3.2.6. Capacity of 






politicization of its 
governing board. 
 











and initiate inquiries 
with the agencies or 








and PRTV to 
promote the 

























* The PRTV should monitor 
the elimination of its access 
to advertising resources. If 
there are undue adverse 
effects, public officials may 
consider amending this 
restriction and adopting a 
five-year budget to promote 
the autonomy of the PRTV. 
* Foreign donors should 
provide technical and 
financial support to promote 
the capacity of the PRTV 
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4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform 
CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 
Part 3.3 Information 
3.3.1. The 
Mongolian Law on 
State Secrets and the 
culture of secrecy 
undermines any 
provisions for access 
to information, such 
as: 
- excessive claims to 
legal confidentiality 
- required 
permission to attend 
court session. 
 
* In consultation 
with CSOs 
working in related 
areas, the GoM 
should review the 
legal regime of 
secrecy to provide 
an appropriate 
balance between 
state interests and 




* With initial 
technical and 
financial support 
from the donor 
community, CSOs 
should monitor the 
implementation of 
legal reforms and 
GoM efforts to 
counter the culture 
of secrecy, 
including 
notification of the 
proper authority of 
infractions by civil 
servants and other 
public officials. 














and other public 




















4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 







parliament and the 
GoM. 
* Parliamentarians 









example, 30 days) 
prior to their 
deliberation. 
* CSOs should be 
the primary means 
for disseminating 
information about 
pending bills and 
recent legislation to 
an informed public 
and assist in 
disseminating this 
information to the 
broader public. 









by public bodies 
more accessible 










* The media, in particular 
public broadcasters, should 
produce public interest 
programs about pending 
issues, proceedings, and key 
decisions by public bodies. 
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4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform 
CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 
* Although CSOs 
are currently 
lobbying for the 
adoption of an 
access to 
information law, 
they should also 
continue in their 




standards. After the 
law is adopted, they 




by actively using it 






may require initial 
technical and 
financial assistance 
from INGOs and 
donor agencies. 
* After passing 
an FOI law, the 
GoM should 
adopt a program 
to train civil 
servants and 
other public 









in the area 
should train 
members of the 
administrative 
body mandated 
to hear appeals 
on denied or 
delayed requests 
to fulfill their 
responsibilities. 




access to the 
law and is 
sufficiently 
trained to give 
effect to the 
legislation. 
* Foreign donors should 
provide initial technical and 
financial support to train 
civil servants on 
implementation of an FOI 
law and insure distribution 




officials are denying 
or delaying access to 
information held by 
government 
agencies; this is 
aggravated by the 
absence of a law on 
access to 
information. 
* Public officials 





citizens and their 
CSOs to exercise 
their 
constitutional 




- a presumption of 
openness; 
- clear procedures 
to gain access; 
- a clear and 
narrow regime of 
exceptions to the 
right to access; 
- and the right to 
appeal any 
refusals or undue 
delays in granting 
access. 
* With initial technical and financial support from the international 
community, the media, related CSOs, and the GoM should undertake a 
publicity campaign to inform the public about their more 
comprehensive rights to information. 
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4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform 
CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 






should expand their 
provision of 
alternative sources 
of information both 
to fill the gaps in 
information 
available from or 
provided by public 
officials and to 
confirm the 
accuracy of this 
information. 
 3.3.4. CSOs play a 




Given research costs, CSOs and the 
GoM should collaborate in both 
gathering and analyzing data.  
 
Part 3.4. Negotiation 
3.4.1 Community 
scorecards are a 
critical tool for civic 
engagement and 
social accountability 
that could be used 
more extensively in 
Mongolia. 
 * Best practice from 
Bank-supported 
operations using 
CSCs could be 
incorporated in the 
Sustainable 
Livelihoods 
Program to increase 
the scope for citizen 
monitoring and 
assessment of the 
quality of services, 
and citizens’ ability 
to negotiate changes 
to improve the 
program.  
* The SLP should 
create partnerships 
with CSOs and 




4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
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to develop training 
programs for 
public officials that 
increase awareness 







local officials to 
facilitate the 
participation of 
citizens and CSOs 
in local governance 
to this end. 
* Local officials should create more 
forums for dialogue and negotiation with 
citizens and CSO representatives on a 
regular basis (for example, well-publicized 
“town hall” meetings with the governor 










at the local level. 
* Stakeholders 
should organize a 
consultation on 







the reform of 






* With technical and financial support from the donor community, the 
GoM (for example, MoFE) should collaborate with CSOs to explore 
mechanisms to enhance citizen engagement in the budget process. 
 
3.4.3. Lack of 
formal mechanisms 
for CSOs input into 
the legislative 
process and policy 
formulation. 





society and citizen 




* Public officials should encourage 
dialogue and networking with CSOs 
through regular meetings (for example, 
CSO councils to the prime minister and 
president and parliamentary working 
groups) that can be individually or jointly 
sponsored by these stakeholders. 
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4.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (CONTINUED) 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 





Policy, Legal, & 
Regulatory 
Reform 
CSOs Public Officials Other: Media, Donors 
3.4.4. Forums 
created by CSOs 




 * With initial 
technical and 
financial support 
from INGOs and 
donors, CSOs 
should develop 
forums to meet 
other stakeholders, 
such as the trilateral 
conferences 
organized by the 
WSP-Uvorkhangai, 






example, a common 





Annex 1. Social Accountability and Legal Advocacy: 
 The National Center Against Violence53 
 
BRINGING A SOCIAL PROBLEM OUT OF THE SHADOWS  
 
The National Center Against Violence was initially founded in 1995 by three Mongolian women’s 
organizations: the Liberal Women’s Brain Pool, Women for Social Progress, and the Women Lawyers’ 
Association (WLA). At that time it was known as the Center Against Violence (CAV). After CAV 
became an autonomous organization, it reregistered with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs as the 
National Center Against Violence in January 1998. During this early period, domestic violence (DV) was 
a concept that was unknown in Mongolian society; there was little information about or discussion of the 
widespread abuse of Mongolian women and children. The founding of the Center was an important step 
to bring DV out of the shadows so that both its symptoms and causes could be legally and socially 
addressed.  
 
The NCAV’s initial mission was twofold: to provide legal and psychological counseling and shelter to 
victims, and to educate the government and the public on domestic violence. As a result of an internal 
reassessment in 2002, the NCAV realized that its fight against DV must include the transformation of 
social structures. To achieve its mission, the NCAV attempts to: 1) raise public awareness and shape the 
social mindset so that DV is no longer tolerated; 2) build a legal framework that effectively prevents and 
ultimately eliminates violence; and 3) develop a social protection system that overcomes the 
consequences of violence (NCAV 2005). Whereas the motto of the organization is “a human life free 
from violence,” the central message in both their public awareness campaign and legal advocacy has been 
that “DV is not just a private issue,” thus requiring the intervention of both Mongolian civil society and 
the government. 
 
The NCAV is governed by a seven-member board, which includes representatives from the Ministry of 
Social Welfare and Labor (MSWL), the Parliamentary Secretariat, the Ulaanbaatar Citizen 
Representatives’ Khural, the UB Police Department, and associations of women, children, and the elderly. 
Representatives of elderly Mongolians are included on the NCAV board as one in four Mongolians over 
the age of 50 is a victim of DV. This statistic is nearly as high as the number for Mongolian women (one 
in three) who suffer from DV (NCAV et al. 2003; NCAV and TAF 2003).54 
 
More than 20 donors, mostly international, including the embassies and aid agencies of the United States, 
the United Kingdom, the European Union, Germany, Sweden, and Australia, have provided financial 
assistance to NCAV in its efforts against DV. Four Mongolian donors, both governmental and 
nongovernmental, have also contributed to the NCAV: the MSWL, the Poverty Alleviation Program 
Office, the Mongolian Women’s Fund, and the National AIDS Foundation. Significant and diverse 
international funding has allowed the NCAV to pursue legal advocacy and provide services to victims 
that the GoM has not been able to provide (Finding NCAV-1).  
                                                          
53 Research for this case study was conducted primarily by Oyuna Baasanjav, Gender and Participation Specialist, 
World Bank-Mongolia.  
54 In 1995, a survey involving 5,000 respondents was jointly conducted by the NCAV and the Ministry of 
Population Policy and Labor. In 1998, another survey involving 3,000 respondents was jointly conducted by the 
NCAV and the Center for Training and Research for the Population at the National University of Mongolia. In 2003, 
a survey of 1,000 elderly Mongolians was jointly conducted by the NCAV and the Federation of Senior Citizens 
(NCAV and TAF 2003). 
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Currently, the NCAV works in six separate but interrelated program areas: comprehensive client services; 
gender development and legal reform; child protection; advocacy to change the behavior of male 
perpetrators; community mobilization and participation; and a shelter network (NCAV 2005). The NCAV 
implements these programs with a 14-member staff,, half of whom have worked for the Center for more 
than five years.  
 
The NCAV shelter network is composed of two shelters with a total of 20 beds. The UB shelter faced a 
great deal of resistance when it first opened in 1995. Owing to Mongolian cultural attitudes toward DV, it 
took two months for the first DV victim to have the courage to come to a shelter. Since then the beds in 
the shelter have never been empty. This underscores the success of the shelter in responding to DV and 
the enormity of this problem. 
 
In June 2004, an NCAV set up a second eight-bed shelter, the Gobi Regional Information Center, to serve 
five neighboring aimags. Filled to capacity since its opening, the Gobi Center receives frequent requests 
from other surrounding aimags and soums to shelter and assist victims of DV.  
 
The NCAV also operates a transfer facility in UB, a one-room housing unit for a woman and her children 
who have “graduated” from the shelter and are awaiting permanent housing so that they do not have to 
return to violence. Since 2004, the Center has also run a toll-free hot line for DV victims. Meanwhile, the 
NCAV has provided counseling at the Men’s Education Laboratory to prevent DV and rehabilitate male 
perpetrators.55 With a grant from The Asia Foundation, the Center began publishing a newspaper, Helhee, 
in 1997 to promote public awareness of DV and the organization’s policy advocacy agenda. Between 
1997 and 2002, the newspaper’s circulation reached more than 1,000 copies. However, when funding ran 
out in January 2002, the NCAV was forced to stop publication; demonstrating that even Mongolia’s 
relatively well-funded CSOs continue to struggle with a limited and precarious resource base (Finding 
NCAV-1).  
 
Since 1998, when it first established chapters outside of UB in the aimags of Bayanhongor and 
Uvorkhangai, the NCAV has expanded to include branches in 13 aimags; the most recent are the Gobi 
Center and two remote districts of Ulaanbaatar. These local chapters operate with significant and 
consistent volunteer support. Between one and four times a year, the NCAV consults with these 
volunteers to provide methodological and professional guidance, and share experiences and strategies.  
 
Despite Mongolian society’s initial misgivings, the Center now enjoys an excellent reputation, a trusted 
relationship with the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor, and regular funding from both foreign donors 
and the GoM. Relations between NCAV and the government have generally been positive. In 2004, for 
example, the aimag of Bayanhongor named NCAV’s local chapter as the best NGO in the aimag, 
recognizing its collaboration with the local government, its cooperation with other NGOs, and its broad 
inclusion of the population.  
 
Unfortunately, the high turnover of public officials (both civil servants and elected officials) has 
adversely affected the NCAV’s relationship with the GoM. During an interview in May 2005, the 
Center’s director noted that despite years of public advocacy work on DV, the NCAV must continually 
educate new public officials about DV and the organization’s mission and activities. Nonetheless, in 
contrast with the typically adversarial relationship between CSOs and the GoM, the NCAV has achieved 
a high level of NGO-government cooperation.  
 
                                                          
55 The laboratory was first established by the Mongolian Open Society Forum in 1998 and has benefited from the 
support of the UB Police Department since 2000. 
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Two issue areas in which collaboration with public officials have resulted in impressive accomplishments 
are the passage of a DV law and government funding for the NCAV shelters. Nevertheless, the Center 
continues to advocate for the state to assume responsibility for the shelters and the development of 
additional shelters as stipulated by the new Law Against Domestic Violence.  
 
LEGAL ADVOCACY FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE LEGISLATION 
 
The NCAV has advocated extensively for legal reform on DV, beginning with its campaign to reform 
Mongolia’s Family Law, which had not been amended since its adoption in 1972. The 10 amendments 
that were adopted in 1999 incorporated various NCAV’s proposals, including the redefinition of the 
family home as shared property between husband and wife despite the tradition of male bias in Mongolian 
culture. The NCAV along with the WLA, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW) Watch, and the Center for Human Rights and Development, continued to 
advocate for specific legislation on DV in the Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure, which 
were passed in 2002. NCAV’s collaboration with other CSOs was critical to the successful legal advocacy 
for DV legislation (Finding NCAV 2). 
 
Despites its successful advocacy for reform of family law and criminalization of DV, the NCAV felt that 
such piecemeal legislative reform could not address such a widespread social problem. Since its 
inception, the Center had lobbied for the passage of a comprehensive DV law. The idea met with 
considerable opposition at first since such a law seemed to counter family values and Mongolian culture. 
Some MPs trivialized the problem by ridiculing, for example, the idea of sending someone “to jail just 
because of slapping a wife once.” Some opponents to DV legislation (especially legislators and legal 
professionals) claimed that the reforms to the Family Law and Criminal Code had sufficiently addressed 
domestic violence. 
 
The NCAV and its partners, therefore, took a two-pronged approach to advocate for a DV law. The first 
part of their strategy was to develop a better conceptual understanding of and support for a DV law 
among a coalition of nongovernmental partners working on human rights and issues related to women, 
children, and the elderly. Through their various efforts, the NCAV and its CSO partners provided critical 
information on DV to public officials as well as the general public (Finding NCAV 3). 
 
The second prong of their strategy was to lobby key public officials in the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches at all levels of government. This networking and collaboration with government 
officials permitted the NCAV greater access to Information, ability to Voice its concerns about the need 
for DV legislation, and opportunities to Negotiate the content of the legislation (Finding NCAV 4). 
 
Various tools were deployed in their advocacy efforts. These included polling among MPs, appearances 
on TV talk shows, articles in the print media publicizing international experiences with DV laws, seminar 
discussions with parliamentarians at the National Human Rights Commission, and collective letters from 
shelter victims to the president, speaker of parliament, and prime minister.  
 
The NCAV provided extensive studies and surveys to demonstrate the need for a special law on DV. 
These included a national baseline survey of 5,000 respondents conducted jointly with the Ministry of 
Population Policy and Labor (1995); a follow-up survey with 3,000 respondents conducted with the 
Center of Training and Research for Population of the National University of Mongolia (1998); regular 
surveys of shelter clients and analysis of the NCAV’s own records of legal and psychological counseling 
(1995–2003); a study on the impact of child abuse in the family (2001); a study of forensic hospital 
records (2003); and a survey of the effect of DV on elders conducted jointly by the NCAV and the 
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Mongolian Federation of Senior Citizens (2003).56 With funding from TAF, the results and findings from 
all of these surveys and studies were summarized in 2003 in a comprehensive fact sheet categorized under 
five different topics: 1) “DV is a common and negative phenomenon” in Mongolian society; 2) “the 
consequences and harm of DV [are a threat not only to] individuals but also the national security”; 3) 
“DV is a specific crime with its distinctive acts, stimuli, and purpose, resulting in specific damages”; 4) 
“the current legal framework and remedies utilized” to fight domestic violence are inadequate; and 5) 
“there is a demand to adopt an independent law on the prevention of domestic violence.” The fact sheet, 
as a centerpiece of the legal advocacy efforts, was widely distributed among public officials and helped 
build support among them for adoption of a DV law.  
 
In particular, the CSOs targeted MPs to ensure their support of DV legislation. Prior to the 2000 elections, 
for example, they petitioned parliamentary candidates to include the adoption of a DV law as part of their 
campaign promises, noting that one-half of all voters are women. Many of the 20 candidates who did 
endorse this idea were elected. Later, 19 MPs jointly presented the legislation to parliament, apparently 
the largest number to have ever proposed a bill in the State Great Khural. 
 
Some of the provisions in the DV bill, including separation orders, victim protection, and mandatory 
training for offenders, were radical innovations to Mongolia’s legal system. Thus, NCAV and other 
advocates had to overcome initial resistance to their inclusion in the DV law. Moreover, key provisions, 
relating to implementation costs, threatened passage of the bill in the final stages of legislative debate. 
Fortunately, the CSOs were well placed to advocate for their inclusion. 
 
In 2003, the State Great Khural set up three specialized working groups composed of key representatives 
from the police, courts, prosecutor’s office, media, and CSOs. Whereas the group on costs was headed by 
a MoFE official, the other two working groups were headed by CSO leaders: the director of the WLA 
headed the group on the drafting of legislation and the director of NCAV headed the group on legislative 
advocacy. To address resistance to the law, the working groups focused on protection of victims and 
prevention of domestic violence. They also pushed for legislation for the government to develop a 
national DV program, thus allowing latitude for later insertion of a more comprehensive set of 
mechanisms and public funding for DV programs. 
 
Once the draft had been placed on parliament’s agenda, the NCAV and its CSO partners were concerned 
they would be excluded from the process, and critical issues that remained would be determined without 
their input. Fortunately, the Legal Affairs Standing Committee formed another working group in March 
2004, to develop consensus on “principally differing views on certain provisions” in the proposed 
legislation. The directors of both the NCAV and the WLA were included in this working group. Thus, 
they were able to give testimony to the LASC, a rare opportunity for CSOs to speak directly to parliament 
on pending legislation. The ability of the NCAV and WLA to advocate for the adoption of the DV law 
illustrates the importance of CSO access to ministerial and legislative forums at key junctures in the 
formulation of legislation and public policy (Finding NCAV 5). 
 
Following a successful hearing on the DV bill in May 2004, the State Great Khural unanimously passed 
the law Against Domestic Violence. The adoption of the DV Law was a remarkable success for the 
NCAV and its CSO partners. In less than a decade, Mongolian society had not only accepted DV as a 
widespread social ill, but also adopted progressive legislation that established DV as a criminal offense. 
As a result, a nationwide Civil Society Index Survey conducted by CEDAW Watch in 2005 indicated that 
                                                          
56 Research by other organizations included analyses of relevant court rulings conducted by the research center of 
the Supreme Court (2001–02) and a survey of 300 police officers by the Gender Center for Sustainable 
Development (2003). 
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64.5 percent of respondents considered NGO advocacy for the Law Against Domestic Violence to have 
been highly effective. 
 
ADVOCACY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DV LAW 
 
Once the Law Against Domestic Violence was passed and the parliamentary resolution on development 
of a national DV program was adopted, NCAV and its CSO partners successfully lobbied the prime 
minister’s office to form a task force on the DV program. The task force was headed by the Minister of 
Justice and Home Affairs, but also included representatives of the CSOs and various other ministries and 
government agencies that had promoted the adoption of the law.  
 
A year later, the Minister of Justice and Home Affairs issued a decree to set up a technical working group 
to draft the DV program. The national DV program is expected to provide detailed guidelines and 
mechanisms to coordinate enforcement of the DV Law. Recently, members of the technical working 
group traveled to Korea to learn about the efficient organization and operation of the services that will be 
provided. 
 
In January 2005, the NCAV and parliament’s Social Policy Standing Committee, with funding from the 
World Bank, held an open discussion on enforcement of the DV Law. They recommended the promotion 
of public awareness of the Law Against Domestic Violence and the need for aimag governors to educate 
and guide law enforcement officials on the application of the law. The Standing Committee sent the 
recommendations to the Ministries of Justice, Health, and Education, along with members of the 
judiciary, law enforcement agencies, aimag khurals and governors’ offices. The NCAV also provided 
aimag, soum, and bag governors with the text of the law and educational materials on domestic violence 
and the new Law. 
 
The judiciary’s inability to access the legal text has hindered implementation of the DV. For example, the 
NCAV had to provide a copy of the law to judges in the Chingeltei district court for them to rule on a 
separation order in March 2005.57 
 
In addition, several technical legal issues have hindered the effective enforcement of the law. This 
includes the need for Supreme Court interpretation of key provisions. For example, the NCAV has 
proposed that in the case of a separation order, the Supreme Court should clarify that abusers, not their 
victims, must leave the family home. The NCAV has also proposed several amendments to the Law 
Against Domestic Violence. For example, the law requires a court decision “within 24 hours after receipt 
of a domestic violence complaint in order to secure the victim’s safety and health” (Article 17.2). As this 
is clearly impractical and often infeasible, the NCAV recommends that individual judges be authorized to 
issue such decisions. The Center has secured a verbal commitment from the Legal Affairs Standing 
Committee to sponsor such an amendment, although this issue has not yet been addressed by parliament. 
Both the successes and the continuing challenges that the NCAV has faced regarding the implementation 
of the DV Law indicate the importance of its continued collaboration with public officials and other CSOs 
(Findings NCAV 2 and 4). 
 
One of the NCAV’s highest priorities in insuring implementation of the DV Law is to transfer 
responsibility for DV shelters to the state. Although GoM has offered some financial assistance officials 
                                                          
57 To date, only one other case has gone to court: in Bayanhongor, where the head of the NCAV branch served as an 
attorney for the victim. 
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are reluctant to assume full responsibility for running the shelters and for building others for which there 
is a clear demand. 
 
ADVOCACY FOR THE PROVISION OF A PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
After learning that the government had allocated funding to the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor to 
implement the National Program on Promotion of Status of Women, the NCAV launched a campaign in 
2000 to obtain government funding for their UB shelter. Senior NCAV officials invited the minister to the 
shelter where he was shown photographs of battered women and briefed on the legal and practical side of 
DV. Meanwhile, within the ministry, a NCAV board member advocated official support for shelters 
based on provisions in the national program. At the same time, the NCAV emphasized the need for the 
GoM to provide services to DV victims at events such as the roundtable discussions on DV organized 
with health and social workers in 2000–01. NCAV collaboration with public officials and its 
encouragement to the GoM to assume its role indicates that the GoM-CSO relationship is not necessarily 
adversarial nor it is competitive (Finding NCAV 4). 
 
In December 2001, the NCAV signed its first contract with the MSWL for one year of funding worth Tog 
2.9 million for the “operation of shelter, legal and psychological counseling and limited health care” for 
victims of DV. Although the contract was renewed in 2002, only half of the funds were transferred 
despite persistent efforts by the NCAV. This contributed to a six-month delay in the extension of the 
contract in 2004. Having learned its lesson, the Center requested that the contract extension for 2005 
provide for the transfer of funds in a single installment; the ministry agreed. Although the MSWL 
contract provides Tog 3 million, approximately 60 percent of the total expenses of running the shelter, the 
NCAV had hoped for Tog 5 million, the sum necessary to cover all of the shelters’ costs as the ultimate 
goal is to transfer these facilities to the GoM. 
 
The NCAV has also had problems with the Han-Uul administration in its attempts to create a new shelter 
specifically for DV victims who are children. Although the District Governor officially agreed to provide 
accommodations for the new shelter, he reneged on this promise in April 2005. The NCAV contacted the 
head of the city’s property department, who preferred to lease the space rather than provide it for free to 
abused children.  
 
In a desperate effort to find funding for the shelters and other DV services, NCAV is analyzing the local 
government finance laws; exploring various government funds, such as the Crime Prevention Fund, 
administered by the MSWL; and using participatory budgeting and budget monitoring techniques, 
especially at the local level.58  
  
An obvious precondition to the transfer of shelters to government management is that the GoM must 
shoulder the full cost of the shelter. According to its director, NCAV’s top priority is to force reluctant 
officials to accept their legal responsibility to provide shelter to victims of DV, and to manage the NCAV 
shelters as required under the new DV Law. She noted, however, that when she and her CSO colleagues 
have confronted officials with their legal responsibility, they put the document aside and indicate that they 
will study it later. This illustrates the important role CSOs play not only in advocating for but also 
insuring implementation of legal reforms. 
 
                                                          
58 One of the aimag chapter coordinators participated in the Social Accountability Regional Seminar in Bangkok in 
March, 2005, and is now assigned to lead the local government-sponsored network of aimag shelters. 
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CONTINUING EFFORTS AT RAISING AWARENESS ABOUT  
DV AND LEGAL ADVOCACY IN RELATED AREAS 
 
The new Law Against Domestic Violence would not have been adopted without the NCAV’s work in 
raising public awareness. According to the Chair of the NGO Gal Golomt (Hearth), the NCAV’s “main 
achievement is public awareness that DV is a societal issue and that society needs to fight against it.” 
Since the adoption of the DV Law, the NCAV has stepped up its efforts to raise public awareness about 
DV and provide information about the Law Against Domestic Violence to ensure its implementation 
(Finding NCAV 3).  
 
Working with the MSWL’s Department on Children, the NCAV developed children’s educational 
materials on DV, entitled “My Family.” In August 2004, the Minister of Education, Culture, and Science 
decreed that the DV curriculum be taught at all grade levels in schools across the country, making it the 
country’s first nationwide DV-education program for children.59  
 
In December 2004, during a month-long campaign to raise public awareness on the new law, the NCAV 
conducted 10 programs on national and FM radio, one live program on national TV, and a press 
conference. The Center also held various training sessions for journalists, NGOs, local-level legal 
officers, prosecutors, council members, social workers, and police officers.  
 
The NCAV has had a long-term partnership with the police to promote greater awareness of DV and legal 
protections among Mongolia’s law enforcement officers. For example, under a 1998 agreement with the 
General Police Department, the NCAV conducted training programs for police officers in UB and various 
aimags on working with abusive men. A specially trained instructor at the Ulaanbaatar detention facility 
operates the Education for Men Pilot Cabinet, which was also established by the NCAV in 1998. After 
the passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence in 2004, a new course was introduced, “Police 
Response to Domestic Violence,” which is taught by a human rights professor specially trained by the 
NCAV. Through the Center’s work with the Police Academy, a special Men’s Education Laboratory on 
DV was also established in that year. 
 
Building on its successful legal advocacy for the Law Against Domestic Violence, the NCAV is currently 
working on addressing sexual violence, and specifically, incest.60 In addition to providing counseling 
services, the Center is drafting a law that will address the need to reform the criminal code and the 
provision of services for victims. According to the NCAV executive director, the law should provide a 
private room for victims in police stations, as well as the opportunity for female victims to speak to a 
woman police officer. The executive director also claimed that whereas rape victims generally fail to 
report the crime, incest victims are even less likely to do so as “those convicted of incest are sentenced to 
death, so their victims do not seek prosecution.” Consequently, the NCAV is proposing a reduction in the 
current punishment for these sex crimes. 
 
                                                          
59 Prior to the curriculum developed in 2004, the NCAV developed a curriculum in 2002 entitled, “Specifics of Working with 
Victims of Violence” with an accompanying video and manuals for teachers and students. 
60 During a dissemination interview in February 2006, the NCAV executive director indicated that the Center is working with the 
International NGO “Asia Pacific Women’s Law and Development” to improve Mongolian women’s access to child support. 
When asked how this was connected to issues of violence, she noted that many, if not most, of the women seeking child support 
are victims of DV, citing an analysis of family court cases between 2000–02 in which DV was a factor in 58.6 percent of the 
divorce cases. 
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: NATIONAL CENTER AGAINST VIOLENCE 
 
Finding NCAV 1. The NCAV’s successes are attributable in large part to its access to significant and 
diverse international funding, even though its staff regularly confronts financial constraints on 
maintenance and expansion of their activities. 
 
Recommendation: Whereas CSOs such as the NCAV should pursue sustainable, independent funding 
sources, the GoM and international donors should provide CSOs with greater resources (tenders and 
projects) on a competitive and transparent basis, recognizing the limited resource base currently available 
in Mongolia. 
 
Finding NCAV 2. The NCAV’s success in bringing DV out of the shadows and giving Voice to the 
needs and concerns of its victims is largely attributable to the unusually high level of collaboration among 
CSOs committed to addressing this and other issues related to women’s and human rights. 
 
Recommendation: CSOs should pursue collaboration through increased and regular communication (more 
CSO forums, greater use of list serves and shared Web sites) as well as through jointly funded projects, 
with technical and financial support from international donors. 
 
Finding NCAV 3. NCAV collaboration with other CSOs has been particularly effective and critical in 
providing Information about domestic violence to public officials as well as to the general public.  
 
Recommendation: CSOs should pursue diverse forums for distributing information, and pursue 
information from public and other sources. Donors should provide start-up funds for CSOs, as well as 
technical support on achieving self-sufficiency in this area. 
 
Finding NCAV 4. The NCAV’s collaborative relationship with public officials, including the GoM, MPs, 
political parties, police officials, and other civil servants, was critical to their ability to voice the needs of 
DV victims, raise awareness about DV among law makers, and enable the passage and implementation of 
the DV Law. 
 
Recommendation: Collaborative relations should be encouraged among both public officials and CSO 
leaders who may typically conceive of their relationship as more adversarial and competitive. Both 
groups would clearly benefit from opportunities to meet on a regular basis (town meetings; CSO councils 
to PM, president, or local governors) to discuss common causes and specific areas for potential 
collaboration. 
 
Finding NCAV 5. The NCAV enjoyed an unusually high level of access to public officials and forums 
through both informal and formal channels. Their participation in parliamentary working groups 
permitted them to ensure passage of the Law Against Domestic Violence and to ensure that its content 
responded to the needs of DV victims. 
 
Recommendation: To ensure the social accountability role of CSOs in legal advocacy, the GoM, 
parliament, and local councils should institutionalize their participation in legislation and public policy. 
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THE UVORKHANGAI “FRANCHISE” OF WOMEN FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS 
 
In 1997, five years after the NGO Women for Social Progress was first established in Ulaanbaatar, a local 
branch of WSP was set up in the central province (aimag) of Uvorkhangai. Although the WSP-UV is not 
registered separately with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs, this local chapter of the WSP might 
be better described as a franchise rather than a branch in that it is “independent in most of its funding, 
activities (and) projects” (WSP-UV 2003). Although both organizations focus on governance issues, the 
mission of WSP-UV is to work specifically with impoverished rural households, community-based 
structures, and family units to: 1) improve their capacities to lobby local government on issues concerning 
local development; 2) strengthen local self-government and good governance through networking among 
local NGOs, government, and business; 3) support the development of micro- and small-scale enterprises 
in the province; and 4) promote the position and role of women in local development.62 
 
According to the founder of WSP-UV, the main goal of the organization is to encourage citizen 
participation in local development, in decision-making processes in local government, and in monitoring 
government actions to establish democracy at the local level. For nearly a decade, the WSP-UV has 
educated local citizens about their political, social, and economic rights and promoted communication 
among local government, citizens, and the business community, while serving as a “watchdog” to ensure 
that public officials are accountable to the community (WSP-UV 2003:11-14). This broad mission has led 
WSP-UV to become involved in various local governance issues, including budget analysis and 
monitoring through a small pilot project financed by the World Bank. 
 
Until 2001, the WSP-UV’s staff included its coordinator and a handful of volunteers. The organization 
now has three permanent staff members and nearly 50 volunteers, operating in every soum within the 
aimag.63 All of the staff have a high level of research skills and experience. As the founder of WSP-UV, 
the coordinator’s unique professional background have provided the organization with critical human as 
well as social capital. Trained as a lawyer at the University of Irkutsk (Russia) with a master’s degree 
from Mongolian National University, 64 she was a criminal prosecutor (1987–90) and then worked for the 
provincial khural (1990–92) before becoming a legal consultant to the Governor of Uvorkhangai (1992–
97). Her experiences in local government provide not only insights into its operations but also important 
contacts both in the aimag and in Ulaanbaatar. Given her frequent challenges of and confrontations with 
local government officials, it is difficult, however, to conclude that her previous role in local government 
has constrained her individual capacity or that of WSP-UV for civic engagement and social accountability 
(Finding WSP 1). 
                                                          
61 Research for this case study was conducted primarily by Linda Beck, Professor of Political Science, University of Maine-
Farmington. 
62 Despite occasional references to the promotion and participation of women, the coordinator of WSP-UV stated during an 
interview in April 2005 that the organization does not have a “gender agenda; WSP is just about women working towards social 
progress.” In fact, she noted that they consider the absence of male staff members to be a weakness that they are attempting to 
rectify.  
63 WSP-UV is currently looking to hire a fourth staff member to replace one who recently joined the staff of the Training in 
Advocacy for NGOs (TAN) project of Mercy Corps. In the past, WSP-UV has also benefited from the assistance of three 
Voluntary Services Overseas volunteers (VSO-UK). 
64 Appropriately, her master’s thesis was on the improvement of the laws governing local khurals (councils). 
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WSP-UV’s coordinator remains in close contact with her former colleagues as the organization’s main 
office is in the aimag government house in the provincial capital of Arvaiheer. In their two-room office, 
they are equipped with a telephone and fax machine and three computers donated by the WSP-UB after it 
received a prize of $20,000 as the recipient of the 1998 Civil Society Award. This prestigious award was 
given jointly by the European Union and the United States to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Marshall Plan and the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome. 
 
Aside from the WSP-UB contribution, the WSP-UV has relied heavily on international funding. This is a 
very common phenomenon among active Mongolian CSOs. Since its inception, WSP-UV has 
implemented projects totaling more than $70,000 that were entirely financed by grants from foreign 
donors. Their funders have included British Globalization Fund, Canadian International Development 
Agency, Gobi Regional Economic Growth Initiative, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Technical Aid to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, The Asia Foundation, UNDP, and UNESCO-Asian Region. Such 
significant and diverse international funding has permitted the WSP to encourage citizen participation in 
local government and to monitor its actions (Finding WSP 2). 
 
Nevertheless, the greatest challenge WSP-UV faces is the dearth of financial resources. In a 2003 
Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats analysis, the staff attributed funding insecurity to the lack of 
a reliable long-term donor (WSP-UV 2003). During an interview in Uvorkhangai, the coordinator sharply 
criticized the “short-termism” of the donor community as undermining the growth of Mongolian civil 
society. In 2003, WSP-UV’s desire for financial autonomy led to its involvement in the marketing of 
women artisans’ products in foreign countries. Although the WSP-UV noted in its business plan for 
2003–04 that it should “seek donations from UB-based companies, gifts in kind” and general fundraising, 
it concluded that these options “do not look very promising as they will not adequately improve WSP’s 
financial resources” (WSP-UV 2003:20). In this sense, the WSP-UV provides an excellent illustration of 
the importance of CSO access to resources, particularly foreign, for successful social accountability as 
well as the fiscal precariousness of the few Mongolian CSOs that do have access to these resources, given 
the limited opportunities for fundraising in Mongolia.65  
 
Perhaps one of the greatest potential sources for self-financing is the WSP-UV’s popular newspaper, 
Gurvalijin Medee (Triangle News), which has been critical to its mission to promote good governance at 
the local level.  
 
PROVIDING INFORMATION THAT PROMOTES  
SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY: TRIANGLE NEWS 
 
The name Triangle News refers to the trilateral relationship that the WSP-UV seeks to promote among 
government officials, the private sector, and civil society to enhance local governance and economic 
development. The WSP-UV began publishing the newspaper in 2002 “to deliver local information to the 
local citizens” and enhance their participation in local government (WSP 2003).  
 
In 2000, a grant of $4,600 from the Globalization Fund enabled WSP-UV to publish six issues with a 
circulation of 9,000 per issue, covering approximately a third of the households in the aimag. The 
following year, the Mongolian Foundation for an Open Society (now the Open Society Forum) 
contributed $10,000 to publish 12 issues. Unfortunately, in March 2004, after these 18 issues had been 
                                                          
65 Although this study did not focus on the complex resource issues confronting CSOs in Mongolia, various stakeholders cited the 
need for improved tax breaks and incentives (for example, on charitable donations) to improve the fiscal autonomy and stability 
of CSOs. 
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printed, the WSP-UV ran out of funding and was forced to stop publishing. The experience demonstrates 
how a limited and precarious resource base may impede even a well-funded CSO’s ability to provide an 
alternative source of information (Finding WSP 2).66 
 
Triangle News has published information about government policies and actions, particularly budgetary 
issues; thus, it has played an important role in promoting civic engagement and social accountability 
(Finding WSP 3). In each issue, an entire page was devoted to the local budget, where information about 
local governmental budgets and the budgetary process was presented in simple, accessible language. 
Articles included “What Is the Budget and Responsibilities of the Aimag Governor on the Budget” (Issue 
No. 1, 2003); “How Were MT 75 Million Allocated?” (Issue No. 4, 2003); and “Weird Things on the 
Soum Budget” (Issue No. 11, 2003). 
 
Articles also provided information about government policies and the goods and services available to 
citizens. For example, in April 2002, an article entitled “Free Disaster Relief Assistance by Soums” 
appeared in Triangle News, which reported that the GoM was distributing free hay for livestock that were 
suffering from recurrent drought in the region. When their readers realized that the hay that they had been 
purchasing for MT 2,000 per bundle from soum officials should be distributed to them for free, they 
contacted the aimag agricultural department. Though no action was taken against those responsible, by 
June the illegal practice was stopped.  
 
Triangle News also discussed and influenced nonbudgetary issues. For example, interviews with GoM 
officials on water pollution led the Governor of Arvaikheer to protect the local river from pollution by 
prohibiting the washing of cars and clothes in the river, and decreasing the number of dogs living along 
its banks by “exterminating them in a humane manner” (WSP 2002:5). 
 
Although there are numerous other examples of news articles leading to modification in behavior by 
government officials, in some instances the publication of critiques of practices by local civil servants and 
elected officials also resulted in threats of retribution against WSP-UV. In the first issue of Triangle 
News, for example, an article cited the harassment of local businesses by tax officers; the officer 
threatened to sue the coordinator of WSP-UV although the issue was never pursued. 
 
Rather than dodging criticisms of their newspaper, however, the WSP-UV conducted research and sought 
opinions from rural citizens. In 2002, WSP-UV organized six meetings with its readership67 in which 
dozens of government officials, business leaders, and CSOs participated and discussed various issues. 
The meetings were the precursors to the Business Development Consultations (BDCs) organized by 
WSP-UV. 
 
PROMOTING A FORUM FOR NEGOTIATION:  
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT CONSULTATIONS 
 
In 2003, TAF provided funding to the WSP-UV for a series of individual meetings with local 
representatives of CSOs, the business community, and the government, along with a tripartite meeting to 
discuss a survey WSP-UV had conducted in three soums and the aimag center. According to the TAF 
                                                          
66 Following our interview with the WSP-UV coordinator in April 2005, the Ulaanbaatar office of the World Bank provided 
additional funds through a grant under the regional BNPP for social accountability, so that WSP-UV could publish another 12 
issues with a circulation of 6,000 copies. 
67 In addition, the WSP-UV received letters from herders in seven different soums who sought more information on reproductive 
health and family planning (WSP 2002). 
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program officer, the methodology used in the survey was “simple and unique.” WSP-UV had used its 
extensive network of contacts to conduct interviews with ordinary people on how they had started their 
own small businesses. The surveys revealed a great deal of misinformation about Mongolian laws, 
including poor legal advice at the soum level. 
 
After conducting the survey, the WSP-UV confronted some initial resistance to organizing a joint forum 
of the various stakeholders in the community. During an interview in May 2005, the TAF program officer 
reported that they had made several attempts at holding the 2003 consultation. While the WSP-UV 
described them as “preparatory meetings,” the TAF representative characterized them as failed attempts 
that reflected the need to convince stakeholders of the value of the BDCs. 
 
The meeting covered various other issues, including the difficulties that businesses faced selling liquor as 
a result of apparent police confiscation of their licenses for minor infractions.68 At the meeting, the WSP-
UV cited Mongolia’s 2003 Human Rights Report on criminal charges brought against more than 200 
police officers who had abused their powers. Subsequently, 18 out of the 19 businesses involved reported 
that the police had stopped confiscating their licenses. When discussing this with the WSP-UV 
coordinator, she commented that “the nice thing about working with the police is when they stop doing 
something, they do so abruptly and for good.” This is just one example of how WSP-UV’s new forum for 
negotiation promotes social accountability (Finding WSP 4). 
 
After the first BDC, the aimag khural created a Business and Economic Council that included three 
representatives of the business community, three governmental officials, and three CSO leaders. Although 
this may be interpreted as a positive outcome of the BDC to institutionalize dialogue among the three sets 
of stakeholders, the WSP coordinator noted that there has been little commitment to the Council. From 
her perspective, one of the main problems is that the representatives are mostly “progovernment” (that is, 
pro-MPRP), including the two other NGOs on the Council (the Chamber of Commerce and the Gobi 
Initiative). Consequently, they are not interested in taking up controversial issues. 
 
Nonetheless, a subsequent tripartite consultation held in December 2004 contributed to additional changes 
in local governance, including the breakup of a monopoly on passport photos by an alleged “official” 
photographer for the aimag’s citizen registration bureau and the dismissal of the official involved; the 
improved expedition of licensing by the land department; and efforts by the manager of the local market 
to improve its sanitation by installing toilets and providing garbage disposal. This local market was, in 
fact, the focal point of an important example of civic engagement in Uvorkhangai the previous year that 
enhanced the social accountability of the aimag government to its citizenry, and in which WSP-UV 
played a crucial role. 
 
GIVING CITIZENS VOICE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT:  
STRUGGLE AGAINST MARKET RELOCATION 
 
In November 2003, the professional inspection agency of the aimag and local police entered the local 
market and demanded that food vendors move to a newly constructed marketplace. When they refused, 
the police confiscated their meat and spilled their milk to force them to leave. The vendors complained to 
WSP-UV about the actions of the inspection agency and the police. Upon further investigation, however, 
                                                          
68 The most egregious infraction was flouting a resolution by the aimag governor that required businesses that sell liquor to close 
by midnight to curtail drunkenness, alcoholism, and domestic violence. However, according to a survey conducted by the WSP-
UV and financed by the health department, this policy was unlikely to achieve these goals. 
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it was revealed that the agency and the police were merely acting on the orders of the aimag governor 
who had issued Resolution 128 on October 15, 2003, to close down the food market. 
 
The previous month the vendors had voluntarily moved to the new location; but they claimed that they 
had lost customers because of its distance from the town center. Furthermore, although the new market 
was clean and “modern,” the storage facilities were inferior and thus their products spoiled within a few 
days.69 Ironically, the vendors had been asked to leave the old market because the health department had 
determined that it did not meet basic health requirements. When the vendors then attempted to move back 
to their old market space, the confiscations and harassments began, ending with the arrest of three of their 
leaders, who were detained for a few hours and released. 
 
The vendors approached the WSP-UV, asking for advice on their legal rights. After analyzing the 
governor’s resolution, the WSP coordinator claimed that it contained legal flaws, specifically the 
violation of the law on fair competition that invalidated the decree. She therefore sent a copy of the 
resolution to the National Human Rights Commission. The Commission then sent out human rights 
experts, who investigated the case and wrote a report indicating that there had been a violation of 
constitutional provisions, specifically in relation to fair competition and the illegal confiscations.  
 
The WSP-UV also advised the vendors of their legal right to demonstrate, which they did in front of the 
aimag government house for more than three months (November 2003 to February 2004). The governor 
who was running as the MPRP candidate for a seat in the State Great Khural was greatly concerned. The 
official campaign did not begin until April 2004, but the market relocation became a campaign issue 
when the Democratic Party candidate running in a neighboring legislative district broadcast a meeting 
with angry vendors on a local television station. Given that it is the only private station in the area and 
had begun broadcasting just prior to the 2004 legislative elections, the WSP coordinator emphasized the 
important “balancing” role it played in relation to public television, which she claimed is controlled by 
the MPRP. 
 
The DP candidate from the neighboring district then shared the footage with a colleague in the DP party 
running against the MPRP governor, rebroadcasting it in the Uvorkhangai district. In the meantime, the 
vendors collected money for the leader of the local Business Women’s Association to attend a national 
meeting of the Chamber of Commerce where her speech on Uvorkhangai’s vendors “stole the floor.”70  
 
Ultimately, the MPRP grew concerned about electoral fallout and urged the governor to rescind the order. 
The governor annulled it 10 days before the election, but suffered a resounding defeat in any case.71 
Whereas the case was a decisive victory for social accountability, there were other less tangible benefits 
as well. In April 2005, the WSP-UV coordinator noted that Resolution 128 had provided an opportunity 
for the vendors to learn about their rights. She noted that she had been “propagating information about 
human rights for years, but it was only when this concrete issue arose that people were able to understand 
the relevance and importance” of what she had been saying all along. Clearly the WSP-UV played a 
                                                          
69 Interestingly, the new market facilities are owned by a Democratic Party politician, whereas the governor is a leader of the 
MPRP. Although this belies the argument that party politics was at play, there are also rumors of “bipartisan” collusion by elites. 
70 A relatively soft-spoken woman, Ms. Dolgorsuren described how she was first thwarted from being placed on the agenda by 
the local chamber of commerce, which was closely allied with the MPRP governor. Then, at the last minute, she went up on 
stage, took the microphone from the recognized speaker, politely excused herself and described the current conflict between the 
vendors and the governor. 
71 When questioned about his stance on the unpopular resolution, the head of the citizens’ representative khural in UV also 
claimed that he and his fellow representatives opposed the forced relocation. Although they had the power to rescind it, they 
preferred to encourage the governor to do so. 
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critical role in promoting social accountability by informing local citizens about their legal rights 
regarding the market relocation, as well as their political rights to voice their objections (Finding WSP 5).  
 
WSP-UV AS A MODEL FOR SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY:  
TURNING AN NGI INTO AN NGO 
 
Clearly one of WSP-UV’s greatest strengths is the leadership of its coordinator. On the other hand, one of 
the greatest risks to the organization is that it may not be able to survive without her. Moreover, the WSP-
UV’s success cannot be replicated without similarly qualified leaders. This problem has appeared even 
within the coordinator’s own aimag at the soum level, where WSP-UV is run by volunteers who are 
considered lacking “enough motivation to deal with everyday needs… [and] experience in either training 
or capacity building” to serve their communities (WSP-UV 2002). The difficulties in replicating the 
successes of the WSP-UV are clearly tied to the fact that WSP-UV is one of Mongolia’s many 
nongovernmental individuals (Finding WSP 6). 
 
Nevertheless, the coordinator strives for the institutionalization of WSP-UV. Whereas other NGIs operate 
with one paid staff member, the WSP-UV has expended resources to build a staff, which the coordinator 
mentors and involves in all of the organization’s activities. Moreover, the WSP-UV’s mission is to build 
the capacity of other CSOs. For instance, WSP-UV encouraged Business Women’s Association’s 
involvement in the campaign against the market relocation, which bolstered its reputation and overall 
capacity.  
 
Even if at the moment WSP-UV may be classified as an NGI, it is clearly embedded in and responsive to 
the local community. As such, WSP-UV represents an important departure from other NGO branches that 
maintain a dependent relationship with the national NGO (Finding WSP 7). One of WSP-UV’s long-term 
strategies is to transform itself into an autonomous NGO that could serve as a model for grassroots 
activism across the country, thereby thwarting the current model of UB-based NGOs that dictate the 
agendas of their financially dependent branches.  
 
Whereas the WSP-UV has undoubtedly been strengthened by its relationship with the WSP-UB, a key 
feature of this relationship has been the fact that the national director has encouraged WSP-UV to 
autonomously develop its own priorities and agenda. The benefits of such decentralized relationships 
should be considered by other NGOs seeking to build networks and by the Mongolian government, 
seeking to improve the opportunities for social accountability. 
 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: WSP-UV 
 
Finding WSP 1. The capacity of the Women for Social Progress-Uvorkhangai to encourage citizen 
participation in local government and monitor its actions is attributable in part to both its challenge and 
collaboration with local and national public officials. 
 
Recommendation: Given the typically adversarial relationship between CSOs and public officials, both 
stakeholders should pursue collaborative relationships in various formal and informal forums while 
maintaining clear boundaries between political and civil society. 
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Finding WSP 2. Although significant and diverse international funding sources have permitted the WSP-
UV to promote citizen participation in local governance and development, a limited resource base has 
also impeded certain of its social accountability activities such as the publication of Triangle News.  
 
Recommendation: CSOs such as the WSP-UV should continue to pursue various sources of sustainable, 
independent funding. The financial solvency of CSOs must be addressed collaboratively with the GoM, 
which could provide funding (for example, tenders and projects) on a competitive and transparent basis. 
 
Finding WSP 3. The WSP-UV newspaper has provided alternative information about local governance 
and development issues that are critical to civic engagement and social accountability. 
 
Recommendation: As the transition from state to public broadcaster remains incomplete (see annex 5), 
alternative media outlets should be pursued and expanded by CSOs. International donors should provide 
initial technical and financial assistance, as well as training in how to make such enterprises self-
sustaining.  
 
Finding WSP 4. The Business Development Consultations serve as trilateral forums for local officials, 
CSO leaders, and representatives of the business community to engage in an ongoing dialogue and in 
negotiations.  
 
Recommendation: Such forums may be organized with limited resources and should be pursued by all 
stakeholders to foster an ongoing dialogue at both the national and local levels. 
 
Finding WSP 5. By informing them of their legal and political rights, the WSP-UV played a critical role 
in giving local citizens voice in local governance. The experience also highlighted Mongolians’ general 
lack of knowledge about their civic and political rights. 
 
Recommendation: With the support of the international donor community, the GoM should collaborate 
with CSOs to develop and implement civic education programs to educate Mongolians about their legal 
and political rights. These programs should target adult as well as school-age populations through the 
media (public radio and television advertisements and special programming), as well as special events 
and competitions (theatrical and essay contests). 
 
Finding WSP 6. Although WSP-UV’s success is in large part due to its leadership, the organization is 
building up the size and capacity of its staff to avoid the longer-term perils of NGI status. 
 
Recommendation: Both CSOs and the donor community should prioritize CSO capacity building 
through the training of staff and volunteers, and through practices that further the institutionalization of 
CSOs.  
 
Finding WSP 7. The WSP-UV represents an important departure from the dependent relationship that is 
common between national NGOs and their branch offices. 
 
Recommendation: Whereas CSOs should address the UB-centric nature of CSO, which restricts their 
ability to represent and provide services to rural Mongolians, the GoM and the international donor 
community should channel resources to CBOs and other locally based CSOs. 
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Annex 3: Social Accountability and Environmental Protection: 
The Ongi River Movement72 
 
THE BIRTH, GROWTH, AND MISSION OF A COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATION 
 
The Ongi River Movement began in 2001 in response to the environmental degradation of the Ongi River 
System in central Mongolia. The river system originally spanned more than 435 kilometers from the 
Khangai Mountains through the Khangai Steppe into the Gobi Desert, and fed into Ulaan (“Red”) Lake, 
which covered an area of 175 square kilometers. Historically, the Ongi sustained the lives of more than 
100,000 people and more than 1 million livestock (TAF 2004c). The Ongi now flows only 100 
kilometers, less than a quarter of its natural length, whereas the lake had completely dried up by 1995.73 
As Mongolia depends largely on surface water (70 percent of its water reserves), the depletion of this 
river system has serious implications for the region. It has led to a shortage of drinking water for more 
than 57,000 people and their animals. As a result pastoralists have been forced to herd their livestock in 
other aimags, causing serious problems for pastureland management in other regions as well.  
 
The driving force behind the movement was the chair of the Citizen Representative Khural in the 
Saikhan-Ovoo soum. In 2001, he gathered residents of eight soums from the three neighboring aimags 
through which the Ongi flows in a shared mission to reverse the drying up of the Ongi River System and 
restore Ulaan Lake.74 Initially he gathered several dozen people to discuss the matter. This was followed 
by a broader campaign that drew governors, leaders of other local khurals, and ordinary citizens from all 
eight soums to a meeting later that year. Local soum governments committed a total of MT 100,000 to 
support the emerging movement, which then registered with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs as 
a nongovernmental organization. Today, ORM is at once a community-based organization and part of a 
growing environmental movement with broad appeal beyond its region.  
 
The chair of the ORM has held his post since his election in 2001. In addition to the chair, the 
organization has four other paid staff positions: an executive director, a manager, a program officer, and a 
driver. ORM’s home base remains Saikhan-Ovoo soum. It is headed by the executive director who served 
as a volunteer until the end of 2004. In this and the seven other soums where the ORM operates, there are 
a total of eight branch offices run by volunteers. The organization also has a small, one-room liaison 
office in Ulaanbaatar to facilitate public campaigns, advocacy, policy dialogue, and fundraising. The chair 
operates from this office but commutes frequently to the river basin. The movement further benefits from 
assistance from the director of the Center for Land, Forest and Water Resource Management at the 
Mongolian State Agriculture University, who acts as both an adviser and researcher for ORM on a pro 
bono basis. 
 
Over the last four years, ORM has expanded its objectives to achieve its initial mission to revive the Ongi 
River Basin. As part of its efforts to promote the restoration and rehabilitation of the Ongi River System, 
its 2004 program included several other objectives: 1) sustainable community-based organizations that 
care for the environment; 2) informed and committed local citizens who monitor and protect the 
environment; 3) transparent local government structures that ensure a healthy environment; and 4) an 
interactive relationship between local governments and CBOs that cooperate with and support each other.  
                                                          
72 Research for this case study was conducted primarily by Jeff Thindwa, Senior Social Development Specialist, World Bank. 
73 In Saikhan Ovoo, for example, the river no longer runs, although a World Water Action report recorded its water flow at 1.8 
cubic meters per second in 1950.  
74 The three aimags in which the ORM works are Uvorkhangai, Umnigobi, and Dundgobi; the eight soums are Uyanga, 
Zuunbayan-Ulaan, Taragt, Arvakheer, Bayangol, Saikhan-Ovoo, Bulgan, and Mandal-Ovoo. 
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GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY 
 
Foreign donors have provided significant assistance to the ORM. The Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
(KAF) provided initial start-up support and continues to provide training in strategic planning and 
organizing. The training was vital as this kind of social activism was new for rural Mongolians in both 
sociopolitical and cultural terms (Finding ORM 1). After decades of authoritarian rule, Mongolians find it 
difficult to challenge the state. Even the leaders of Buddhist monasteries see a restricted social role for 
themselves (see section 2). On the other hand, the head lama at a local monastery in Uyanga was quick to 
point out that Buddhist teachings about respect for nature and the environment inspired people’s 
involvement in the campaign. 
 
In addition to KAF funding, ORM has received financial and technical support for projects, training, 
publications, and administration from various other international NGOs and donor agencies, including 
The Asia Foundation, Mercy Corps, the United States Agency for International Development, the 
Japanese Government, and the Open Society Forum. These international sources are critical as local 
resources are limited, particularly in impoverished rural areas. In 2004, the ORM budget exceeded 
$72,000, at least 90 percent of which was from international sources. This raises concerns about the 
sustainability and autonomy of ORM (Finding ORM 1). Currently, the organization receives $2,000 per 
year from membership fees. The amount may be impressive for a rural-based organization, but it is still a 
small fraction of its operating budget. Asked if financial dependence compromises their autonomy, ORM 
leaders stated that they try not to give way to donor pressures and priorities, and that donors have to date 
been more flexible and deferential than they had expected. 
 
ORM has also enjoyed a high level of support from Mongolia’s political class, beginning with the 
participation of soum governors and khural leaders at their first meeting in 2001. In 2004 ORM created an 
“interest group” of MPs who act as advisers and help improve the organization’s engagement with 
government. Initially, the movement had an 11-member board of directors, also referred to as the steering 
committee, which boasted several soum governors and a mining company director. The board was 
subsequently reduced to five members, including the former khural chair of the Saikhan-Ovoo soum who 
founded and currently leads the ORM.  
 
Despite close collaboration with public officials, the ORM leadership understands that to promote social 
accountability, they must have a certain amount of detachment from political vested interests (Finding 
ORM 2). After the current chair was nominated to head the ORM board, he resigned his position as chair 
of the local khural and focused on the goals of the movement. In 2002, when the ORM leadership sent a 
letter to the prime minister and members of parliament, calling on them to halt mining activities in the 
Ongi Basin and ensure rehabilitation of mining sites, other local politicians made a similar choice 
between their dual roles in local government and civil society. One of the board members explained that 
“we felt a lot of pressure from the aimag and central government, and some of the governors struggled 
whether to sign the letter or to leave the ORM.” The board member claimed that he was “safe” because as 
khural chair, he had been elected by the people. The fact that he was not a member of the ruling party 
undoubtedly helped as well, as the MPRP reportedly put pressure on its members not to be associated 
with the letter.75 
 
The soum governors of Taragt, Arvakheer, Zuunbayan Ulaan, and Bayangol, along with the chairs of the 
soum khurals, succumbed to political pressure and refused to sign the letter. The Uyanga governor 
resigned from the movement when he failed to be reappointed as governor. Two governors and two 
                                                          
75 Similarly, the governor of Mandal soum in Umnugovi aimag, who was a founding member of the movement but not a member 
of MPRP, has also remained an active board member. 
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khural chairs who served on the ORM board gradually withdrew from the organization, and were 
subsequently replaced at the annual ORM meeting that followed, thus freeing up the organization to press 
its demands for government action to protect the Ongi River system from further decline. Curiously, the 
governors of Dundgovi and Umnugovi aimags, who also belong to the MPRP, maintained their support 
for the organization. They may have realized the political implications of opposing such a groundswell of 
support from among their local constituencies. Moreover, the ORM had, by this time, established a 
rapport with highly placed MPRP leadership in UB. 
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF CSO ACCESS TO AND PROVISION OF INFORMATION 
 
Although there are other environmental factors, such as desertification and overgrazing, mining practices 
in Mongolia have had devastating environmental implications. In 2002, the leadership of ORM 
successfully lobbied the Ministry of Nature and the Environment to investigate the causes of 
environmental problems in the Ongi River Basin. The study determined that mining had caused 
environmental damage in the basin (Finding ORM 3). Heavy mining had diverted the Ongi waters from 
their natural course, and the lack of effective restoration measures had impacted the drying up of the river. 
Furthermore, the study revealed that 28 rivers in the 8 aimags were in danger of drying up (Ongi 2004:3).  
 
Although the GoM study was critical to the ORM mission, the movement sought in 2002 to gain further 
independent information about the current condition of the river system (Finding ORM 4). A study 
conducted by ORM’s consultant at Mongolia State University concluded that as a result of the seven 
ponds built along the Ult River by mining companies, the river could no longer flow into the Buruljut 
River, one of the tributaries of the Ongi River. He also found 10 other examples of mining activities that 
had diverted rivers flowing into the Ongi. Although there has been no formal response to these findings, 
which were presented to key parliamentarians and the Deputy Minister of Nature and the Environment, 
the study provides further documentation of mining company practices that adversely affect the 
environment. 
 
In Mongolia, 625 mining companies are registered to explore and mine mineral resources, Among the 307 
that mine gold, 32 mining companies are licensed to operate in the Ongi River basin. Together, they use 
20 percent of the region’s water resources (World Water Actions, 2004). The main environmental issues 
surrounding mining in Mongolia are 1) no regulation of water use in the establishment of gold mines; 2) 
use of antiquated technology by gold mining companies that involves creating dams and ponds; 3) weak 
monitoring and enforcement of environmental laws, notably provisions on diversion of rivers, 
requirements for rehabilitation measures after mining, and sanctions for noncompliance by mining 
companies; and 4) mining practices that attract artisanal “Ninja” miners along the rivers, whose activities 
are unregulated and therefore difficult to control by local government authorities.  
 
“Ninjas” wear metal gear that earned them their name from the popular Ninja cartoon characters. They 
dig ponds and deep shafts to divert river water and then use mercury to filter the gold, polluting the land 
and water. Some public officials claim that the Ninjas alone are to blame for current environmental 
problems. The chair of an aimag khural remarked that mining companies rehabilitate the land after 
extraction, but Ninjas dig up this land looking for remnants of gold deposits. Aimag authorities, however, 
may be complicit. For example, in Arvakheer they allegedly permitted, perhaps even encouraged, the 
Ninjas to dig up shafts that a mining company had filled in as part of a restoration project. Aimag 
authorities maintained that the Ninjas also have rights to mine and that this was “a complicated human 
rights issue.” As a remedy, Ongi representatives recommended that regardless of whether the companies 
or Ninjas were responsible, soum governors should be authorized to stop companies from operating the 
following season if they fail to rehabilitate a mining area. 
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In its efforts to monitor environmental compliance over the last few years, the ORM has approached the 
Ministry of Nature and the Environment for information on Environmental Impact Assessment reports, 
protection plans, and monitoring plans as they relate to the Ongi River watershed.76 Under the 
Environmental Protection Law, these documents must be publicly available. The ORM chair noted, 
however, that “ministry officials prevaricated on these requests and in some cases gave implausible 
excuses for not releasing the documents.” In a few incidents ORM leaders were prevented from seeing the 
appropriate ministerial officials. The experience underscores the urgency of a freedom of information law 
to guarantee access to information, require officials to respond, and thus render government more 
transparent and accountable (Finding ORM 3). 
 
On the other hand, the movement has had some positive responses to its demands for information. In 
addition to its request in 2002 for an environmental study, ORM requested in 2003 that the Mineral 
Resource and Petroleum Authority (MRPA) provide the names of companies operating in the Ongi Basin 
and maps showing the location of their operations. They also requested information on the volume of 
mining activities and the assessed environmental damage. The ORM confirmed that the MRPA provided 
this information “in a timely manner.” 
 
In May 2004, the ORM and the MRPA conducted a joint tour of gold mining sites. They were joined by 
the governors of three affected soums and representatives of the mining companies. As a result, the 
MRPA commissioned a comprehensive study into the causes of the depletion of the river and lake. The 
MRPA sought a financial contribution from ORM for the study; but unfortunately the ORM did not have 
the resources. Such financial participation would have increased ORM’s stake in the study and enhanced 
the report’s objectivity and credibility. This illustrates that the capacity of CSOs to generate, as well as to 
gain access to, information is contingent on sufficient financial resources (Findings ORM 1 and 4). 
 
In comparison with the GoM, the movement has had less success obtaining information from mining 
companies. For example, in 2004, Ongi leaders requested information on the volume of earth removed by 
the mining company Erel in order to know the level of water diverted and monitor the company’s 
rehabilitation activities of their sites in Uyanga. The company declined to release the information, 
whereupon the team went to the local environment inspector, who said he did not have the information. 
They then contacted the soum governor, who should have had this information but did not. The governor 
directed them to the inspector at the aimag level, who said he had the report but that it was in the 
possession of someone else. The inspector referred them to the Environment Ministry in Ulaanbaatar, to 
whom the Ongi leaders submitted an official request letter but have yet to receive a response.  
 
To monitor the GoM’s performance, ORM has also sought information under the government’s 
international treaty obligations. The MoNE informed ORM that there are 11 such treaties and 4 protocols. 
The ORM leadership complained that the environment ministry only gave a partial response that did not 
cover all the conventions.  
 
Based on its studies and those requested of the GOM, the leaders of the ORM have demonstrated that 
mining companies are not being held accountable for damaging the river basin. The ORM and observers 
from various INGOs, the media, and donor agencies maintain that the Environmental Impact Assessments 
demonstrate a lack of compliance with the applicable laws, and that the GoM’s environmental monitoring 
                                                          
76 During a discussion of the preliminary synthesis of the study with the Secretary of State at the Ministry of Nature and the 
Environment in February 2006, he indicated that under the Environmental Impact Assessment Law, adopted in 1998, there are 40 
specialized agencies authorized to conduct EIAs, including Mongolian NGOs. The secretary noted that this is because “the 
government cannot control or monitor its own activities.” He added that over the last two years MoNE has monitored 61 entities, 
of which only 4 percent have carried out restoration activities on sites as required by law.  
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is inadequate. Part of the problem is that some companies go bankrupt and disappear, and cannot be held 
accountable for rehabilitation. In other cases, mining companies bribe local officials to escape their 
responsibilities. 
 
In proving these allegations and ensuring that they are redressed ORM faces an uphill battle. Its mixed 
experience in seeking information demonstrates the need to address deferred requests and incomplete 
responses, as well as outright refusals to provide information (Finding ORM 3). 
 
VOICING THEIR CONCERNS: A MULTIFACETED  
STRATEGY IN PURSUIT OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Ongi leaders have employed a variety of approaches to achieve their objectives. For example, in April 
2003, ORM submitted a petition to the prime minister. The petition was signed by 1,200 people, mostly 
residents of the eight affected soums. They requested that the prime minister take the following actions: 
1) stop mineral extraction in and around the source and outflow of the Ongi River; 2) ensure the 
rehabilitation of lands after gold extraction; and 3) include Ongi River and Ulaan Lake Basins in the State 
Special Protected Areas. In May 2003, Ongi leaders also presented a letter to the President of Mongolia 
outlining these requests. The president personally acknowledged the letter, but authorized no immediate 
action. 
 
Ongi leaders also requested a meeting with the prime minister, but were received by the deputy prime 
minister instead. Unsatisfied with the meeting, they called a press conference and issued a press release 
on April 15, 2003, “to provoke a response from the prime minister.” Their concerns were carried in 
several media outlets, including the UBS television, Eagle, Channel 25 TV, the Udriin and other daily 
newspapers.  
 
The chair of ORM then presented the movement’s concerns and demands at a workshop to commemorate 
the year 2004 as Mongolia’s “Water Policy Reform Year” (internationally, the “Year of Fresh Water”). 
The Deputy Minister for the MoNE, who attended the workshop, invited the chair of the Ongi board to 
address a cabinet meeting. Although he submitted a statement in March, 2004, the Ongi leader maintains 
that the Environment Ministry’s real motive in inviting his submission had been to garner support for a 
water law amendment the ministry was pursuing, which required it to show specific interest in 
environmental protection measures. 
 
In May and June 2004, the ORM leadership also organized an ecology protest march to raise public 
awareness. The 478-kilometer march traced the entire span of the river. More than 2,000 people 
participated, mostly residents of the river basin. The march provided a rallying point for participants to air 
concerns about the plight of the Ongi River, and served as an educational forum for citizens and public 
officials. During the walk, Ongi leaders held 12 rallies, including a protest rally at a gold mine. Buddhist 
priests conducted religious ceremonies, offering prayers for the preservation and protection of the Ongi 
ecosystem. Extensive media coverage, both broadcast and print, ensured wide publicity for the event and 
greater dissemination of the movement’s message.  
 
Like other savvy Mongolian NGOs, Ongi leaders invite the media to all their major events, using radio, 
television, and the print media to convey their message to both the public and policy makers. The media 
also appears to have a genuine interest in ORM’s environmental agenda, as evident in the Mongol Radio 
journalist who has extensively covered the movement’s programs. The movement’s activities have been 
covered extensively in both radio and television programs, illustrating the importance of a collaborative 
relationship between CSOs and the media (Finding ORM 5). With a grant from TAF, the organization 
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also created its own Web site (www.Ongi.mn) in November 2003 to promote awareness of the problems 
of the Ongi River Basin, as well as broader environmental and natural resource management issues in 
Mongolia. 
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING:  
CHALLENGES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT 
 
The ORM work with public officials has borne mixed results in terms of concrete political actions to 
improve the environment. Some public officials have been fairly responsive to inquiries by the 
organization. For example, Ongi leaders submitted a compendium of laws to MRPA that it allegedly had 
been flouted by mining companies operating in the Ongi River Basin (Ongi 2004e). While they responded 
to each charge, MRPA officials shifted responsibility to local governors and inspectors, who they 
suggested had not effectively discharged their duties. 
 
For example, one allegation by the ORM was that Khaangarid LLC had violated Article 15 of the 
Environmental Protection Law requiring restoration of its mining site on the Buyant River. The MRPA 
responded by citing Article 20.2.4 of the law on Subsoil, which holds local authorities responsible for 
verification. ORM also claimed that contrary to Articles 31.2 and 31.4 of the Environmental Protection 
Law, mining companies have not allowed public access to site-restoration schedules or completion reports 
of restoration activities. The MRPA responded that Article 30.6 of the law on mineral resources legislated 
only that companies must deliver these reports to local authorities. Similarly, the movement claimed that 
GoM had not ensured efficient utilization of natural resources and protection of nature in accordance with 
Section 38, Article 2.4 of the Constitution. The MRPA retorted that the specialized inspection agencies 
and local authorities had not taken the necessary actions against violations by gold mining enterprises.  
 
However, as one soum governor observed, local government structures are not conducive to social 
accountability as they are responsive to their superiors in GoM and not to the citizenry (Finding ORM 6). 
This is attributable to the legal code by which a soum governor is nominated by the local khural but 
appointed by an aimag governor, who is nominated by the aimag khural but appointed by the prime 
minister. Furthermore, as the central government licenses mining operations, local governors are 
powerless to enforce compliance or penalize offences. As an illustration of the powerlessness of local 
officials, one Ongi board member cited an incident where local environment inspectors had stopped 
mining in Uyanga, but aimag authorities had superseded that order and allowed the company to proceed.  
 
Similarly, the ORM submitted a letter to a local khural in 2002, requesting action against two mining 
companies that were allegedly conducting harmful extractive practices. Khural leaders admonished 
company officials, but to no avail. The khural then passed a resolution to stop mining activities but was 
ignored. It then requested that the governor shut down the mines. He did so initially, but the mines were 
reopened through the intervention of the central government. 
 
In yet another incident, a local khural passed a resolution to stop the mining activities of Erel if it did not 
rehabilitate a former mining site by July 2004. When the company failed to comply, the site was initially 
shut down. However, it was subsequently reopened by order of the aimag authorities. One soum governor 
noted that this was “a very complicated political situation” in which vested economic interests often 
dictate outcomes. Indeed, local members of ORM complained that aimags do not enforce compliance as 
they, themselves, benefit from tax revenues from mining operations. 
 
Even ministerial support does not ensure compliance. According to Ongi leaders, two mining companies, 
Seligdar Mongolia and Erel, were ordered by the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs in 2003 to halt 
operations until they had implemented restoration plans. The companies never implemented restoration 
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plans, but there was no follow-up action taken by the GoM. According to the ORM, only 10 percent of 
sites have been restored following mining operations. The only response offered by the MRPA is that its 
Mining Department has set out an annual schedule of sites needing restoration and a list of the associated 




Currently Ivanhoe Mines Mongolia, Inc., and the GoM are negotiating a stability agreement to mine the 
massive Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold deposit. Hence, the issues affecting the Ongi River Basin are likely 
to extend to other regions of the country, which are also beginning to organize themselves in social 
movements and community-based organizations.  
 
One such organization is the Uuguul (“Native”) movement, established by dwellers of the South Gobi 
region in 2005 to oppose the government’s Stability Pact with Ivanhoe Mines, which allows Ivanhoe to 
retain 95 percent of extracted minerals. Uuguul also advocates reform of the Mongolia Mineral Law to 
include stricter environmental standards for the mining industry. The “movement for Giving Half of Oyu 
Tolgoi to Mongolians” (or the 50/50 Movement) is pressing for the equitable distribution of mineral 
resources in Oyu Tolgoi. Toson Zaamar is a movement formed by herders to defend the sacred Barjin 
Mountain against the activities of the Mongolian-Chinese mining company, AshB.77 These organizations 
have explicitly stated that they want “to bring their voice to the government and demand [that] … the 
government leaves … their land alone” (interview with Liberty Center, April 2005). 
 
During this study’s dissemination, the ORM chair listed several new and important developments in the 
growth of the Mongolian environmental movement. He cited the creation of “Calls for Khongor Aimag” 
to protect the aimag’s lakes and rivers in 12 soums; “Holy Stupor” [sic.] to protect Aokhon, Tamir, and 
Tarniliin Rivers in Arkhangai aimag; “Huvsgul Lake Dalai Movement” to protect Huvsgul Lake; “Ardin 
Elch Peoples Missionaries” to protect rivers in Selenge aimag; and “GToson Daamar” in Tuv aimag to 
protect the Tuul River. 
 
The leaders of the ORM deserve much of the credit for inspiring these movements, many of which they 
advise informally and several of which they hope to incorporate into an umbrella organization of 
environmental protection for Mongolia’s river systems. Their emergence indicates the urgency of 
environmental concerns affecting Mongolia’s watershed and the perception that if citizens do not act, 
mining activities will cause serious environmental decline. Whether these organizations achieve ORM’s 
level of social accountability will depend upon their capacity to tap into political and financial resources, 
as well as their ability to network and coordinate their activities (Finding ORM 7).  
 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: THE ONGI RIVER MOVEMENT 
 
Finding ORM 1. Although access to significant and diverse resources, including extensive pro bono 
contributions, have been critical to the success of the ORM, there are continuing concerns about its 
sustainability and autonomy, especially in light of the limited resources they have been able to raise 
through membership dues. 
 
                                                          
77 It has been suggested by various observers that the Zaamar movement’s campaign may be rooted more in economic concerns 
and the anti-Chinese and anti-Russian sentiments of disaffected Ninja miners than in purely environmental concerns.  
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Recommendation: Although the ORM, and CSOs in general, should pursue sustainable, independent 
funding sources, the GoM and international donors should continue to provide financial and other 
material resources, recognizing Mongolia’s limited resource base. 
 
Finding ORM 2. The ability of the ORM leadership to balance collaboration with and cooptation by 
public officials has been critical to its social accountability initiatives. 
 
Recommendation: Whereas CSOs should expand their collaboration with public officials (for example, 
joint research studies and fact-finding missions), the autonomy of both stakeholders must be sustained 
through formal or informal regulations on the behavior and appointment of officials, as well as internal 
CSO regulations regarding board membership. 
 
Finding ORM 3. Although the ORM’s close relationship with public officials has allowed it to lobby for 
research and obtain information from the GoM, the ORM has nevertheless faced difficulties in obtaining 
information in a timely manner.  
 
Recommendation: Public officials should adopt a Freedom of Information Law to ensure the timely 
access to information that renders government more transparent and accountable. Donors and CSOs 
working in this area can provide technical support and comparative insights into international standards 
and best practices.  
 
Finding ORM 4. ORM-sponsored research has been an important alternative source of information that 
has confirmed or elaborated upon GoM’s records and data.  
 
Recommendation: Given the costs of such research, CSOs should collaborate with the GoM and other 
national and international actors on related issues, while donors should fund both data collection and 
analysis in policy areas critical to social accountability. 
 
Finding ORM 5. Compared to other Mongolian CSOs, the ORM has been particularly effective in 
collaborating with the media, allowing it to voice its environmental concerns and offer its 
recommendations.  
 
Recommendation: CSOs should be encouraged to cultivate a collaborative relationship with broadcast 
and print media at the local and national levels through joint programming and other activities (for 
example, training journalists about the role of CSOs) that may initially be supported by international 
donors. 
 
Finding ORM 6. Social accountability is weak at the local level because local governors lack downward 
accountability to their constituents and lack the capacity and the mandate for enforcement. Hence, mining 
companies are responsive only to the central government.  
 
Recommendation: To promote CSO capacity to negotiate with public officials, the GoM should reform 
the legal code on the structure of political and administrative authority to promote greater downward 
accountability. To transform the political culture of centralization, senior officials should send clear 
signals that downward accountability is an important component of good governance and critical to 
economic development. 
 
Finding ORM 7. Although the proliferation of environmental organizations is a sign of growing civic 
awareness and engagement, the large numbers may also pose a challenge to effective coordination and 
cooperation among these various CSOs.  
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Recommendation: Effective CSO collaboration should be promoted through increased and regular 
communications (forums, list serves, and shared Web sites and UB offices), and encouraged by donors 
through jointly funded forums and projects.  
 
Finding ORM 8 (based on overall assessment). Effective community-based organizations such as the 
ORM are relatively uncommon in Mongolia.  
 
Recommendation: The GoM, INGOs, and donors should channelize resources to CBOs and expand 
training programs for these and other local CSOs. 
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Annex 4. Social Accountability and Service Delivery: 
Community Involvement in Mongolian Schools78 
 
 
One of the more positive legacies of Mongolia’s socialist past is its high level of literacy, which remains 
at 98 percent despite a relatively high level of poverty. Primary school enrollment has also been sustained 
at a nearly universal rate. However, secondary school enrollment dropped dramatically in the mid-1990s, 
but recovered to more than 93 percent by academic year 2004–05 (United Nations Statistical Yearbook 
2004).79 Although public expenditure on education has been higher than in most transition countries, total 
spending has fallen and remains below the 1990 level of 12 percent of GDP, declining to 5.5 percent in 
1995 before gradually increasing to 9 percent by 2002 (Dung et al. 2006). Stakeholders nevertheless 
indicate that education remains a high priority. In the opinion poll conducted in May 2005, nearly one-
quarter of the respondents said that education was their highest priority, although only 40 percent thought 
that public officials were providing sufficient access to education, and 23 percent indicated that they were 
able to ensure the quality of education (annex 7, Questions C and K). 
 
This case study on community involvement in kindergarten through secondary school is based largely on 
data collected at two public schools, one in Ulaanbaatar and the other in Uyanga soum, Uvorkhangai 
aimag, in central Mongolia. Interviews were held with stakeholders at the national and local levels, 
including representatives of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (MoECS), local government 
officials, parents, and leaders of education-related NGOs. Whereas the schools were chosen to provide 
both an urban and a rural perspective, the school in Ulaanbaatar was selected for its location along the 
“border” between the city center and the Ger District, which is composed largely of recent migrants.80 
Although it is difficult to draw general conclusions about the Mongolian education system from just two 
examples, the case study provides insights into issues related to social accountability in the education 
sector.  
 
Over the last decade, the MOECS’ reforms have varyingly supported and undermined civic engagement 
and social accountability in Mongolia’s education sector. Although reforms were intended to ensure local 
input into the management of public schools, it has been difficult to achieve the appropriate balance 
between community involvement through the school boards and stability in the management of public 
schools. As a result, effective participation of parents and the broader community in the education sector 
appears weak. The need for community involvement in schools is illustrated by concerns about 
mismanagement of funds and allegations of corruption in the private tutoring by public school teachers.  
 
LOCAL PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC SERVICE DELIVERY:  
FROM SCHOOL BOARDS TO SCHOOL COUNCILS 
 
In 1995, the State Great Khural passed a new Law on Education that established local School Boards for 
preschool, primary, and secondary schools. Pursuant to Article 30 of the Law, the Boards were given a 
                                                          
78 Research for this case study was conducted primarily by Alison Dong, a graduate student at Teacher’s College, Columbia 
University and Bilge Byambaa, a consult with The Asia Foundation. with guidance from Charles Abelmann (Lead Program 
Coordinator, World Bank). 
79 An OSF education program officer noted that GoM statistics tend not to include disabled children, mostly mentally but often 
physically disabled, who are not enrolled in school. 
80 Gers are traditional tents commonly used in rural Mongolia and increasingly by migrants whose gers circle much of the 
perimeter of Ulaanbaatar. In the Ger district as well as the countryside, household incomes tend to be lower and social services, 
less accessible. 
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wide mandate to manage and monitor the operations of schools. In 2000, MoECS adopted Regulation 92 
to clarify the role of school boards, specifying their authority to: 1) hire and dismiss school principals; 2) 
approve and amend school budgets and investment schedules; 3) approve salary funds and number of 
employees; 4) approve the development of policy, mission, curriculum, and business plans; and 5) 
develop their own internal procedures.  
 
Initially, the boards were to be composed of 17 members, with only teachers, students, parents, and 
representatives of local organizations to serve on a board. In 1998, however, an amendment extended 
representation to include alumni and representatives of the aimag governors as “the founders” of public 
schools.81 Under this new amendment, the representatives of the founders were not elected to the board 
like other members, but were usually the soum governors or their designees. Moreover, the amendment 
stipulated that the founders were to hold a majority of 51-60 percent of the seats on the board.  
 
In May 2002, a new law on education was adopted in which the role of the now highly politicized boards 
was essentially reduced to an advisory one (Finding EDU 1). These changes were adopted in the broader 
context of recentralization, which stripped the boards of their fiscal responsibility. The boards lost their 
power to approve school budgets and were left only with the right to comment on proposals submitted by 
school principals to representatives of the Ministry of Education.  
 
In addition to their lost fiscal authority, school boards lost their power to hire or dismiss principals; they 
could merely propose candidates for the positions. The governor of Uyanga soum acknowledged that 
under the new system, boards could technically “block” a candidate nominated by a governor, but 
ultimately the governor could override their veto and hire or dismiss a principal over the board’s 
objections. Consistent with the new more limited advisory role of school boards, in 2002 Regulation 230 
changed their name from school boards to school councils.  
 
The 2002 Law on Education also changed the process for appointing members to the councils. The 
changes were deemed necessary to depoliticize the boards and to enhance continuity. In addition to 
reducing the council’s number to between 9 and 11, the new law stipulates that all members are to be 
elected at a general meeting (an annual meeting of stakeholders), although representatives of the other 
organizations are nominated by the founders and merely approved at the general meeting. These 
representatives retain a majority on the councils even though there is no legal stipulation for this.  
 
THE REDUCED BUT CONTINUING ROLES OF  
SCHOOL COUNCILS IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
Public officials and community members both perceived the reduced authority of the school councils as 
undermining their role. The two parent representatives on the Uyanga School Council, for example, noted 
that unlike the former school boards, the councils have no real authority to monitor the principal or the 
school budget. At the national level, a member of the Standing Committee on Education of the State 
Great Khural also noted that school councils have no real authority, as they can merely suggest how to 
support school activities, improve the quality of services, and maintain parent involvement. Various 
stakeholders in both Ulaanbaatar and Uyanga echoed these critical assessments of the new school 
councils.  
 
                                                          
81 Under Mongolian Education Law, the aimag or city governors have the authority to create, transform, or disband a local 
school. As such they are characterized as the “founders” of public schools. 
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On the other hand, the initial legal code vested inordinate power in the school boards, which exercised 
more power than community school bodies in other countries. Various stakeholders indicated problems 
that were created by the boards’ exercise of their full powers. For example, stakeholders said that boards 
would replace principals according to their political affiliation when a new government took office. 
According to the director of the Mongolian Association for Primary and Secondary School Development 
(MAPSSD), the changes in 2002 were a result of “founders” politically appointed to the councils 
asserting their right to hire and dismiss principals. The principal of the Ulaanbaatar school confirmed this 
practice, noting that 10 principals in one UB district alone were fired in rapid succession in 1997–98, only 
to be reinstated by the courts.82 Such practices were obviously disruptive and destabilizing, but could 
possibly have been remedied by curtailing political appointments to the council rather than 
disempowering them.  
 
Although the new councils serve only in an advisory capacity, they still play a role in school governance. 
They make proposals on policy and development, review budget documents, supervise principals, and 
recommend their hiring or dismissal. Although their powers are markedly reduced, the councils can 
nonetheless continue to play a role in promoting civic engagement and social accountability. 
 
Nevertheless, the significant reduction in the power of the councils has reinforced the popular perception 
that they are not relevant. This perception is problematic and needs to be addressed because to be 
effective, bodies such as the school councils must have the support and trust of the community (Finding 
EDU 2).  
 
NEED TO CHANGE POPULAR PERCEPTIONS OF  
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN MONGOLIAN SCHOOLS 
 
Community involvement in the education sector has been limited even when the boards held extensive 
formal powers. According to a representative of the NGO, Mongolian Education Alliance (MEA), the 
general citizenry lacks the sense of public schools being “public.” Parents feel that they “just need to send 
their kids to school and worry about their getting good grades; that is enough.” She noted that parents 
rarely attend meetings where their representatives to the school council are elected, because these 
meetings are “boring” and teachers publicly denounce poorly performing students at these meetings. 
Moreover, parents believe that principals and those above them have “all the authority” and set the rules 
of school governance. 
 
These attitudes may well be linked to Mongolia’s socialist legacy in which schools had top-down 
structures of authority, which characterized them as state rather than public institutions. Such authority 
structures are difficult to reform through legal processes; they require outreach programs that encourage 
community involvement in the education sector. The need for civic education at the local level was 
stressed not only by NGOs working in this sector but also by public officials such as the chair of 
Uyanga’s soum-level Khural, who observed that parents are oblivious to the importance of their 
participation in school councils.  
 
The MEA is collaborating with the Open Society Forum to improve parent and community involvement 
in schools by setting up a grant competition to which school and local government officials can apply. 
The MEA/OSF project has sent out questionnaires to 80 schools in all aimags and the Ger district of 
                                                          
82 Although there was insufficient time to ascertain the grounds for either the dismissals or the court rulings, the principals’ 
terminations occurred shortly after the election of a new ruling party in 1996. 
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Ulaanbaatar, asking them to identify their needs and make specific requests to enhance collaboration with 
the community.  
 
Although more than 40 percent of the respondents to the CSO Survey indicated that their organization 
works in the area of education (annex 6, Question G), there are relatively few NGOs dedicated 
specifically to education, most notably MAPSSD and MEA. Both NGOS are spin-offs from the OSF and 
work to increase community involvement in Mongolia’s schools. MAPSSD n particular specifically 
supports school councils. In addition, whereas unions in the education sector are instrumental in 
promoting social accountability in many countries, in Mongolia they are, in the words of a CSO leader, 
“just kind of sleepy” (Finding EDU 3). 
 
ENHANCING THE PROFILE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF SCHOOL COUNCIL ELECTIONS 
 
Enhancing the profile and significance of school council elections may be an effective way to change 
popular perceptions about community involvement in local schools. Although the majority of council 
members are typically nominated by the governors, the law now stipulates that the remaining council 
members must be elected. The implementation of this important provision, however, has been 
problematic (Finding EDU 4).  
 
Not all members of the community or even those elected to the councils are aware of the elections. The 
governor of Uyanga soum related that a parent had visited him to discuss a matter unrelated to the school. 
During their conversation, the governor had mentioned that the parent had been “elected” to the local 
school council. The parent had neither solicited nor accepted his nomination before he became a parent 
representative on the council. 
 
According to the Uyanga governor, it is not uncommon for parent representatives to school councils to be 
elected in absentia. Indeed, another parent representative at the school in Uyanga mentioned that she had 
not known of her election to the council until she was contacted by the school social worker who serves 
as the chair of the council. According to the social worker, the election took place at the first parents’ 
meeting at the beginning of the school year, which this parent, like many others, did not attend. 
 
Moreover, the director of MAPSSD noted that council members are often chosen by principals. Not only 
is this contrary to the rules and the purpose of the elections, which is to ensure that council members are 
accountable to the community, but it seriously undermines the capacity of councils to objectively evaluate 
the performance of principals or to recommend their dismissal.  
 
THE IMPORTANCE OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION FOR  
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR 
 
Another factor that undermines community involvement in the education sector is the inadequate access 
to the information necessary for activism in and monitoring of school governance (Finding EDU 5). 
Preliminary results from the World Bank-sponsored Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) project 
indicate that parents characteristically have no information on the school budget processes. Although the 
representative of MEA noted that it is easiest to gain access to information “at the bottom” (soum level), 
she indicated that officials typically refuse at the aimag level. Currently, the law on education does not 
require that school finance or fiscal information be available to the public, a legal lacuna that clearly 
undermines the capacity for social accountability in the education sector. 
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Gaining access to budgets is a critical first step in addressing complaints about the mismanagement of 
resources to public schools. In one instance, local officials allegedly colluded with those delivering 
heating fuel to schools to supply less than the amount budgeted but then charge the full amount, and 
pocket the rest.83 According to the principal, however, the funds that were “skimmed” off were used to 
cover teachers’ salaries. Regardless of the accuracy of the allegations, they indicate a need for greater 
transparency and local involvement in the management of schools. 
 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) is implementing a Public Administrative Reform Program to assist 
educational institutions to adhere to the Public Sector Management and Finance Law adopted in 2002. 
The ADB’s focus is on budgetary bodies and public institutions, as opposed to the participation of local 
communities or CSOs in budget formulation or monitoring. Moreover, various stakeholders, including 
education specialists, noted that the PSMFL has reinforced upward rather than downward accountability 
to institutions such as school councils and local communities (Finding EDU 6). This trend is reflected in 
the reduced role of school councils. 
 
THE LOCAL INITIATIVE FUND: A COMMUNITY INITIATIVE? 
 
The Uyanga school was selected for this study from among a group of schools that have received funding 
from the Local Initiative Fund.84 A key goal of LIF is to “facilitate community prioritization, selection, 
cofinancing, and execution of investments in basic infrastructure and social services provision” (World 
Bank 2005a). LIF provides financial resources to bag and soum communities for a small-scale sustainable 
livelihood project to empower local governments For this reason LIF seeks to empower local government 
and communities and strengthen their capacity to improve the potential for sustainable livelihoods by 
making financial resources available to bag and soum level communities for a small-scale sustainable 
livelihood project that they deem to be their highest priority. Priorities are identified at a bag-level 
meeting and then voted upon by the soum khural. The decision is forwarded to the aimag khural and 
ultimately to the LIF project office in Ulaanbaatar that coordinates these projects. 
 
The LIF project is being conducted as a pilot in Bayangol, a duureg (neighborhood) in Ulaanbaatar, and 
in 8 aimags (provinces), where 143 soums (districts) were initially eligible to receive grants of up to 
$8,000, subsequently raised to $16,000 in January 2005. With the exception of Bayangol, LIF targets 
mostly rural areas. A LIF project can fund anything that is not on a “negative list.”85 As of January 2005, 
however, more than 730 projects had been approved to enhance the infrastructure of educational 
institutions, representing approximately 60 percent of the total number of grants awarded. In addition to 
enhancing local control over public resources, these education-related LIF projects enhance community 
involvement in Mongolian schools and empower school councils. The evidence from the Uyanga school, 
however, suggests that this potential is not being realized.  
 
According to the local SLP secretary in Uyanga soum, meetings were held in the local bags to identify 
priority sectors for LIF funding. After the bags identified education as the priority for LIF funding, the 
school authorities selected the actual project. However, parent representatives on the local school council 
who were questioned about this, were uninvolved in the process and unaware that their school had even 
received funding from the LIF program (Finding EDU 7).  
                                                          
83 Heating and electricity costs account for 20 percent of the money spent on education in Mongolia (World Bank 2002c). 
84 LIF projects are a component of the World Bank-financed Sustainable Livelihoods Project, funded through an International 
Development Association loan. 
85 The negative list includes projects that would benefit only a few households, may have a negative environmental impact or 
social consequences, or are financed by another World Bank project or funding source. 
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Moreover, after a World Bank Supervision Mission in September 2004, the team reported that “a 
worrisome trend has emerged in which aimag Household Livelihoods Capacity Support Councils appear 
to be taking away responsibility for subproject design, costing, procurement, and financial management 
from soum and bag communities.” In a worst-case scenario, these projects designed to empower local 
communities and governments may actually undermine the authority and role of preexisting bodies such 
as school councils. 
 
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: SCHOOL COUNCILS (EDU) 
 
Participation in school governance through school councils and parent-teacher associations is one of the 
most effective forms of civic engagement in countries around the world. Education is a matter of great 
importance to Mongolians: it represents one of the largest public service delivery sectors in Mongolia. 
Although school councils offer an important opportunity for communities to affect school governance, 
active community participation has been negatively impacted by certain cultural and legal factors.  
 
The 2002 Law on Education has significantly curtailed the capacity of Mongolian school councils either 
to demand social accountability of public officials in the education sector, or to be socially accountable to 
the local community or a constituency of students and parents. Although the initial draft of the PETS 
report on the education sector indicates that this legal reform has enhanced school councils’ capacity to 
ensure that allocated resources are delivered in a timely fashion, the report does not consider the role of 
councils in monitoring budget formulation or expenditures, or the need for this important aspect of social 
accountability. 
 
Finding EDU 1. The 2002 Law on Education transformed School Councils into advisory bodies and thus, 
radically reduced their capacity to promote social accountability.  
 
Recommendation: With technical support from the international community, the GoM and education-
related CSOs should reevaluate the role of school councils to increase community involvement and social 
accountability in the education sector. Stakeholders should avoid another pendulum swing such as 
occurred when the powerful school boards were transformed into the anemic school councils with limited 
authority to negotiate with the public officials who control school budgets and administration. 
 
Finding EDU 2. There is a general lack of knowledge about the role of school councils. This ignorance is 
reinforced by the sociopolitical context in which school council members, ordinary parents, or community 
members are unlikely to challenge figures of authority, including school principals. 
 
Recommendation: The GoM and education-related CSOs should undertake a civic education program in 
schools and among the adult population to explain the role of local school councils, specifically, and 
social accountability in general.  
 
Finding EDU 3. Relatively few CSOs are actively engaged in the education sector and even fewer 
promote community involvement in the local schools and their councils. 
 
Recommendation: More CSOs, particularly CBOs at the local level and education-related unions at the 
national level, should monitor the education sector through targeted capacity-building programs 
sponsored by the international community and by NGOs working in this area. 
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Finding EDU 4. As legal provisions for school council elections are not typically implemented, 
councilors who are unaware of their appointment and responsibilities may be designated. This undermines 
their capacity to voice local concerns when advising the ministry and other government officials about the 
budgetary and managerial needs of the schools. 
 
Recommendation: For school councils to effectively serve as local representatives, at least the majority 
of the school council must be directly elected in regularly scheduled, well-publicized elections. Ideally, 
these should be held across the country on the same day along with other local elections. 
 
Finding EDU 5. Local communities, parents of students, and representatives on local school councils 
lack information about school management and governance. 
 
Recommendation: In addition to the adoption of an access to information law, the GoM should revise the 
current law on education to ensure public access to information about school finances. 
 
Finding EDU 6. The education law, as well as the PSMFL passed in the same year, has reinforced 
upward accountability toward the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science rather than downward 
accountability to institutions such as school councils and local communities.  
 
Recommendation: Public officials must redress the lack of downward accountability through legal and 
regulatory reform while senior public officials must send clear signals about the importance of downward 
accountability and the important role of local representative institutions such as school councils. 
  
Finding EDU 7. Specifically designed to promote community control over the selection and 
implementation of projects, the Life Initiative Fund presents an invaluable opportunity for local 
communities (particularly school councils) to become involved in school governance.  
 
Recommendation: The experience of the school in this study shows that more could be done to realize 
the potential of the LIF Program, including the notification, if not the involvement, of local stakeholders. 
 
Finding EDU 8 (based on overall assessment). Given the dearth of rural CSOs that engage in social 
accountability, the school councils represent an important and underdeveloped mechanism or forum for 
social accountability at the local level both outside and within Ulaanbaatar. 
 
Recommendation: Public officials should empower school councils through legislative and regulatory 
reform. Meanwhile, CSOs should enhance the capacity of these local councils through workshops for 
their members and other public officials, which may be sponsored by the international community. 
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Annex 5. Mongolian Media: Overview of Constraints and 
Opportunities for Social Accountability86 
 
 
The Mongolian media sector is characterized by lively, if sometimes not very professional, reporting from 
outlets that represent the full range of political viewpoints, although few outlets are politically neutral. In 
many respects, the challenges facing the Mongolian media are similar to those facing the media in other 
countries emerging from the oppression that characterized the period of socialist rule, although progress 
toward a free and responsible media has been hampered by Mongolia’s relative poverty. 
 
The media play a key role in giving voice to the views and demands of citizens, as well as providing 
information to both ordinary citizens and decision makers. A free and effective media acts as a two-way 
conduit for communication between government and the citizenry. As such, the media play a crucial role 
in facilitating civic engagement for social accountability.  
 
This study provides an overview of the media sector and the various constraints and opportunities for 
media in Mongolia. In addition to legal constraints on the media, the study outlines some of the informal 
and internal challenges that the media confront. In this manner, the study provides a framework to 
identify priorities for reform that can promote an environment in which the media maximizes its role in 




A survey by the Press Institute in 2004 found that there were six dailies, 25 weeklies, and numerous less 
frequent newspapers, along with 69 magazines, 43 radio stations, 36 television stations, and 13 cable 
operators (Press Institute 2005a). 
 
All six dailies are alleged to have political biases. The allegations were confirmed by media monitoring of 
the 2005 presidential election campaign by Globe International, a prominent NGO based in Ulaanbaatar 
that works on media-related issues (Globe International 2005a and 2005b). All of the daily newspapers 
are privately owned, with daily circulations ranging from just under 3,000 to almost 12,500 copies in 
2004.  
 
There is only one national radio broadcaster, the state-owned, Mongolian Radio. Of the 15 Ulaanbaatar-
based stations, 12 were privately owned and three were state broadcasters. In contrast, the state owns the 
largest share of the province-based stations (10 out of 25), followed by NGOs, which own eight, mostly 
community radio stations. Another five are privately owned and two are classified as other.87 The 2005 
Globe International project only monitored the national radio, which was found to be relatively 
nonpartisan in its coverage of the presidential candidates. 
 
There is only one national television station, the state-owned Mongolian TV. There are five television 
stations operating in Ulaanbaatar, although four more have recently been licensed,88 bringing the total to 
                                                          
86 This note was primarily researched and written by Toby Mendel, Law Program Director, Article 19. 
87 Figures for provincially based stations come from the Press Institute survey for 2003 (Press Institute 2004a). In a more recent 
report (Press Institute 2005a), the Press Institute indicates that there are now 27 province-based stations, but it does not separate 
them into different categories. 
88 Two were due to start in August 2005, and the other two must start operating by April 2006, or lose their licenses. 
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nine.89 Of the 28 province-based television stations, 20 were state-owned, seven were private, and one 
was classified as other.90 As part of its 2005 election media monitoring efforts, Globe International 
covered the five Ulaanbaatar-based television stations, as well as the national broadcaster. The first round 
of monitoring found serious biases in all but one station. although this had improved significantly during 
the period covered by the second report (Globe International 2005a and 2005b).  
 
The relations between Mongolian media and civil society are generally sound. Most CSOs, particularly 
Ulaanbataar-based NGOs, are able to attract news coverage of their work. Several CBOs, such as the 
Ongi River Movement (annex 3) have worked closely with the media over a number of years to build 
better relationships and thus ensure better coverage. Many CSOs have complained, however, that they are 
often required to pay for coverage that may be tied to the structure of the media discussed below. 
Furthermore, NGOs must pay to broadcast their own productions, including various public interest 
programs, though they have effectively relieved the media of the responsibility to produce it themselves.. 
Consequently, several stakeholders described CSO-media relations as adversarial. In response to a wave 
of media criticisms at the CSO forum during the study’s dissemination, a representative of PRTV 
commented that “it is easy to accuse the media.”91 
 
THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The constitution guarantees basic human rights, including freedom of expression and freedom of the press 
(Article 16.16). These rights may not be used to harm national security or the rights and freedoms of 
others, or to violate public order (Article 19.3). The 1998 Law on Freedom of the Media supports these 
constitutional guarantees, prohibiting censorship and the adoption of laws that restrict media freedom 
(Articles 2 and 3.1). In practice, however, neither of these documents is consulted in legal cases involving 
the media such as defamation cases (discussed below). As the president of Globe International observed, 
Mongolia has “good [media] laws but bad governance” in terms of weak enforcement, as well as the 




All broadcasters are required to obtain a license from the Communications Regulatory Commission 
(CRC), ostensibly an independent body with its own oversight committee. The CRC is appointed by the 
prime minister and staffed almost entirely by senior civil servants. Licenses are awarded through a 
competitive tender process. A group composed of staff from the CRC and other related ministries (such as 
finance and justice) assesses applications and makes recommendations to the CRC oversight committee, 
which makes the final licensing decision. There is a methodology for rating competing applications, 
which is based on technical factors such as financing, broadcasting expertise, and equipment rather than 
more general public interest considerations such as proposed program content. 
 
It is unclear whether or to what extent there is political interference in the licensing process at the CRC 
level. None of the broadcasters interviewed registered any complaint, although as successful applicants 
                                                          
89 Mention should also be made of Eagle TV, formerly a terrestrial broadcaster that now goes out on cable. Channel 
8 is apparently being held in reserve for Eagle TV, should it be able to resolve internal differences that led it to cease 
terrestrial operations in 2003. 
90 As these figures are from 2003, for reasons noted in footnote 2, there are now in fact 30 province-based television stations. 
91 While one CSO leader interviewed during the dissemination phase indicated that CSO-media relations are “not so good… not 
very developed” in Mongolia because “the media doesn’t think the CSOs are important,” another criticized the media for “not 
appreciating democratic values.” 
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they would be unlikely to do so. CRC staff members stated that the working group’s recommendations 
are usually accepted by the oversight committee. 
 
Aspirant broadcasters must receive permission from the relevant local governor (Law on Radio Waves, 
Article 10.1.4). In many cases governors have delayed applications for political reasons, sometimes until 
significant pressure has compelled them to provide the requisite permission as was attested to by 
members of the CRC staff during the dissemination mission. The purpose of requiring the governor’s 
approval is unclear. 
 
License fees are the same for all similarly placed broadcasters without regard to either the 
management/ownership structure or the content. The fee structure penalizes broadcasters that aim to 
provide higher quality (and therefore more costly) content. It also jeopardizes sustainability for 
community broadcasters that are operated by NGOs on a nonprofit basis. 
 
The number of licenses awarded in a given sector is determined by the frequency capacity and interest, 
rather than public interest considerations or market-carrying capacity. As noted above, nine terrestrial TV 
licenses have now been issued for UB. The disparity between demand and supply results in a serious 
incapacity on the part of the market to support these broadcasters (Finding MEDIA 1). 
 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING OF NEW PUBLIC BROADCASTING 
 
The 1998 Law on Freedom of the Media formally prohibited state control over the media (Article 4)), 
though this was never put into effect. However, a new public service broadcasting law, which came into 
effect on July 1, 2005, aims to implement that law. It provides for an independent governing board, the 
National Council, for the new public radio and television, which replaced the old national state 
broadcaster.92 The new law provides that the 15 members of the board be nominated by the president (four 
members), prime minister (four members), and State Great Khural (seven members), from a list of 
nominees proposed by NGOs. Appointments are made by the State Great Khural from these, although this 
last step would appear to be more or less a formality.93 
 
The first National Council was appointed in October 2005, albeit with certain difficulties (Finding 
MEDIA 2). The Mongolian Press Institute oversaw the participatory process that led to 34 nominations 
by civil society for the National Council. However, only eight of the appointees were drawn from this list; 
the other seven were nominated in ways that remain unclear. The chair of the Council, an MPRP member 
of parliament until 2004, is viewed by some as too partisan for this position.94 The Council was divided 
over the appointment of the new general director of PRTV. Some members lodged a court case to 
challenge the appointment. However, the case was withdrawn and the appointments ratified. 
 
During dissemination of the study in February 2006, some of the director’s critics complained that he was 
less qualified than the other candidates, describing him as “untrustworthy” and “totally close to the 
MPRP.” During a subsequently televised “open debate” at which members of the National Council were 
permitted to pose one question to each of the other three finalist for the position, he was asked to explain 
a 6-year-old charge of having embezzled MT 125 million from the national television to produce his own 
                                                          
92 The law originally proposed by the State Great Khural was vetoed by the president on two grounds, namely appointments to 
the governing board and advertising. The president’s proposals, described below, were accepted by legislators and are reflected in 
the adopted law. 
93 The State Great Khural would presumably not review its own nominations.  
94 The Public Service Broadcasting Law prohibits the appointment of elected officials and members of political party 
management to the National Council, but not former officials or former members of management. 
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movies. The Council member who had raised this question indicated during a dissemination interview 
that she was subjected to “black PR” when she tried to sue to prevent the new director from taking office, 
with newspaper articles accusing her of being of Chinese ancestry, which in Mongolia is considered 
slanderous. 
 
As of July 1, 2005, the new law also significantly reduced PRTV’s access to advertising to 2 percent of 
airtime and completely eliminated it from January 1, 2006 (Finding MEDIA 2). In their original budget 
estimates for 2005, PRTV estimated that it would raise 12.9 percent of its total revenues from advertising, 
almost all of which was targeted toward programming. As a result, the new system will make it 
particularly difficult to maintain program quality, although the precise implications of these changes 
remain to be seen. Under the new arrangements, the transmission system will be split off from PRTV, 
leaving the former to be managed by the government. 
 
According to an MP interviewed during the dissemination of this study, there is some discussion of 
reintroducing advertising on public broadcasting. The MP attributed the elimination of advertising to 
heavy lobbying by commercial broadcasters of political leaders, in particular the former president who 
vetoed the bill in February 2005, because he objected to provisions for limited advertising. 
 
Various stakeholders also noted that the PRTV has an exceptionally large staff in comparison to 
independent broadcasters, who use digital technology. Although this could be redressed through an initial 
outlay by the GoM, a National Council member also recommended that state funding for PRTV be 
stabilized through five-year budgets as annual submissions that are time consuming and make it difficult 
to plan programming in advance. This would also enhance the autonomy of PRTV as it makes its 
transition from state to public broadcasting. 
 
There is no provision in the law on Radio Waves to address content issues in broadcasting, despite serious 
problems relating to quality (see below), and to political bias in the media. Although CRC staff members 
claimed that local broadcasting was not an issue in Mongolia, given the large number of radio stations 
outside of Ulaanbaatar, a leader of the Press Institute noted that there is a need for local public media, 
which is not covered by the new legislation, save one minor reference. She believes that this could be 
readily addressed through legislation parallel to the new law on national public broadcasting. 
 
REGISTRATION OF NEWSPAPERS 
 
Print media outlets are required to register with the Ministry of Justice and Home Affairs. Applications 
are considered by the board of the ministry, a high-level internal body—and a recommendation is then 
made to the minister, who makes the final decision. Ministry staff indicated that ultimately no applicant 
has ever been refused, although MoJHA does review proposals to ensure that they do not pursue illegal 
goals. Proposed names have been rejected on the basis that they are either already taken, or that they fail 
to conform to rules on the use of the Mongolian language.  
 
This process, however, is open to political abuse and numerous allegations have been made that the 
registration system is used as a means to control newspapers (Finding MEDIA 3). In at least one case, 
during the 2005 presidential election, a newspaper was closed due to a dispute over ownership and over a 
special requirement for all newspapers to reregister (see box 3.2.3, section on Voice). Nonetheless, 
various stakeholders expressed during dissemination interviews the need to maintain media registration to 
identify publishers so that they may be held accountable for the content and quality of their reporting. As 
the president of Globe indicated, “the public should know who is behind the media, who is the ‘real 
owner.’” To avoid having registration become a means to restrict content and further self-censorship (see 
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discussion below), the director of the Press Institute suggested that registration be done through a 
nongovernmental agency. 
 
ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND THE LEGAL REGIME OF SECRECY 
 
The media’s access to information determines the extent to which they can provide information to the 
public. A 2005 study by the Press Institute revealed that media workers identified problems in accessing 
information held by public bodies as one of the most serious constraints on their work (Press Institute 
2005b). General publication practices in the public sector are improving slowly.95 A more fundamental 
issue, however, is that Mongolia does not have an access to information law, though the need for general 
legislation of this sort was identified as a key priority by all stakeholders. In 2005, the coalition 
government made a clear commitment to adopt such a law, including it in the Ten Steps to Intensity: The 
Implementation of the National Program to Combat Corruption. More recently, a working group set up by 
the MoJHA, which includes representatives from CSOs, has been developing a draft of the Access to 
Information Law and is currently seeking comments from other ministries. 
 
Given that the Convention on Corruption recently signed by the GoM requires passage of an access to 
information law, it is likely that a draft of this law will be considered during the spring 2006 
parliamentary session. Failing this, an opposition MP indicated during a dissemination interview that 
opposition leaders are willing to put it on the agenda themselves. Nonetheless, Globe International, which 
prepared a Draft Law of Mongolia on Freedom of Information in 2002 in collaboration with the INGO 
ARTICLE 19, was skeptical since the issue was on the parliamentary agenda in the fall of 2005 as well 
and was never addressed (Finding MEDIA 4).96 
 
While there are a number of specific disclosure provisions in various laws, there is also a draconian State 
Secrets Law that establishes broad categories under which information may be classified, and grants 
individual bureaucracies the power to develop their own lists of secret documents based on these 
categories (Finding MEDIA 5).97 The government, however, made a commitment in its 2005 
anticorruption document to replace this law with a more narrowly drafted one. More recently, a prominent 
MP indicated that “there is no talk yet of modifying the state secrecy laws either within the government or 
among the MPs.” When the question was put to a representative of the MoJHA, he responded that “this is 
not within [their] purview but the responsibility of the State Intelligence Agency.” 
 
The history of secretive government and bureaucratic obstacles dating from socialist rule reinforces the 
legal regime of secrecy. As one journalist put it: “We have to sneak around almost like thieves to get 
information.” Obstacles include rules specifying that information may be obtained from only one central 
contact point; officials causing delays in providing information; and fear among lower officials of the 
consequences of disclosing information. Consequently, the president of Globe International indicated that 
reform of the state secrecy laws and introduction of a freedom of information law, although critical, 
would only be a first step toward changing the culture of secrecy in Mongolia. 
                                                          
95 In the legal area, for example, many laws are still not available online, and it is difficult for nonlawyers to access them in hard 
copy. Moreover, only a small number of leading court decisions is published. On the other hand, court archives are generally well 
maintained and accessible, albeit for a fee. Mongolia’s extremely ambitious plans for new technology, and particularly e-
government, may help address this problem. 
96 The director of Globe International also indicated that they have not yet analyzed the new draft, which would require them to 
obtain additional outside funding. 
97 For example, Article 36 of the Law on State and Local Property requires publication of information prior to a process of 
privatization: all laws of the State Great Khural, orders of the President, and ministerial resolutions must be published (ARTICLE 




The Defamation Law is regularly employed in response to critical reporting in the media; the vast 
majority of suits are initiated by politicians and other officials (Finding MEDIA 6). The Defamation Law 
was repeatedly cited in interviews and various studies as a serious impediment to free reporting.98 
Moreover, there have been high-profile cases of imprisonment for defamation in recent years (see box 
3.2.1, in the section on Voice).99 Although the poor quality of reporting is a very serious problem in 
Mongolia, the necessity of criminal defamation laws has been seriously questioned.100 Furthermore, both 
the criminal and civil defamation laws do not provide internationally recognized defenses, but do provide 
special protection to public officials contrary to international standards. 
 
During dissemination, various stakeholders, including MPs and a representative of the Ministry of Justice 
and Home Affairs, expressed their support for reform of the criminal code on defamation. One legislator 




Poor Quality and the Structure of the Media 
The poor quality of the media content remains a very serious problem in Mongolia despite the numerous 
training programs offered by both local and international groups. Factors affecting quality include funding 
constraints, the extent of politicization, the lack of an authoritative standard-setting body, and weak 
ethical and professional traditions among journalists.101 At the same time, some excellent work is being 
produced. For example, TV Forum, a weekly show broadcast on national television under the sponsorship 
by the Open Society Forum was widely praised as opening up the debate on issues of national 
importance. 
 
As to the lack of ethical or professional standards, a study by Globe International identified a number of 
common failings in media coverage, including a failure to check the reliability of sources or to obtain 
more than one source; failure to update stories with more current information; copying stories from other 
media sources without assessing their accuracy; and publishing stories to increase circulation without 
regard for their accuracy or relevance (Press Institute 2005b:15). Stakeholders noted that the problem 
exceeds a simple lack of commitment to ethics or professionalism and that the structure of the sector is 
such that ethical behavior is not rewarded by either financial reward or career advancement (Finding 
MEDIA 7). 
 
According to the Globe International study, poor training also undermined professionalism. One 
journalist related that he was required to take a course on agriculture as part of his journalism degree, 
although the subject was irrelevant to his work (Press Institute 2005b:15). In another study, Globe 
surveyed 200 journalists, half of whom felt that journalists as a group needed to increase their 
professional knowledge (Globe International 2004). 
                                                          
98 A 2001 study by the Mongolian Open Society Forum found that of the 79 civil defamation cases studied from the three 
preceding years, only four were decided in favor of the defendants (Mongolian Open Society Forum 2001b; see also ARTICLE 
19 and Globe International 2002:110-115). 
99 There were no cases of imprisonment for defamation during the Democratic Party government tenure: 1996–2000 (Press 
Institute 2005b). 
100 One interviewee described the phenomenon of journalists’ negative reporting on one person as a form of character 
assassination. 
101 The Press Institute survey rated distribution of false information, journalists’ professional irresponsibility, and their political 
affiliation or dependence as the leading constraints on media quality in Mongolia (Press Institute 2004b:26). 
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Social and cultural considerations also affect journalistic standards. For example, sports writers find it 
difficult to criticize players because they are personally familiar or socially connected with many of them. 
A mutual acquaintance may request that the journalist refrain from a negative or unflattering account, as 
is also the case with politicians. 
 
Moreover, media owners, who are all politically linked, exercise close control over political content, 
which results in systemic biases in coverage. There are numerous accounts of editors who either refuse to 
carry content or insist on a certain slant to a story. Thus, even highly qualified journalists may face 
obstacles from their editors or the owners of the media outlet. In light of this, stakeholders have proposed 
trainings for owners and editors as well as journalists.  
 
Despite political slanting in the media, both major political parties are supported by outlets from each 
media subsector. As a result, stakeholders repeatedly stated that they had to read numerous newspapers to 
get a composite picture. There are, however, signs that the political polarization of the broadcast media 
has decreased since the 2004 parliamentary elections and that Mongolia Radio and Television, now 
PRTV, in particular, is becoming less biased toward the government and ruling party. Monitoring of the 
media during the 2005 presidential election campaign indicated that MRTV had become far more 
balanced (Globe International 2004, 2005a, and 2005b; Press Institute 2004b:25-26). It should be further 
noted that politicization extends to various civil society actors in the media sector, who may, as a result of 
their own involvement, fail to protest abuses of media freedom. 
 
Another concern is the concentration of the media such as the vertically integrated media empire 
controlled by Mongol News, as well as Igel’s growing network of local (aimag) newspapers (Press 
Institute 2004a). At present, there is no specific regulation on the concentration of ownership in the media 
sector or any proposal for such a legal reform.  
 
The criminal and civil laws are the primary means for redressing harmful media content. However, this 
form of redress is inaccessible for most Mongolians as it is a lengthy, expensive, and unreliable process. 
On the other hand, when powerful economic or political actors initiate cases, the consequences are 
oppressive for the media outlets and for the journalists. In many countries, self-regulatory or statutory but 
independent bodies receive complaints from the public who claim to have been adversely affected by 
media content. The idea of a self-regulatory press council has been discussed for some time in Mongolia, 
but the serious divisions within the media community have prevented any sustainable initiative from 
emerging.102 There is also discussion about a statutory press council, although there are some concerns 
regarding the possibility of official interference or control because, as one CSO leader noted, it is “the 
GoM and politicians who have politicized the media, resulting in the poor quality of the media.” 
 
A major obstacle to establishment of such a council is the serious lack of solidarity that permeates the 
media sector, which also hinders the ability of journalists and media owners to stand up for freedom of 
the press and their rights as media workers. In a 2004 Globe International survey, 50 percent of journalists 
indicated that the sector needs a strong organization to project its rights and interests. A lack of such an 




                                                          
102 In the 2004 Globe International survey, 47.5 percent of journalists called for a system of self-regulation to improve ethical 
reporting. In that same year, the Open Society Forum and Globe International worked with various media groups to establish a 




All of the factors discussed here, as well as the financial constraints and incentive structures noted below, 
place pressure on journalists to practice self-censorship (Findings MEDIA 7 and 8). There are also a 
number of informal restrictions that result in self-censorship. For example, critical media coverage may 
attract telephone calls or threats of investigations under the media registration or tax regimes. The 
intelligence services also allegedly monitor media output, with obvious implications for self-censorship. 
In addition, public officials use access to official information as a lure to mute criticism, so that friendly 
media outlets receive better access (Press Institute 2005b:4-10). Moreover, government funds have 
reportedly been channeled to the media, in particular to the yellow press that focuses on pro-government 
and anti-opposition “reporting.” As a further reward, ministries and other public bodies are strongly 
encouraged to subscribe to the tabloid, News of the Century, a significant advantage, given the low 
circulation rates in the country. 
 
One of the best examples of self-censorship identified by the study occurred in 2005 under the UNESCO-
sponsored project “Media for Transparent Government.” The president of Globe International recounted 
in a dissemination interview that 20 journalists had worked in teams of four to write 12 anticorruption 
articles. These were then published in the newspaper People’s Right under the name of the team, as the 
journalists had refused to publicly reveal their identity for fear of reprisal. One of the teams even refused 
to publish an article it had investigated on corruption in the education sector, preferring to take the safer 
though still risky path of writing on the difficulties they faced during their investigations and the need for 
media legal reform. Further evidence that self-censorship is a widespread phenomenon is provided in the 
2004 Globe International survey: Each of the 200 journalists polled identified self-censorship as a 
problem in Mongolia.  
 
Consequences of Inadequate Funding 
Inadequate funding for the media sector adversely affects the quality of output in various ways. The 2005 
Survey of Civil Society Organizations (annex 6 Question HH) indicates that 43 percent of the CSOs 
surveyed thought that lack of funding was a significant contributing factor to the lack of investigative 
journalism in Mongolia. As noted above, the underlying problem is the existence of more outlets than the 
market can support. As a result, almost all media operate at a loss and can only survive with the financial 
support of a patron that contributes to politically biased coverage (Finding MEDIA 8). 
 
As competition for sales is based on short-term returns, the media are pressured to provide sensationalist 
stories, regardless of their veracity. For example, one newspaper reportedly published a story about 
Mongolians in Saudi Arabia; the actual story had concerned Russians, but was adapted for the local 
audience.  
 
“Financial journalism”—reporting a particular view in exchange for cash—is widespread and precipitated 
by the poor wages that journalists receive. This point was repeatedly raised in interviews with various 
stakeholders, while journalists complained that they were forced to write stories they did not believe to 
keep their jobs. 
 
The media in any democracy have a crucial role to play in informing the public, transmitting popular 
views to officials, providing a forum for public debate, and monitoring public performance. A 
combination of legal, informal, and internal constraints undermine the media’s ability to fulfill these 
roles. Since the end of socialism, Mongolia has made significant advances in the legal framework and in 
the diversification of the media sector. More is currently required to refine the legal framework, to 
improve implementation of progressive laws, to address the financial constraints facing the media, to 
build a culture of tolerance among political figures, and to promote professionalism in the media. 
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Findings and Recommendations: Mongolian Media (MEDIA) 
Finding MEDIA 1. The current licensing regulations enable political distortions by requiring a letter of 
support from the local governor; failing to promote public interest broadcasting by disregarding content; 
and undermining the capacity of broadcasters by licensing more than the market can currently support. 
 
Recommendation: The GoM in consultation with media-related CSOs should 1) remove the licensing 
requirement of a governor’s signature from the law on Radio Waves; 2) regulate licensing by considering 
diversity of content and ownership, including nonprofit and community broadcasters; and 3) reduce the 
number of television licenses to reflect the capacity of the market. 
 
Finding MEDIA 2. The full potential of the national public broadcaster (PRTV) to produce public 
interest programming is threatened by dramatic reductions in its sources of funding and the politicization 
of its new governing body, the National Council. 
 
Recommendations:  
1) In collaboration with the PRTV and media-related CSOs, the GoM should promote the capacity 
building of the PRTV to ensure more efficient management and resource mobilization. 
International donors should provide initial support for such a program, which should include 
investigation of cost-saving measures within broadcasting operations and exchanges with other 
public broadcasters who have been forced to cut back on operations (for example, the Georgian 
public broadcaster). 
2) PRTV should monitor the impact of eliminating access to advertising resources, keeping the GoM 
and the public informed about adverse consequences. Should this seriously undermine the ability 
of PRTV to provide public interest programming, public officials should amend this restriction 
and establish a five-year budget to promote the autonomy of the PRTV. 
3) With initial technical and financial support from the international community, media-related 
CSOs should monitor the implementation of the Public Broadcasting Law and initiate inquiries 
with the agencies or the judiciary should any shortcomings be identified. 
4) The international community should provide technical assistance for the capacity building of 
National Council members to enable them to operate effectively and in accordance with best 
practices around the world.  
 
Finding MEDIA 3. The registration system for the media threatens its independence by permitting 
politicization that causes delays or obstructions for those wishing to enter the market. 
Recommendation: In consultation with the media and media-related CSOs, public officials should revise 
the registration system for the media to ensure it does not pose obstacles to potential entrants. They may 
transfer this responsibility to a nongovernmental agency to avoid undue political influence in the 
registration process. International donor agencies, INGOs, and interested CSOs should actively advocate 
for these changes by, for example, providing comparative materials on other countries’ experiences.  
 
Finding MEDIA 4. Although a Draft Law of Mongolia on Freedom of Information was prepared in 
2002, parliament has not passed legislation to ensure access to information required by the media. 
 
Recommendation: Public officials should take immediate action to adopt an access to information law 
that is in line with constitutional and international standards. In collaboration with CSOs and the media, 
and with initial funding from the donor community, the GoM should then promote its implementation 
through training and publicity. 
 
Finding MEDIA 5. A culture of secrecy, reinforced by several broad secrecy laws, is inconsistent with 
open government and obstructs the media’s access to information. 
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Recommendation: Public officials should amend secrecy laws to bring them in line with international 
standards. To ensure implementation, senior officials should send clear signals against undue secrecy, 
such as disciplining officials and civil servants who withhold information unlawfully. The GoM, with 
initial donor funding, should also provide ongoing training for both civil servants and politicians on the 
negative effects of secrecy and the benefits of open government to socioeconomic development. 
 




1) In collaboration with other stakeholders, public officials should comprehensively review and 
reform the criminal and civil defamation regimes to bring them in line with international 
standards. At a minimum, the provision of imprisonment for defamation should be removed. 
International donor agencies, INGOs, and interested CSOs with an expertise on defamation laws 
should actively advocate for these changes by, for example, providing comparative materials on 
defamation laws in other countries. 
2) Given the norms that have developed under the current defamation regime, stakeholders need to 
undertake explicit actions to ensure the implementation of reforms to the legal code. With 
technical and financial support from media-related CSOs and the donor community, they must 
revise the legal text and provide training on its implications for both journalists and the judiciary. 
 
Finding MEDIA 7. The poor quality of media output in Mongolia is a product of inadequate funding and 
the related phenomenon of self-censorship, which threaten both freedom of expression and the public’s 
right to diverse and reliable information. 
 
Recommendations: 
1) Media-related CSOs, public officials, and media representatives should have a broad social 
consultation to analyze the factors that influence the quality of media reporting, such as the 
politicization of the media, funding constraints, weak ethical or professional norms, and the 
concentration of media ownership. They may also consider possible actions to enhance incentives 
to improve quality and reliability. Special consideration should be given to the establishment of a 
media council that offers country-specific recommendations to address the problem of poor media 
reporting.  
2) There should be additional training for media workers, including editors and owners, that focuses 
not only on promoting professional reporting, but also on enhancing the financial viability of 
media outlets by promoting efficiency and fundraising. 
3) Senior officials should take the following measures to address the widespread phenomenon of 
self-censorship: Prosecute threats and acts of violence against journalists to the fullest extent of 
the law and publicly expose the perpetrators; stop pressure to subscribe to particular media 
outlets; and instruct intelligence services workers to restrict monitoring of media output to a 
limited set of legally defined issues related to state security.  
 
Finding MEDIA 8. Inadequate resources contribute to the poor quality, politicization, self-censorship, 
and ownership concentration of media in Mongolia. 
 
Recommendation: As the primary underlying problem is that the number of outlets exceeds the market, 
broadcast licensing and print registration should reflect this concern, while the concentration of media 
ownership should be regulated. 
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Annex 6. Survey of Civil Society Organizations on 
the Enabling Environment for Social Accountability in Mongolia 
 
The Mongolian CSO Survey was conducted to assess the opportunities for and constraints on the ability 
of civil society organizations to influence the policies of the Government of Mongolia. The study was 
conducted in April-May 2005 by The Asia Foundation.103 Almost 100 CSOs were surveyed in two 
categories of respondents: a sample of randomly selected NGOs (35) registered with the Ministry of 
Justice and Home Affairs (MoJHA), and a list of “active” CSOs (61) identified in consultation with 
various NGOs, INGOs, and members of the donor community. 
 
The team decided to take a dual approach because a survey of active CSOs would not reflect Mongolia’s 
larger CSO environment, where access to resources (human and financial) and public officials is 
markedly reduced. On the other hand, a random sample of registered NGOs would not reflect the dynamic 
involvement of Mongolian CSOs in civic engagement and social accountability. Moreover, the team was 
uncertain at the outset whether TAF would gain access to the MoJHA list, and if it could, whether it 
would be able to locate most of these organizations and obtain their participation in the survey.104 In the 
end, the survey is heavily dominated by CSOs located in Ulaanbaatar (93 percent). This does not reflect a 
bias in the survey, however, because according to the MoJHA 90 percent of registered NGOs are based in 
the capital, although only 50 percent of the population resides there. 
A greater number of respondents would have enhanced the survey, particularly respondents from the 
underrepresented provinces as well as informal organizations. Nevertheless, the findings from the survey 
have been very informative, confirming and clarifying the qualitative research conducted for the study. 
 
I. ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION 
 
To assess the scope of civil society organizations involved in civic engagement, we need some basic 
information about your organization. 
 
In what year was your organization established?105 
Prior to the 1990 Transition      6% 
1990–96       29% 
1997–2004       55% 
 No response        9% 
 
Location of main office (city or province)106  
Ulaanbaatar       94% 
Other         6% 
 
 
                                                          
103 Recent Politobarometer polls conducted by Sant Maral are available at the Open Society Forum Web site www.sorros.org.mn. 
104 In fact, the refusal rate for the randomly selected NGOs was nearly double the rate for active CSOs. Moreover, the list of 
NGOs provided by the MoJHA frequently had outdated or insufficient information, forcing TAF to take the next NGO on the list. 
105 We also asked the year in which CSOs were registered, but given that responses closely corresponded to the reported date, and 
a third of the respondents gave registration dates prior to the 1997 legislation that set up NGO registration, this question was 
dropped from our analysis. 
106 The UB-bias reflects that the category of pre-identified “active” NGOs, which constitute more than 60 percent of the 
respondents, is based in the capital. It is also a product of incomplete or outdated contact information from the MoJHA on NGOs 
outside of UB, as well as the fact that most NGOs are based in UB.  
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In which parts of the country does your organization operate? 107 
 Hangai       45% 
 Central       47% 
 Eastern       38% 
 Western      44% 
 
Is your organization membership-based?  
Less than 10 members        4% 
11-25 members        5% 
26-50 members        6% 
51-100 members       7% 
101-500 members       8% 
More than 500  members     12% 
No members       10% 
Don’t know        1% 
No response108       47% 
  
How many people work each week at your organization? 
Paid full-time (20+ hrs)      68% 
Volunteer full-time      29% 
Paid part-time (<20 hrs)      28% 
Volunteer part-time      55% 
 
Which of the following activities is your organization involved in?  
Legal services       19% 
Monitoring government services or performance   18% 
Training and capacity building     72% 
Provision of services      28% 
Research/publications      39% 
Other        43% 
 
What areas does your organization work in?  
Education       41% 
Environment       27% 
Economic development      22% 
Social development      43% 
Human, political, or civil rights      40% 
Media/information      22% 
Women/family       29% 
Other        37% 
 
II. INVOLVEMENT IN SOCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The questions in this section of the survey are intended to assess the opportunities and constraints on the 
ability of your organization to influence public policy and conduct. 
                                                          
107 A total of 57 percent of the respondents reported operating in a region outside of UB. 
108 As the survey did not include “no members” as a response, which some respondents added, a significant number of those who 
did not respond (47 percent) undoubtedly do not have members. 
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How frequently has your organization been involved in the following activities?  
At least monthly: 
Comment publicly on official conduct or policy   23% 
Undertake advocacy for a change in public policy or legislation 26% 
Meet or correspond directly with public officials (informally)  56% 
Participate in a public hearing/meeting    61% 
Participate in state commission or advisory committee  21% 
Monitor government expenditure     7% 
Monitor the performance of public services   22% 
Analyze budgets or explain them to citizens    8% 
Other        11% 
 
In your opinion, which of the activities described in the previous question are likely to result in 
changes in public policy, legislation, or conduct of public officials? 
    Often to Almost Always: 
Comment publicly on official conduct or policy   53% 
Undertake advocacy for a change in public policy or legislation 60% 
Meet or correspond directly with public officials (informally)  66% 
Participate in a public hearing/meeting    40% 
Participate in state commission or advisory committee  35% 
Monitor government expenditure    42% 
Monitor the performance of public services   58% 
Analyze budgets or explain them to citizens   50% 
Other             0% 
 
J. In relation to the activities listed above, how frequently have you received the following types of 
responses from public officials?  
          At least sometimes: 
Your recommendations were incorporated and policy or conduct changed 44% 
Public official(s) were held accountable for wrongdoing       4% 
Received direct feedback (for example, in the form of a letter or telephone call) 41% 
Received negative feedback (for example, in the form of criticism or sanction) 35% 
Received no feedback or response      34% 
Other           1% 
 
Rate the following types of public officials according to the degree to which they are receptive to the 
activities listed in Questions H and I. 
At least usually receptive: 
National officials      45% 
Local officials       48% 
Senior officials       37% 
Middle- and low-ranking officials    40% 
 
Are public officials working in certain ministries or policy areas more or less receptive to the 
activities listed in Questions H and I? 
Some are more receptive       8% 
Some are less receptive       26% 
No difference between ministries or policy areas   18% 
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Over the last 12 months have public officials become more responsive to efforts by civil society 
organizations to influence public policy or conduct? 
Much more responsive      17% 
More responsive      33% 
No change       30% 
Less responsive        4% 
Much less responsive       6% 
Don’t know        8% 
No response        1% 
 
In your opinion, are there sufficient opportunities for civil society organizations to influence policy, 
legislation, and conduct of public officials in the following areas? 
At least somewhat sufficient: 
Voice views on public policy, legislation, and conduct of officials  64% 
Monitor implementation of policy, legislation, and conduct of officials   32% 
Monitor public allocations and expenditure     13% 
Monitor performance of public services      28% 
Negotiate with public officials to influence policy and legislation  43% 
 
Question on the ability of CSOs to influence public policy, legislation, and the conduct of officials 
dropped due to mistranslation. 
 
In your opinion, is the relationship between the government and CSOs cooperative or 
confrontational?  
Very cooperative       3% 
Somewhat cooperative      57% 
Somewhat confrontational     19% 
Very confrontational       7% 
None of the above        2% 
Don’t know        3% 
No response        8% 
 
III. ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES  
 
To assess the opportunities as well as the constraints on the ability of civil society organizations to 
influence the policies and conduct of public officials, in this section we seek to determine the level and 
types of resources that your organization has at its disposal. 
 
Does your organization have an office? 
Own a building       25% 
Rent an office        57% 
Use someone’s home        3% 
No office        10% 
Other         2% 
No response         2% 
 
Does your organization own or have access to the following (check all that apply)? 
Vehicles    41%  up to 7 vehicles, 71% only 1 
Telephone     91%  up to 10 telephones, 46% only 1 
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Computer    95%  up to 40 computers, 21% only 1 
Internet     80%   
Other      31%   
 
What was the size of your organization’s annual budget in 2004? 
< 1 million MT   16% 
>1-5 million MT    8% 
>5-10 million MT    6% 
>10-15 million MT    9% 
>15-20 million MT    1% 
> 20 million MT   43% 
Don’t know     1% 
No response    16% 
 
Does the size of your budget vary greatly from year to year? 
Varies dramatically   12% 
Varies somewhat   43% 
Varies little    29% 
Never varies          4% 
No response    13% 
 
Please indicate the percentage of your 2004 budget that came from the following sources:109  
     Mean of  
No. of responses:     reported: 
Member fees and contributions    38   33% 
Local private contributions    33   24% 
Profit-making activities     41   31% 
Funding from Mongolian public sources (GoM)  11   24% 
Funding from international donors   43   64% 
Cooperation with international NGOs   34   44% 
 
If your organization has received government funding, please indicate the terms, and which 
ministry disbursed the funds.110 
Contract with a government office    10% 
Other form of funding        3% 
No funding received          62% 
 
 In your opinion, is the allocation of public resources (funding, contracts) to CSOs sufficiently 
transparent and fair? 
Transparent and fair        9% 
Transparent but not fair      12% 
Fair but not transparent        6% 
Neither fair nor transparent     58% 
Don’t know         9% 
No response        5% 
 
                                                          
109 The varying level of “no response” suggests that those who do not have this budget source did not respond, which of course 
influences the mean. This is one indication why a face-to-face interview would have been preferable had there been more time. 
110 The percentage of CSOs that reported receiving government funding in Question U (12 respondents) is almost identical to 
those who reported having a GoM contract or other funding in Question V (13 respondents). 
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If you do not believe that the allocation of public resources is transparent and fair, which of the 
following are factors?  
Contracts are often given to CSOs with links to GoM   24% 
Contracting is too bureaucratic       34% 
Funds provided are insufficient to deliver quality products  26% 
Instructions on how to obtain GoM awards are not available to the public 30% 
Information about who was awarded is not disclosed   37% 
Very few CSOs meet requirements to access public resources  54% 
Other         7% 
 
In your opinion, which of the following pose a significant constraint on the ability of your 
organization to raise or obtain funds? 111     
At least somewhat significant: 
Laws and regulations       55% 
The policies of international donors     47% 
Political interference       47% 
CSO is unknown       47% 
Too few sources of funds      65% 
Lack of time for fundraising      30% 
   Don’t know         5% 
   Other          7%  
 
In your opinion, which of the following pose a significant obstacle to CSOs obtaining funding from 
international donors?112                
At least somewhat significant: 
Funding processes are not competitive enough    51% 
Funding processes are not transparent enough    57% 
Funding is too short term      43% 
Funding is too focused on project work rather than overheads  62% 




To assess the opportunities as well as constraints on the ability of civil society organizations to influence 
policies and conduct of public officials, we need to establish the types of information sought, received, 
and disseminated by your organization. 
 
How many times has your organization requested documents or other information from public 
authorities?  
Very rarely         4% 
From time-to-time       52% 
Frequently        37% 
Never          6% 
                                                          
111 There was a wide range of “no responses” on Question Y, ranging from 19 percent on limited sources as a constraint on ability 
to raise or obtain funds to 37 percent for lack of time to fundraise. It is unclear as to whether the lack of a response reflects 
disagreement about the significance of the factor or lack of knowledge. 
112 There was also a wide range of “no responses” on Question Z, ranging from 24 percent on funding that was too project-
focused to 37 percent for funding that was limited to a one-time grant.It is unclear as to whether the lack of a response reflects 
disagreement about the significance of the factor or lack of knowledge. One response noted a “language barrier.” 
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No response         1% 
 
BB1. If you have requested information, was it provided? 
Almost always          13% 
Sometimes          56% 
Rarely           13% 
Almost never          10% 
Not applicable         4% 
No response         4% 
 
BB2. If you have never requested information, why not?113 
Did not expect to receive the information    1% 
Did not know how to request information    3% 
Concerned about reaction a request would generate   5% 
Government information is not relevant to our work    3% 
 
CC. Question on GoM openness to civic engagement/social accountability committed due to 
mistranslation. 
 
DD. Through which of the following sources does your organization receive information from the 
government?  
Government publications (journals, newsletters)     87% 
Government Web sites (specify)      49% 
Independent Web sites       18% 
Informally from officials (private meetings)    63% 
Informally from other individuals     31% 
Public TV/radio       74% 
Private TV/radio        58% 
Newspaper(s)         73% 
Seminars, conferences, other events      63% 
Other         10% 
 
V. VOICE AND MEDIA 
 
To assess the opportunities as well as constraints on the ability of civil society organizations to influence 
the policies and conduct of public officials, we need to establish the autonomy of the media, its 
relationship your organization, and other mediums at your disposal to voice concerns and opinions as well 
as disseminate information.  
 
EE. In your opinion, do any of the following influence media coverage in Mongolia?   
At least some influence: 
Political pressure       83% 
Legal pressure (for example, threat of defamation or libel suit)  75% 
Economic pressure (writing for pay)     83% 
Sociocultural pressures (for example, impropriety of airing dirty laundry) 59% 
                                                          
113 The 20 responses to Question BB2 were made by respondents who had either not responded to Question AA or stated that 
they never requested information (6), very rarely (2), and from time to time (7). However, there were also several respondents to 




FF. Question on factors that make media more dependent omitted due to mistranslation. 
In your opinion, is the media conducting sufficient investigative journalism (for example, exposing 
corruption or violations of law)?  
Sufficient         2% 
Somewhat sufficient       26% 
Insufficient        56% 
Don’t know         1% 
No response        15% 
 
If there is insufficient investigative journalism, which of the choices below are significant 
impediments to this?       
At least somewhat significant: 
Fear of reprisals (for example, from the government)   68% 
Lack of training        38% 
Lack of commitment to this      64% 
Lack of funding        43% 
  
II. Has your organization ever received media coverage for any of the following? 
An activity or event organized by your organization   69% 
Interviewed/profiled your organization     72% 
Referred to your organization in a story or program   60% 
Covered issue in response to request from your organization  49% 
Other          6% 
Don’t know         3% 
   
JJ. In the last year, has your organization used any of the following means for disseminating 
information?  
Produced radio or TV programs      58% 
Written articles for publication in a magazine or newspaper  65% 
Produced a regular publication (for example, a newsletter)  26% 
Written or published books or research papers    54% 
Maintained a Web site       39% 
Contributed to a Web site      28% 
Disseminated information via e-mail     47% 
Issued press releases       42% 
Given media interviews       71% 
Bought advertising       14% 




To assess the opportunities as well as constraints on the ability of civil society organizations to influence 
the policies and conduct of public officials, we need to establish the ability of civil society organizations 






KK. Over the last year, how frequently has your organization participated in the following? 
         At least monthly: 
National government/ministry/national council meeting   26% 
National public forum or hearing     14% 
Legislative hearing       26% 
Local council (aimag, soum, or bag)     20% 
Other          4% 
 
LL. How effective were these activities in influencing public policy?  
At least somewhat effective: 
National government, ministry, or council meeting   30% 
National public forum or hearing     40% 
Legislative hearing       50% 
Local council        26% 
Other          2% 
 
MM. In your organization’s particular field, please indicate the extent to which you feel you have 
an adequate opportunity to present your views to the government 
Sufficient opportunity       27% 
Quite a lot of opportunity      29% 
Some opportunity        32% 
No opportunity         5% 
Don’t know         2% 
No response         4% 
 
VI. INFORMATION ABOUT THE RESPONDENT 
 
NN. Your position in the organization:  
Director         67% 
Staff member        16% 
Volunteer         1% 
Board member         3% 
Other         10% 
No response         3% 
 
OO. Your gender:    
Male         49% 
Female         49% 
No response          2% 
 
PP. Your age: 
21-30         12% 
31-40         24% 
41-50         41% 
51-60         15% 
>60          7%  
No response         2% 
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Annex 7. Opinion Poll on Government Relations 
with Mongolian Civil Society 
 
 
The purpose of the opinion poll was to gauge popular views on the relationship between the Government 
of Mongolia and Mongolian civil society. The study was conducted in May 2005 by Sant Maral, a 
Mongolian NGO with extensive experience in opinion polling.114 There were slightly more than 600 
randomly selected respondents to the poll; half of them reside in Ulaanbaatar, while the rest reside in 
three other randomly selected aimags. One of the aimags is Uvorkhangai, where we conducted interviews 
to confirm our findings from the capital and strengthen the case studies.115 
 
In evaluating Mongolia’s political economy, the two most important issues identified by respondents 
were economic issues, although they generally considered the economy to be better than the political 
situation in Mongolia today (Questions A-C). After unemployment (53 percent) and poverty (38 percent), 
the third most important issue cited was corruption (24 percent), which nearly all respondents consider to 
be a serious political obstacle (Question G). 
 
One of the most significant findings from the poll was that the overwhelming majority of respondents (92 
percent) indicated that they knew little to nothing about civil society organizations (Question Q1). This 
may explain why the level of confidence in CSOs was extremely low (29 percent), especially when 
contrasted with the prime minister (60 percent) and the president (69 percent), though not nearly as low as 
either the judiciary (24 percent), or political parties (14 percent), with which the ordinary citizens 
presumably have greater familiarity (Question I). The respondents’ assessment of the role and influence 
of CSOs should be considered in this light. 
 
A. What is your opinion of the current economic situation in Mongolia? 
Very good       .3% 
Good        7% 
Mixed       54% 
Bad       33% 
Very bad       5% 
Don’t know       1% 
 
B. What is your opinion of the current political situation in Mongolia? 
Very good       .2% 
Good        8% 
Mixed       39% 
Bad       42% 
Very bad       7% 




                                                          
114 Recent Politobarometer polls conducted by Sant Maral are available at the Open Society Forum Web site www.sorros.org.mn. 
115 Although several NGOs in Uvorkhangai responded to our questionnaire, the overwhelming majority of respondents to the 
CSO survey are based in Ulaanbaatar (see annex 6). 
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C. What are the most important sociopolitical or economic issues in Mongolia today?116 
Education       23% 
Health        21% 
National economy     21% 
Unemployment      53% 
Corruption      24% 
Poverty       38% 
Environment        6% 
Other(s)       2% 
 
D. Are public officials concerned about the issues you identified in question C? 
Very concerned about these issues    3% 
Somewhat concerned about these issues   37% 
Little concern for these issues    43% 
Not at all concerned about these issues    14% 
Don’t know       3% 
 
E. Are these issues being effectively addressed by government officials and politicians?  
Very effective in addressing these issues   10% 
Somewhat effective in addressing these issues   20% 
Not very effective in addressing these issues  41% 
Totally ineffective in addressing these issues  18% 
Don’t know      11% 
 
F. What are the greatest political obstacles to addressing economic issues?  
Insufficient financial resources    32% 
Insufficient technical expertise    13% 
Lack of political will     20% 
Political instability      35% 
Political dominance of a single party   14% 
Corruption      36% 
Other         5% 
 
G. If you consider corruption to be a serious political obstacle, which of the following sociopolitical 
and economic factors are the most important sources of corruption? 
Weak political institutions     18% 
Political legacy of the previous socialist regime      6% 
Inadequate anti-corruption laws     42% 
Inadequate access to information about GoM activities 16% 
Low incomes       36% 
Informal economy     22%  
Weak or disempowered CSOs       9%  
Weak or politicized media      7% 
Other         9% 
Corruption is not a serious obstacle    .5% 
 
                                                          
116 For Questions C, F, and G respondents were asked to list up to two issues. Consequently the responses total more than 100 
percent. 
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H. To what degree are the following institutions or sets of actors responsible for reducing the 
corruption of public institutions? 
At least somewhat responsible:  
Prime Minister       81% 
President       79% 
Parliament       76% 
Judiciary       73% 
Political parties       60% 
Local governors      62% 
Local khurals       58% 
The media       71% 
Civil society organizations     54% 
Mongolian citizens      73% 
 
I. What is your level of confidence in the following social and political institutions?  
Confident or very confident: 
Prime Minister       60% 
President       69% 
Parliament       37% 
 Judiciary      24% 
Political parties       14% 
Local governors      31% 
Local khurals       30% 
Media        28% 
Civil society organizations      29% 
 
J. Are coalition governments more likely to improve the government’s performance through 
political consensus or increase corruption through political conspiracy between members of the 
coalition government? 
Improve GoM performance through political consensus    28% 
Increase corruption as result of political conspiracy     33% 
Improve GoM performance in some areas and corruption in others  34% 
Neither improve GoM performance nor increase corruption      5% 
Don’t know         17% 
No response          .8% 
 
K. Are public officials effective in the following areas?   
Effective or very effective: 
Providing access to education     40% 
Insuring the quality of education    23% 
Reducing poverty        7% 
Protecting the environment      8%  
Providing access to natural resources    13% 
Addressing women’s issues     15% 







L. How much influence do citizens have on public officials in the following areas?  
At least some influence: 
Policy making       32% 
Policy implementation      31% 
Legislation and legal reform     20% 
Budget allocations and expenditures    18% 
 
M. Have you ever attempted to influence public officials in any of the following ways?  
At least occasionally 
Write to a public official       7% 
Attend a public hearing      14% 
Meet with a public official     14% 
Participate in call-in radio program with a public official   7% 
Petition a public official or government agency   18% 
Lobby for the passage, reform, or elimination of legislation   3% 
Participate in a demonstration or rally    24%  
 
N. Do you know your representative to: 
The national khural        84% 
The aimag khural          40% 
The soum khural       29% 
 
O. Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections? 
Yes       87% 
No       13% 
No response       .3% 
 
Which party do you support? (optional) 
MPRP       41% 
Motherland-Democratic coalition   37% 
Other party       3% 
No response/missing     20% 
 
P. Do you plan to vote in the upcoming presidential election? 
Yes       92% 
No        4% 
Don’t know       3% 
No response/missing      .9% 
 
 
P1. Which candidate are you supporting? (optional) 
Enkhbayar (MPRP)     36% 
Enkhsaikhan (MDP)     18% 
Erdenebat (Motherland)      3% 
Jargalsaikhan (Republican)    12% 
Don’t know      20% 
No response/missing     12% 
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Q1. How much do you know about civil society organizations in Mongolia?117 
A lot        .3% 
Enough        8% 
A little       51% 
Nothing       41% 
 
Q2. How much influence do civil society organizations have on Mongolian public officials and 
politicians in the following areas? 
At least some influence: 
Policy making         49% 
Policy implementation        47% 
Legislation and legal reform       36% 
Budget allocations and expenditures      25% 
 
R. Are CSOs making an important contribution to Mongolia in the following areas?  
At least some influence: 
Mobilizing resources for their members, constituents, or community  47% 
Organizing social activities for members, constituents, or community  49% 
Providing information to citizens about budget revenues and expenditures 33% 
Monitoring performance of government      34% 
Engaging public in discussion over issues of public concern   49% 
Gathering opinions to communicate to public institutions or officials  44% 
Communicating government positions on issues of public concern  50% 
Assisting government in policy implementation (for example, GoM contracts) 37% 
 
S. How effective are CSOs at addressing the needs of their members or constituents in the follow 
areas?  
 Effective or very effective: 
Representing their political interests       35% 
Promoting their political awareness       36% 
Promoting their political activism       37% 
Representing their economic interests      32% 
Promoting their economic activities      32% 
Promoting their sociocultural interests      36% 
Providing them with a social community     35% 
 
T. Have you personally benefited from the assistance of a CSO in any of the following areas? 
Representing your political interests        5% 
Promoting your political awareness        8% 
Promoting your political activism       14% 
Representing your economic interests       8% 
Promoting your economic activities      11% 
Promoting your sociocultural interests      12% 
Providing you with a social community      11% 
Other            6% 
 
                                                          
117 After testing the survey, Sant Maral discovered a significant number of respondents could not respond to Questions S through 
W. Question 1 was, therefore, added and pollsters were instructed to move on to Question W if respondents indicated that they 
knew nothing about CSOs (41 percent). Consequently, the number of potential respondents for Questions 2 through W was 
reduced from 606 to 355. 
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U. Are most civil society organizations autonomous of public officials and politicians? 
All are autonomous          7% 
Most are autonomous          8% 
Some are autonomous         16% 
Few are autonomous         12% 
None are autonomous         3% 
Don’t know          11% 
  
V. Which of the following are important roles for the Mongolian media to play?  
         Very important: 
Reporting on national events       76% 
 Reporting on local events      67% 
 Informing the public about major issues and debates   72% 
Providing competing views of major issues and debates     60% 
Engaging the public in discussion over issues of public concern   66% 
Communicating government’s positions on issues of public concern  71% 
Reporting on the performance of government institutions and officials  61% 
 Gathering public opinions to communicate to public institutions/officials 70% 
Reporting on international donor activities in Mongolia    62% 
       
W. What types of information in the Mongolian media are important to you?  
Very important: 
Information about government policies       54% 
Information about political debates      45% 
Information about the economy       49% 
Information about civil society organizations and their activities   31% 
Information about international events      33% 
Information about sports and other leisure activities    32% 
X. Are most members of the media autonomous of public officials and politicians? 
All are autonomous          4% 
Most are autonomous         15% 
Some are autonomous         26% 
Few are autonomous         20% 
None are autonomous        10% 
Don’t know          20% 
No response/missing         7% 
 
Y. What is your gender?    
Male     43% 
Female     57% 
 
Z. How old are you?  
< 21       9% 
21-30     24% 
31-40     27% 
41-50     21% 
51-60     12% 




AA. What is your profession? 
Public sector employee   14% 
Small business owner   17% 
Large business owner    .3% 
Private sector employee   19% 
Student      7% 
Housewife    11% 
Unemployed    22% 
Other      9% 
 
BB. Education 
None      .5% 
Primary118    15% 
Secondary    38% 
Vocational    22% 
Higher      25% 
 
CC. Location 
Ulaanbaatar    51% 
Uvorkhangai    17% 
Sukhbaatar    16% 
Khuvsgul    17% 
                                                          
118 Also includes those who did not complete secondary school. 
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Annex 8. Stakeholders’ Map 
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May 3, 2005 
Lawyers’ Center 
for Legal Reform 
(or Just Society0 









TV programs to 
educate on legal 
rights 
 
Legal cases to 
challenge system 
 February 2005 
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Mongolian NGOs Blueprint for 
Development (2000) 
 
Liberty Center Ms. Oyungerel, 
Advisor to PM 
oyunlta@yahoo.com 
www.liberty-center.org  












system with goal 
of systemic 
change: success 
in 20 out of 40 
cases 
Environmental Movements Burst 
as Mongolian Mining Industry 
Booms. http://www.liberty-
center.org/ 
Feb. 15, 2005 
April 27, 2005 
Mamba Datsang 
Monastery 
Mr. Amgalan, Abbot   Focus Group: 
May 3, 2005 
Mining 
Association 
Mr. Alagaa, Head  
mongma@mobinet.mn  
Tel: 976-11-314877  
Fax: 976-11-319563  
Cell: 976-99127929 
 
Mr. P. Ochirbat, 
President  




 May 2, 2005 
 
Focus Group: 




Mr. Bilegsaikhan   Focus Group: 






Mr. D. Manaljav, Head  
Cell: 976-99172152  
 
Mr. M. Mandakh, 





The Manifesto on Local Self-
governance of Mongolia (2001)  
 
 







B. Jadamba, Director 
jadamba@magicnet.mn 
Tel: 976-11-311588 
School of Education 
Studies, Room 29 
Ulaanbaatar-48 
Education   
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President and MP 
erdenesuren@mail.parl.
gov.mn  
Tel: 976-11-266457  
Fax: 976-11-322866  
Cell: 976-99113468 
Education   
Mongolian Bar 
Association 
Ms. Orkhon,  
Desk Officer 
  Focus Group: 






Dr. Dulbaagiin Altai, 




Fax: 976 11-321136 
Room 506, Central 
Building of MPRP 
Women’s wing 
of the MPRP 
though registered 
as an NGO 











P.O. Box 349  
UB 210646-A 













Current Status of ICT Development 
in Mongolia (2003) 
 
Feb. 16, 2005 
 
Focus Group: 




















List of MEA Partner Schools 
 
The Class Monitor: Product and 
Producer of a “Darga Mentality” in 
the Classroom 
 
April 26, 2005 
March 1, 2006 
 
Focus Group: 














Ms. Ariuntsetseg  







May 3, 2003 
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Women  Focus Group: 

























May 3, 2005 
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Ms. D. Enkhjargal, 
Head 
mongolcav@magicnet.
mn www.ncav.org  
Tel: 976-11-329850  
Fax: 976-11-318087 















and the legal 
framework in 
Mongolia 
Violence Against Women and 
Legal Framework in Mongolia 
(2002) 
With TAF, Fact Sheet on Domestic 
Violence (2003) 
 
With Amnesty International, 
Catalogue for Photo Exhibit on 
Gender in Mongolia,  
 
 
April 27, 2005 
March 2, 2006 
 
Focus Groups: 
May 3, 2005 









Women   
Ochirbat 
Foundation 
Mr. P. Ochirbat, Head 
First President of 
Mongolian Republic,  
Former President of the 
Mining Association  
Tel: 976-11-327233  
Cell: 976-99117505  
  May 2, 2005 
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Tel: 976-11-341918 (O) 












- Education of 
population and 
public officials 
- Conducted 8 





MPs, GoM, and 
the President 
- Campaigned to 
get MoNE to 
assess causes of 
river’s 
disappearance 






creation of other 
watershed-based 
CBOs with 
which it is 
currently seeking 
to form a union 
under “Rivers at 
Risk”  
Letter to N. Enkhbayar, Prime 
Minster, April 14 (2002) 
 
Invitation Letter to Director of 
Retona Ink Mongolia Co., Ltd. 
(2002) 
 
Invitation Letter to Mr. Badamdorj, 
Director of Baket Co., Ltd. (2002) 
 
Letter to N. Enkhbayar, Prime 
Minister (2003) 
 
Letter to N. Bagabandi, The 
President of Mongolia and Head of 
National Security Consul, #10 
(2003) 
 
Some facts about the violation of 
laws and regulations by mining 
entities operating in upstreams of 
Khangai mountain range, and by 
national and local policy makers 
 
Letter to N. Enkhbayar Leader of 
MPRP, #46 (2004) 
 
Request letters to N. Enkhbayar, 
Leader of MPRP; M. Enkhsaikhan, 
Leader of MDP; and B. Erdenebat, 
Leader of Mongolian New Socialist 
Party, #46/47/48 (2004)  
 
Request letters to the Head of the 
Citizens’ Representative Khural 
and Governor of Soum (2004) 
 
Introduction letters to the President 
of Mongolia and Standing 
Committees of Parliament (2004) 
 
See Bibliography for additional 
documents produced by ORM 
April 25, 29 
2005; May 2, 




















Ms. P. Erdenejargal, 
Executive Director  
jargal@soros.org.mn , 
www.forum.mn  
Tel: 976-11-313207  
Fax: 976-11-324857  
















Ms. Bayartsetseg, Rule 







- Access to 
justice project  
- NGO legal 
regulation  
- Freedom of 
information 
- Open and 
transparent 
budget 











School 2001, Evaluation Project 
Year 1 (1999) 
 
School 2001, Evaluation Project 
Year 2 (2000) 
Report on Internet for Project Rural 
Schools (2001)  
 
Survey Report 2003, Internet and 
Information Needs of NGOs (2003) 
 
Directory of Mongolian NGOs 
(2003) 
 
Evaluation Report: First Project 
Phase 2000 –2004, Rural School 
Development Project in Mongolia 
(2004) 
 
Striking Balance Between Central 
and Local Government (2005) 









Feb. 18, 2005 
April 28, 2005 
May 3, 2005 
 
Focus Groups: 
May 3, 2005 







Feb. 18, 2005 
April 28, 2005 

































 Feb. 15, 2005 
May 3, 2005, 
Feb. 28, 2006 
 
Focus Group: 









May 3, 2005 
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Teacher of “Journalist” 
College and Deputy 





Tel: 976-11-353476  











Freedom of Information in 
Mongolia: Case Study Report 
(2005) 
 
April 28, 2005 
Feb. 27, 2006 
 
Focus Group: 
March 3, 2006 








- Blood donor 
program funded 
by Govt 
 Feb. 14, 2005 
 


















and is involved 





Feb. 17, 2005 
April 25, 2005 
May 3, 2005 





Mr. Gantumur, Director   
csd@mongolnet.mn  
Tel: 976-11-329607  
Cell: 976-91911926  
  April 26, 2005 
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- Builds capacity 
of associations 
- Attempts to get 















 April 29, 2005 
Tseh Mr. Lamjav, Lawyer  





 May 2, 2005 
Union of Savings 
and Credit 
Unions 
Ms. Munkhtuya   Focus Group: 
May 3, 2005 





Tel/Fax: 976-11-  
315306 
Cell: 976-99113499 








A. Bolat, Deputy Minister of 
Nature &Environment, Request 
letter to D. Odbayar, Governor of 
Dornod Aimag, # 4/1400 (2002) 
 
D. Odbayar, Governor of Dornod 
Aimag, Reply letter to A. Bolat, 
Deputy Minister of N&E, #1/674 
(2002) 
 
N. Ekhbayar, Prime Minister of 
Mongolia, Submission of Proposal 
to S. Tumr-Ochir, Parliament 
Speaker (n.d.) 
 




Ms. Burmaa (also 





Citizen and voter 
education 
 Feb. 18, 2005 
May 2, 2005 
March 1, 2006 
 
Focus Group: 
March 3, 2006 
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Citizen and voter 
education 
Report on Issues of Soum 
Government Budgets (2001) 
Feb 18, 2005 
May 2, 2005 
March 1, 2006 
 
Focus Group: 


















percent of which 
involved citizen 
monitoring 
(see annex 2 for 
list of activities) 
Report on Issues of Soum 
Government Budgets (2001) 
 
April 29, 2005 
March 1, 2006 
 
Focus Group: 




Ms. Bolormaa, Head 
wlfound@magicnet.mn 





 April 26, 2005 




Ms. Chimeg, Director  
wwfmon@magicnet.mn
, chimeg@magicnet.mn 
Tel: 976-11-318447  
Fax: 976-11-310237 
  April 26, 2005 
 
Focus Group:  
May 3, 2005 
Zorig 
Foundation 






Government House 251 
Ulaanbaatar-12  
 














- Supports Globe 
International 
project on media 
transparency 
Final Report on the project 
“Monitoring of the Implementation 
of the Government’s National Anti-
Corruption Program (NACP) in 
Mongolia and the Role of the Open 




Feb 17, 2005 
April 26, 2005 



































Prime Minister Mr. Ulaan,  
Deputy Prime Minister,  










Mr. Enkhbat, PM’s Office 












Manual” for the Local 






























  Feb 15, 2005 
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Mr. B. Erdenesuren, MP 
erdenesuren@mail.parl.gov.mn  
Tel: 976-11-266457  
Fax: 976-11-322866  
Cell: 976-99113468 
Assistant’s Cell: 976-99883222 
 
Mr. Batuul, MP and Leader of 
the Mongolian Democratic Party 
 





Nadine Kreisberger, Advisor 
Nadine@inmongolia.com 
Cell: 99175015 
Government House 251 
Ulaanbaatar-12 
 
D. Idevkhten, MP 
 
M. Sharavdorj, MP 
 
Mr. Damiran, MP and 
Committee Chair 

































Feb. 28, 2006 
 
 











Feb. 27, 2006 
 
Feb. 28, 2006 
 




























Mr. Bayartsogt, State Secretary 
and MP, Chief of Cabinet 
bayartsogt@prime.pmis.gov.mn  
bayartsogt@mail.parl.gov.mn 
Tel: 976-11-263501 or 323501 
Fax: 976-11-315401  
 
Mr. Battuvshin, Local 
Governance Advisor to Cabinet 
Secretariat 
Cell: 976-99117458 






Ms. Ninjbolor, Expert, 
Regulatory Department 
Tel: 976-11304258  
Cell: 976-99094688  
 
Mr. D. Myanganbaatar, Expert 
of Radio Frequency, Regulatory 
and Monitoring Department 
myanganbaatar@crc.gov.mn 
www.crc.gov.mn 
Tel: 976-11-304257  


















Tel: 976-11-264772  
Fax: 976-11-325383 
  April 26, 
2005 













P.O. Box 785 
Central Post Office 
Sq. Sukhbaatar-1 
Ulaanbaatar-13    211213 
 
Mr. R. Ganbold, Director 
General of Policy and Planning 


















Feb. 29, 2006 
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Mr. Lu Bold, Chair  
Tel: 976-11-263707 
 
Assistant’s Tel: 976-11-263701  










Fax: 976-11-260613      
Government Building 3, Room # 
110  
Ulaanbaatar 









Mr. Khurelbaatar, State 
Secretary and creator of Open 
Government Web site, Chair of 
National Council for Millennium 
Challenge Account 






E. Namjildorj,  
General Director of Economic 
Policy Department  
 Law on Public Sector 
Management and 
Finance (2002). 














Ministry of Justice 
and Home Affairs    
 
Mr. Tserendorj, State Secretary 
 
T. Altangerel, Head, Foreign 
Relations and Cooperation 
Division 
Tel: 976-11327700 or 325225 






Ministry of Nature 
and Environment 
(MoNE) 
Mr. Adiya, State Secretary  
Tel: 976-11-326595 
 
Mr. B. Bayasgalan, Director, 
Department of Sustainable 
Development and Environment  
bayasaa35@hotmail.com 
olonlog@mongol.net  
Tel: 976-11-326616 or 976-11-
264166  
Fax: 976-11-321401  
Cell: 976-91910091 
Environment Letter to Ts. 
Munkbayar, Head of 
ORM. Reply letter, 
#4/2130, October 10 
(2002) 
May 2, 2005 
Feb. 29, 2006 
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Tel: 976-11-329758  
Fax: 976-11-311798  
Cell: 976-99114609  
 
Baigalmaa, Assistant  
Tel: 976-11-312346 
Cell: 976-99199593 
  May 2, 2005 





Mr. Javzmaa, Chairman 
Tel: 976-11-264653 
 




Hulan, Manager    
Tel: 976-11-319603  
 




Mr. N. Enkhbold, Chairman 
enkhbold@spc.gov.mn 
Tel: 976-11-312460 






Mr. S. Tserendorj, Chief,  
s.tserendorj@nhrc-mn.org 
Tel: 976-11-320284   
Fax: 976-11320284 






Tel: 976-51-266717 (O) 
Tel: 976-11-366547 (H) 
Fax: 976-11-262971 
Room 503 Government Building 
11, Liberty Square,  
Ulaanbaatar-38 
 
Ms. G. Zoljargal, Public Affairs 
Officer  
g.zoljargal@nhrc-mn.org  
Cell: 976-9159794  
Human rights  Human Rights and 
Freedoms in Mongolia: 
Status Report 2003 
 
Human Rights and 
Freedoms in Mongolia: 
Status Report 2004 

































D. Orosoo, Researcher   
Tel: 976-11-315734  
Cell: 976-99193620 
 
Dr. Dorjdamba Zumberellkahm, 
Head of Sector for 
Criminological Research  
Tel: 976-11460997  
Ulaanbaatar-46 
 Assessment of the 










Regulation on visiting 
parliament (2004) 
 






Committee on  
Education, Culture 
and Science 
Mr. B. Erdenesuren, MP and 
Chairman 
erdenesuren@mail.parl.gov.mn  
Tel: 976-11-266457  
Fax: 976-11-322866  








Secretariat of Khural 
Tel: 976-01322-22354 
 
 Report on the 
investigation on legality 
of the resolution issued 








Baasan Tsognyam, Chief Justice   April 25, 
2005 
UB School # 2 Mr. Yadamsuren, Director of 
School # 2, Principal 
  May 2, 2005 
Uyanga Soum, 
Uvorkhangai 
Mr Mishigdorj, Soum Governor 
 




Mr. Dorjsuren, State 
Environment Inspector at 
Uyanga Soum 
Mr. Ganhugel, School Principal 
 
Ms. Tungalag, Social Worker 
 
Mr. Tungalag and Bold, Parent 
Representative Council, Schools 
#1 and #2, Uyanga Soum  
  April 28 and 
29, 2005 
May 5, 2005 
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Eagle TV  
      
Mr. Tom Terry, General 
Director 
tom@eagletvmongolia.com  
Tel: 976-11-457431  
Cell: 976-99113967   
 Media  April 25, 
2005 
Inforum NGO Mr. B. Lutaa, Director and 
Editor of Info newspaper and 
New Times online magazine 











and Strategy NGO 
 




Tel/Fax: 976-11-324632  
Cell: 976-99116632 











P.O. Box 365 
Huvisgalyn Zam-3 
Ulaanbaatar-11  
Media   
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Mr. Batzorig Tuvshintugs, Head 
of Foreign Relations 
batzorig@fastmail.fm 
Tel: 967-11-326663 






Mr. Nyamaa Tungalag, Director, 
Financial Department  
Tel/Fax: 976-11-327257 
 
Mr. Myagmar, Executive 
Director of PRTV 
323801 
mrtv@magicnet.mn  
Media Budget of Public 
Service Broadcasting 
(2004 and 2005) 
 





























Feb. 28, 2006 
Steel Pen Rural 
Newspaper 
Association 
Mr. Lhvagasuren, Director    





   
TV 25 Mr. Altai, Executive Director 
and journalist  
Tel: 976-91197913 or 976-
11330796 or 9919123 or 
95258625 
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UB Post Ms. Bulganaa   Focus 
Group : 
May 3, 2005 
Wind FM 104.5  
  




Fax: 976-11-461212  








Mr. Barry J. Hitchcock, Country 
Director  
The Honorable N. Altanhuyag, 
Minister of Finance, Governor 
for Mongolia, ADB  
adbmnrm@adb.org  
http://www.adb.org/MNRM/ 
Tel/Fax: 976 11 313 440/323507
Fax: 976 11 311 795 




Ms. Tsagaach, Education Expert 
of Public Administration Reform 
Program 
tsagaach@magicnet.mn  
Tel: 976-11-260325.  
Fax: 976-11-329877 
 
 See Bibliography April 26, 
2005 
AusAid www.ausaid.gov.au     
Canada Fund www.acdi-cida.gc.ca    
Danida Tel: 976-11-361299 
Fax: 976-11-361245 
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* social audit 






















Report on “NGOs 
Needs Assessment 
Study in China, 
Mongolia, and ROK” 
(1999) 
 
Survey Report on 
“NGO- Implemented 
Assistance in Social 
Sector in Mongolia” 
(2000) 


























Tel: 976-1-312185, 312183, 
312197 
312201, 312213, 312217 
Fax: 976-1-327313  
 
Youth   





























































Education  May 4, 2005 
Asia Foundation Mr. T. Layton Croft, Country 
Rep (through May 2005) 
William Foerderer Infante, 




Tel: 976-11-330-524, 323-413 
Fax: 976-11-311-497 
UN Street 18 
P.O. Box 1003 
UlaanBaatar-13 
210613 









Development   
Konrad 
Foundation 






Erhuugiin Gudamj 5 
P.O. Box 337 
Ulaanbaatar 210620 
 




Tel: 976-11-350-544, 350-546 
Fax: 976-11-350-542 
Cell: 976-99094082 
Erchuugiin Gudamj 5 





media, and civil 
society 
 Feb. 18, 2005 
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Mr. Sean Granville-Ross, 









P.O. Box 761 
Ulaanbaatar-49 
 



























Manual Results for 
“My Aimag 2005: A 
Management 







in Advocacy for NGOs 
2005) 
 
Feb. 14, 2005 





















Mr. Steven Buxt, Senior 
Technical Advisor- Information 
for Development  
stevan@gob.initiatine.org.mn  
Tel: 976-11-460901  
Fax: 976-11-461048  
Cell: 976-99119618 
 
Mr. Ganhuyag, Editor-in-Chief 
www.pactworld.org , 
www.rbn.mn  




 April 26 and 
May 4, 2005 
Save the Children 
 





Tel: 976-11-329371, 329365  
Fax: 976-11-329361 
Development 





















World Bank Mr. Saha D. Meyanathan, 







Ms. B. Oyunbileg, Consultant 




Mr. D. Bayartsogt, Rural 
Development Operations Officer 
dbayartsogt@worldbank.org  
Development See Bibliography 
 
 
May 5, 2005 
Feb. 28, 2006 
World Vision Mr. Warren Ferdinandus, 
Country Representative 
Tel: 976-11-345323, 345464 
Fax: 976-11-345322 
warren_ferdinandus@wvi.org  







Mr. D. Tserendorj, Director of 
School of Public Administration, 
Former Head of “Good 
Governance” UNDP project  
mmatsfl@magicnet.mn  
Tel: 976-11-342152  
Fax: 976-11-343037 
Cell: 976-99115825  
 
P. Darisuren, Professor  
Tel: 976-11-342190  
Fax: 976-11-343037 
   
Ms. Otgontuya, Professor 
Tel: 976-11-342190  










Dr. S. Narangerel, Director, 
School of Law 
 
Ms. Selengee, Director, 
Global Consensus  
Education A Micro Study of 
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